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Thesis Abstract  
 
This thesis is intended to be part of a vigorous debate currently going on in the 
international community of exchange rate regime, monetary policy and related core 
issues in East Asian economies. From different angles and aspects, this thesis 
contributes to the related literature, and provides fresh theoretical arguments and 
comprehensive study on the exchange rate regime and exchange rate performance in 
East Asia. 
 
This thesis firstly investigates the performance and characteristics of exchange rate 
regimes in a group of East Asian economies during the 1990s. The determination of 
local currency, the flexibility of exchange rate regime, as well as the regional 
coordination of exchange rate management have been thoroughly examined. This thesis 
then considers the implications of exchange rate regimes on the monetary policy. It 
examines whether the adoption of new exchange rate regime has affected monetary 
autonomy, concerning the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest 
rates under different currency regimes, from the cases of the selected East Asian 
economies during 1994-2004. One of the aspects of the choices of exchange rate regime 
is its implications for the magnitude of exchange rate volatility and the transmission of 
this volatility into other countries in the region. This thesis thus carries out an empirical 
investigation on the exchange rate volatility and cross-country contagion/spillover effect 
within foreign exchange markets for a group of East Asian countries in the context of 
the 1997/98 financial crisis. In addition, this thesis provides an investigation on the 
measurement of foreign exchange market pressure and currency crisis proneness, as 
well as examines interrelations between exchange market pressure and monetary policy. 
The post-crisis interactions among EMP, domestic credit growth, and the interest rate 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates, in particular, have been 
investigated for a representative group of East Asian countries. Finally, this thesis 
provides further evidence on the relationship between stock prices and exchange rates, 
from the typical case of Hong Kong, to realise what kind of causality prevailed over the 
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period 1995-2001. Based on the high frequency weekly data, both long-run and 
short-run dynamics between stock prices and exchange rates in Hong Kong are 
addressed. 
 
Various forms of evidence and empirical techniques are extensively applied and fully 
evaluated for the specific questions addressed in this research. These practical 
methodologies include Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Generalised Method of 
Movements (GMM), Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH), Exponential GARCH (EGARCH), Vector Autoregressions (VAR) and their 
Impulse Response Functions (IRF), Unit Root Tests, Cointegration, and Granger 
Causality Tests. All kinds of data sets and sample periods employed in this research 
provide an interesting comparison to the existing related studies.  
 
The main findings and key ideas drawn from this research have important implications 
for policy markers on the exchange rate management. The study on specific research 
topics and the comprehensive and thorough applications of various econometric 
methodologies provide valuable insight in characteristics and patterns of East Asian 
foreign exchange markets.  
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Chapter 1  
General Thesis Introduction 
 
1. 1 Background and Motivation of Research    
 
With the development of increasing integration in global financial markets and the 
growth in the international trade and financial liberalisation, the emerging East Asian 
economies have attracted enormous attention from both economists and policy markers. 
The 1997/98 financial crisis, in particular, has raised a number of theoretical issues and 
puzzles, among which are the questions such as what the characteristics of the East 
Asian exchange rates are, and what the appropriate exchange rate regime for the small 
and open emerging economies is. The long lasting debate with respect to the exchange 
rate management is typically framed in terms of the trade-off between credibility and 
flexibility, while the recent arguments switch attention to the preference of corner 
solutions (the “hard peg” or the “free float”) and intermediate regimes such as limited 
flexibility, crawling bands, target zones, basket pegs and managed floating. Regarding 
the East Asian experiences, it is widely accepted that most East Asian currencies 
maintained de facto pegs to the U.S. dollar in the pre-crisis period. Such de facto pegs to 
the U.S. dollar sometimes destabilised the real effective exchange rates of these 
currencies and this pegged regime is universally recognised as one of the causes of the 
crisis in the East Asian countries. Several economists have, thus, proposed the 
desirability of intermediate exchange rate regimes in East Asia that might stabilise their 
effective exchange rates (Bénassy-Quéré, 1999a; Williamson, 1999, 2000; Rajan, 2002). 
The “bipolar” or “two-corner solution” view of exchange rates, in contrast, states that 
intermediate exchange rate regimes between hard and floating pegs are not sustainable 
(Fischer, 2001). Moreover, the “fear of floating” view proposed by several studies 
suggests that only a short time after the crisis, the exchange rate regimes of East Asian 
economies have in fact returned to their previous fixed regimes, despite the fact that 
their official exchange rates were officially declared to be flexible (McKinnon, 2000; 
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Hernández and Montiel, 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). The hypothesis of “fear of 
floating” further argues that “two-corner solution” is realistic for many emerging 
economies (Hausmann et al., 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  
 
Based on the intensified debates and prevailing thoughts on the choice of optimum 
exchange rate regimes for most Asian countries, a question regarding evaluation of the 
post-crisis exchange rate polices in East Asia arises: is the pre-crisis U.S. dollar standard 
still dominating the exchange rate policies, or has another path been followed by East 
Asian countries after learning a lesson from the crisis? Moreover, recent studies have 
acknowledged the fact that the declared exchange rate policies in some East Asian 
economies do not match the actually implemented policies in practice, implying an 
evident gap between the de jure and de facto exchange rates in many East Asian 
countries. Hence, identifying the actual operation of exchange rate arrangements based 
on observed outcomes for exchange rates and other variables, and empirically detecting 
the flexibility of exchange rate regime in the transition period, are a crucial topic that 
this research tackles.  
 
In the context of the debate on the appropriate currency regime in East Asia, the impact 
of exchange rate regimes on the independence of monetary policy is highlighted after 
the 1997/98 currency crisis. In theory, with a pegged exchange rate under free capital 
movements, monetary policy is committed to the single goal of maintaining the 
exchange rate at its officially announced level. The domestic interest rates cannot be set 
independently. On the other hand, under a flexible exchange rate arrangement, the 
domestic interest rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates, 
if other things equal. Changes in the exchange rates would absorb the shocks of 
international interest rate and thereby provide “insulation” for domestic interest rates. 
Countries with intermediate regime should also display less sensitivity to international 
interest rates than countries with firm pegs. Nevertheless, the recent prevailing thoughts 
such as “fear of floating” argue that countries with de jure flexible regimes do not allow 
their exchange rates to move freely (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Frankel et al. (2002) 
further point that factors such as lack of credibility, exchange rate pass-through, as well 
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as foreign-currency liabilities prevent countries from adopting an independent monetary 
policy no matter what their announced regimes are. Some researchers (for example, 
Shambaugh, 2004) also point out most countries that have liberalised their capital flows 
or are in the process of doing so and few countries have monetary freedom in today’s 
world. Thus a tight connection to relevant base economy is witnessed by most countries 
and there would be no difference between pegged and non-pegged countries under this 
scenario.  
 
In the case of East Asia, one of the distinctive characteristics is that the exchange rate 
regimes adopted by East Asian countries have varied significantly in the wake of the 
1997/98 financial crisis. The diversified exchange rate regimes in the Asian region can 
be detected from the form of a hard peg currency board arrangement to the case of free 
floating system. Hence, the experience from East Asian emerging countries poses an 
interesting research question: Has the adoption of new exchange regime in the 
post-crisis period affected monetary autonomy? If so, how do the local interest rates 
react to international interest rates (U.S. interest rates) in the pre- and post-crisis periods? 
Do the traditional view and prediction theory regarding the currency regimes and 
monetary autonomy still hold for East Asian economies? All of these considerations 
drive us to carry out a statistical examination on the impact of exchange rate regimes on 
the independence of monetary policy. Specifically, this research attempts to address this 
issue through investigating the sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international 
interest rates under different currency regimes adopted before and after the 1997/98 
financial crisis. 
 
To evaluate a given exchange rate regime, we may consider its ability to face periodic 
and potentially contagious financial crises. East Asia provides a fruitful laboratory to 
study the event of financial crisis and the accompanied transition in exchange rate 
regimes. In fact, the experience from East Asia (1997), Latin America (1994) and 
Russia (1998) are typical examples of financial market collapses in the 1990s. One 
distinct characteristic of these incidents is that the crisis quickly spreads from one 
market to the entire or even other regions. Thus there is a growing concern among 
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researchers and policy markers to investigate the causes and effects of such crises. Most 
of the earlier research, in general, aims to identify the linkages and transmission 
mechanisms across countries. In particular, the strong trade linkages and 
macroeconomic similarities have been proved by several theoretical researches as major 
sources to spread the crisis (Eichengreen et al., 1996, Glick and Rose, 1999; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; and Ahluwalia, 2000). 
More recent studies on the transmission mechanisms make a distinct difference between 
tranquil periods and crisis periods and attempt to investigate normal interdependence or 
spillover effect and contagion of financial crisis.   
 
Motivated by the crisis study, another focus of this research is to expand the existing 
research by looking into the presence of volatility transmission effect in the foreign 
exchange market, which has, in contrast to stock and bond markets contagion/spillover, 
still received limited attention. For the case of East Asia, most existing literature mainly 
examines the transmission mechanism from the origin of the crisis, i.e. Thailand, to 
other regional countries. Differently from the previous work, this study conducts an 
empirically examination on whether volatility of one exchange rate market is 
transmitted to others in some way, and if so, to what extent this volatility 
contagion/spillover effect works during the crisis or tranquil period. From the 
perspective of volatility transmission analysis, the patterns of linkages among regional 
foreign exchange markets can be recognised accordingly. The findings would help 
policy markers to deign appropriate polices in case an adverse shock is observed in one 
foreign exchange market where the volatility contagion/spillover effect is empirically 
evident. 
 
Motivated by recent debate, this research also tackles the issues of monetary policy 
regarding the experience of crisis-affected Asian countries in the 1997/98 financial 
collapse. Existing literature mainly focused on addressing the following questions: Was 
the monetary policy too tight or too loose before and after the crisis? Could a tight 
monetary policy (especially with higher interest rates) have successfully defended the 
exchange rates? The traditional view suggests that tighter monetary policy, as 
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implemented through lower domestic credit growth or higher interest rates, should in 
principle help strengthen a currency whether this is reflected in the exchange rate, in 
additional to foreign reserves, or both. Nevertheless, a “revisionist” view proposes that 
raising interest rates could actually exacerbate the currency deprecation and a “Laffer 
curve” could be found, following which contractionary monetary policy induces a panic 
among investors and a loss of a currency’s value (see, Corsetti et al., 1998; Furman and 
Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 1998a, 1998b; Pakko, 2000). Also a fiscal-based 
theory, in which higher interest rates mean a higher burden on the public sector, implies 
that the currency would not strengthen without a corresponding adjustment of the 
primary surplus (Flood and Jeanne, 2000; Lahiri and Vegh, 2000, 2001). 
 
More and more attention from both academic and political worlds has also been drawn 
to the development of the exchange rate and the actions of the monetary authorities, 
leading to a growing concern over the pressure of exchange market as well as the degree 
of foreign exchange management. Measuring the speculative pressure of currency and 
countries susceptibility to crisis becomes one of centered issues. On the other hand, 
there is no consensus on the appropriate reaction of monetary policy to the pressures on 
the domestic currency in literature. The 1997/98 financial crisis has prompted a handful 
of countries (for instance, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand) in the East Asian 
region to explicitly or implicitly alter their monetary policies in addition to their 
exchange rate policies. In these countries, exchange rate regime has been switched from 
a “rigid” one to a more flexible one, and the monetary policy has been fashioned around 
an inflation objective, that is, inflation targeting regimes. In the existing literature, little 
has been done to emphasise the interactions between monetary policy and currency 
pressure on the post-crisis East Asia. It is, then, important to draw out policy lessons 
learned from episodes such as the Asian financial crisis and to examine whether and by 
how much, monetary policy responds to the exchange market pressure under more 
flexible exchange rate and inflation-targeting regimes adopted by East Asian countries 
after the crisis.  
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In addition, a distinct feature of the 1997/98 financial crisis was the almost 
simultaneous decline in asset prices and currencies, leading to the turmoil in both stock 
and currency markets in a group of Asian countries. This motivates us to dwell on the 
relationship between stock markets and exchange rate or currency market. When 
investigating the possible relationship between stock markets and exchange rate or 
currency market, the main concern is usually over the direction of causality between the 
said variables. However, the literature of this field are far from reaching any consensus 
on the interactions between stock markets and foreign exchange markets, specifically, 
on the direction or a particular sign of the relationship: for instance, the traditional 
approach (“flow oriented” models) suggests that exchange rates lead stock prices with 
arbitrary correlation. In contrast, the proponents of portfolio approach represented by 
the “stock oriented” models argues that stock prices lead exchange rates with negative 
correlation.  
 
In fact, understanding the dynamic links between stock and foreign exchange markets 
has important policy implications. Theoretically, the relationship between asset prices is 
an important input to open macroeconomic models as well as international portfolio 
diversification and hedging models. Practically, establishing the relationship between 
these two variables provides informative implication for investors in their search of 
diversification opportunities and for the hedging of their investment strategy. It also 
would be necessary for economic and financial policymakers and regulators to know the 
interaction between exchange rates and stock markets if they are to formulate the 
appropriate polices (for example, to predict and prevent the crisis). It is thus advisable 
to carry out further tests and analysis of these issues on the particular market interested. 
Hence, this research provides further evidence on the relationship between stock prices 
and exchange rates, from the particular case of Hong Kong market, to realise what kind 
of causality prevailed over the period 1995-2001. We select Hong Kong as a case study 
for three reasons: First, being the second largest stock market in Asia, exceeded only by 
Japan, Hong Kong plays a significant role as a major international financial center and 
is characterised by its high degree of internationalisation, free trade and flow, and 
information financial network. Second, the exchange rate regime adopted in Hong Kong 
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is quite unique: with currency board arrangement (CBA), Hong Kong fixes its nominal 
exchange rate against U.S. dollar at a specific level. Third, the Hong Kong dollar has 
remained remarkably stable under the anchor of the linked exchange rate, while many 
other currencies in the region have all suffered sharp depreciation over the financial 
crisis. Hence, we can infer that the Hong Kong experience differs from that of most 
Asian economies, offering a particularly interesting opportunity to investigate the 
long-run and short-run causal relationship between stock prices and exchange rates.  
 
1.2 Objectives of Research  
 
Overall, the East Asian experience offered a fruitful laboratory to examine the above 
mentioned research issues. This thesis intends to be an important and significant part of 
a vigorous debate currently going on in the international community about exchange 
rate regime, monetary policy and related issues in East Asian emerging countries. In 
particular, this thesis contributes to the literature in East Asian economies by providing 
a solid empirical analysis, fresh theoretical arguments, and a better understanding in the 
exchange rate regime and exchange rate behaviour in East Asian countries/regions. The 
main research questions are identified to guide the overall research. They are: How to 
evaluate exchange rate regime and exchange rate performance in East Asia over the last 
few years? What are the recent trends of Asian currencies, especially after the crisis? 
What are the implications for the East Asian exchange rate management and policy?  
 
The main research questions can be developed into the following five sets of sub-topics 
with their corresponding research questions addressed by the five empirical chapters, 
respectively: 
1. Exchange rate regimes of East Asia: performance and characteristics before and after 
the 1997/98 financial crisis 
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¾ How much influence did international anchor currencies such as U.S. dollar, 
Japanese yen and Euro/Deutsche mark have on the local East Asian currencies 
before and after the crisis? 
¾ Has the flexibility of exchange rate regime increased after the crisis compared to 
the pre-crisis period? 
¾ Has the regional exchange rate coordination strengthened in the post-crisis period? 
2. Exchange rate regimes and monetary independence: the transmission of interest rates 
in East Asia 
¾ Has the adoption of new exchange regime in the post-crisis period affected 
monetary autonomy? If so, how did the local interest rates react to international 
interest rates (U.S. interest rates) in the pre- and post-crisis periods?  
 
¾ Do the traditional view and the prediction theory regarding the currency regimes 
and monetary autonomy still hold for East Asian economies?  
3. Exchange rate volatility and its contagion/spillover effect from the evidence of East 
Asia 
¾ Did volatility of one exchange rate market transmit to others in some way? If so, to 
what extent this volatility contagion/spillover effect worked during the crisis or 
tranquil period? 
4. Exchange market pressure (EMP) and monetary policy in the post-crisis East Asia  
 
¾ How to measure the tensions (pressure) on the foreign exchange market and 
countries susceptibility to crisis? 
 
¾ What is the relationship between EMP and monetary policy, especially for the 
post-crisis East Asia? How did monetary policy affect EMP? What was the reaction 
of monetary policy to EMP?   
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5. The interaction between stock prices and exchange rates: Evidence from Hong Kong 
 
¾ Are there any dynamic long-run and short-run relationships between stock prices 
and exchange rates?  
 
¾ What is the direction of causality between the two variables? Does stock price 
affect exchange rate or the other way around? 
 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of five empirical papers (or chapters) on different aspects of 
exchange rate regimes and exchange rate behaviour of East Asian economies. The 
following structure is adopted: 
 
Chapter 1 is a general introduction to the whole thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 begins by briefly reviewing the theoretical choice of exchange rate regime 
from optimum currency area theory, impossible trinity theory, and currency crisis theory. 
It also provides a critical assessment on the prevailing thoughts and arguments put 
forward for East Asian countries regarding the desirable exchange rate regimes. Then 
this chapter conducts an empirical investigation on the exchange rate arrangements of 
East Asian countries over 1990s. The related analysis is conducted on the data gathered 
during a longer period that spans from 1990 to 2005 which fully captures the possible 
change of exchange rate regimes in the pre-crisis, mid-crisis and post-crisis periods. The 
study considers determinants of exchange rates under a currency basket of U.S. dollar, 
Japanese yen and Euro/Deutsche mark as international anchor currencies for East Asian 
countries’ exchange rate stabilisation. We then compare the degree of influence of U.S. 
dollar and Japanese yen and Euro/Deutsche mark on the local currency during the 
pre-crisis period with that during the post-crisis period. Additional robustness tests of 
related hypotheses are performed. By constructing a flexibility index, this study also 
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explores whether the flexibility of exchange rate regime has increased since the 
pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period.  
 
Regarding the debate on the feasibility of regional monetary arrangement, Chapter 2 
also tests whether a regional coordination of exchange rate has been strengthened in the 
post-crisis period. Previous studies mainly examined the possibility of an optimum 
currency area by reviewing the evidence of trade patterns, economic shock, factor 
mobility and monetary transmission mechanism. Despite the arguments being made for 
optimum currency area or monetary union within Asia, there seems to be relative little 
discussion of the need for exchange rate coordination. This thesis attempts to 
materialise regional coordination in exchange rate management, carrying out Granger 
causality tests on the bilateral relations among regional currency values to compare the 
causal effect between possible pairs of any two currencies under the studies on the 
pre-and post-crisis periods, respectively. 
 
The impact of the exchange rate regimes on the monetary policy independence is an 
important question in the context of the debate on the choice of currency regimes. Due 
to the fact that exchange rate regimes adopted by the East Asian countries in the wake 
of the regional crisis have varied significantly, Chapter 3 mainly examines the influence 
of exchange rate regime on the monetary independence in East Asian economies before 
and after the 1997/98 currency crisis. Specifically, this chapter examines whether the 
adoption of new exchange rate regime has affected monetary autonomy, concerning the 
sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest rates under different 
currency regimes, for the selected East Asian economies during 1994-2004. In principle, 
under floating regimes, changes in the exchange rates would absorb the shocks of 
international interest rate and thereby provide “insulation” for domestic interest rates. 
Hence, for a given degree of capital mobility, we would expect the sensitivity of local 
interest rates to international base rates increases with the rigidity of the exchange rate 
regime. This study takes the short term interest rate as a measure of monetary policy 
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and assumes that autonomy can be measured by movements in these rates1. The link 
between local interest rates of eight East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) to foreign interest rates 
(U.S. interest rates) under different currency regimes will be examined accordingly.  
 
Chapter 3 extends the literature in three ways: First, most of previous studies mainly 
relay on the official or de jure classification of exchange rate regime. Considering the 
classification of exchange rate regime might be sensitive to empirical results, our study 
in Chapter 3 employs the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) coding as an alternative (de facto) 
classification to test the robustness of results. Second, large data set and long time 
period are used in this chapter, for which results are compared with the existing related 
studies. The choice of the sample period depends on the possibility of contrasting 
alternative exchange rate regimes. Third, the Generalised Method of Movements (GMM) 
technique is adopted to capture the methodological issues such as endogeneity of 
international interest rate shocks as well as heteroskedasticity of unknown form in the 
disturbance terms.  
 
One aspect of the choices of exchange rate regime is its implications for the magnitude 
of exchange rate volatility and the transmission of this volatility into the other countries 
in region. Chapter 4 provides an empirical investigation on the exchange rate volatility 
and cross-country contagion/spillover effect within foreign exchange markets for a 
group of East Asian countries in the context of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis and the 
period afterwards. This chapter begins with a brief review of the theoretical perspective 
on financial market contagion as well as the empirical measurement on the contagion. 
Then it employs domestic currencies as an indicator to identify the presence of 
contagion in the foreign exchange markets from the viewpoint of volatility 
transmission. 
 
The GARCH-typed models which explicitly consider conditional volatility in the time 
series data are adopted in this study to overcome the assumption of constant variance 
 
1 Short term interest rates are taken into account since these are the most relevant for monetary policy. 
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that made by most of the previous studies in literature. To be specific, using the 
gathered high frequency data, the volatility of seven foreign exchange markets in East 
Asia has been modelled in the frameworks of GARCH (p, q) for both crisis and tranquil 
periods. As an alternate estimation, the EGARCH (p, q) model is applied to capture the 
possible size effect, sign effect and persistence effects on the volatility of exchange rates 
dynamic. In order to identify the presence of volatility contagion, a particular interest of 
Chapter 4 is to look into the possible volatility transmission from Korea, a 
crisis-affected market, to other regional exchange markets during the crisis period. This 
chapter also pays specific attention to the possible volatility spillover from Hong Kong 
to other regional markets over the tranquil period. In doing this, an extension of 
GARCH (p, q) model that includes an exogenous regressor in the conditional variance 
is employed to address the problem. Creating more insights into the volatility of foreign 
exchange market would be informative for recognising the nature and linkage of 
financial markets. Any possible evidence of volatility transmission within regional 
exchange rate markets would support the argument of contagion/spillover effect.  
 
Contributing to the considerable debate regarding the issues of exchange rate and 
monetary policy, Chapter 5 not only attempts to measure foreign exchange market 
pressure and currency crisis proneness, but also investigates the interactions between 
exchange market pressure (EMP) and monetary policy for five East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Rather than focusing on 
exchange rate movements alone as most previous empirical studies did, our study uses 
EMP to gauge the strength of the domestic currency in order to capture tensions on the 
currency and degree of exchange rate management from monetary authorities. Firstly, 
we especially compare and evaluate two model-independent EMP indices as measures 
of currency crisis proneness. Secondly, extending the existing literature, most of which 
merely focus on East Asian countries prior to or during the crisis, we attempt to explore 
the relationship between exchange market situation and monetary policy stance, 
especially for the post-crisis period that has not been mainly taken into account in 
previous studies. The vector autoregresson (VAR) approach and impulse response 
function as well as Granger causality test are employed in this chapter to capture the 
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interaction among three variables: EMP, domestic credit growth and interest rate 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. This framework not only shows 
the response of EMP to the monetary policy shocks, but also yields a policy reaction 
function that captures the effects of lagged innovations in both EMP and the interest 
differential on domestic credit growth. The analysis of this study provides further 
evidence of monetary policy responses to pressures on currency in the post-crisis or 
recent East Asia where more flexible exchange rate and inflation-targeting regimes have 
been prevailed.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the issue of the relationship between stock prices and exchange 
rates. The literature in general provides evidence in the joint determination between the 
both markets. Nevertheless, there is no theoretical consensus on the direction of 
causality relationship: does stock price affect exchange rate or the other way around?  
Against this background, Chapter 6 provides further evidence on the relationship 
between stock prices and exchange rates, from the particular case of Hong Kong asset 
markets, to realise what kind of causality prevailed over the period from 1995 to 2001. 
Based on the high frequency weekly data, both long-run and short-run dynamics 
between stock prices and exchange rates in Hong Kong are addressed. 
 
Compared to previous work, Chapter 6 applies a full set of empirical methodologies to 
investigate the relationship between both markets. The stationarity property of data has 
been firstly addressed by conducting a set of robust unit root tests. The conventional 
unit root tests that most previous studies extensively applied ignore the possibility of 
structure break, particularly during a period when major event happens, such as a 
financial crisis. In this case, the conventional unit root tests could be unreliable. 
Therefore, our analysis takes unit root tests with structural break into account to avoid 
possible erroneous results. The long-run relationship between stock prices and exchange 
rates are explored by employing both Engle-Granger two-step method and Johansen 
cointegration procedure. The Granger causality tests in the setting of the vector 
autoregressive (VAR) together with the impulse response (IR) function are adopted in 
this study to examine the short-run causal relationship between two variables. This 
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study further explores the relative importance of each variable in forecasting the other. 
In addition, most previous studies have been conducted under periods where the stock 
markets are operating under normal conditions. It would be important and interesting to 
consider situations where asset markets such as the foreign exchange and equity 
markets are under stress given that the frequent occurrence of such scenarios in 
financial markets history. Therefore, our study provides a fully examination of the 
relationship between exchange rates and stock prices during normal and stressful 
conditions. The results of this investigation have implications in terms of policy and in 
terms of hedging of portfolios for Hong Kong financial market. 
 
Chapter 7 summarises the main findings and contributions of this research. Some policy 
implications and areas for future research are also identified in this part.  
 
The following chapters contain a more detailed description of the material covered in 
this general introduction.  
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Chapter 2  
Exchange Rate Regimes of East Asia: Performance and 
Characteristics Before and After the 1997/98 Financial 
Crisis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Exchange rate management is one of the core issues of macroeconomic policies. There 
has been a long history of debate over the advantages of fixed versus floating exchange 
rate regimes. Such debate is typically framed in terms of the trade-off between 
credibility and flexibility (Taguchi, 2004). The conventional view suggests that a fixed 
exchange rate regime can reduce exchange rate volatility and provide a credible anchor 
for monetary policy. Alternatively, a flexible exchange rate allows for more independent 
monetary policy. The recent debates pay attention to the preference of intermediate 
regimes such as crawling, target zones and basket pegs or the corner solutions with the 
“hard peg” or the “free float”. However, no consensus has been reached so far. As the 
debates go further, some prevailing thoughts over the exchange rate regimes have been 
proposed. One hypothesis is the “two-corner solution” which involves opting either full 
flexibility or rigid commitments to fixed exchanges (Eichengreen, 1994). According to 
this hypothesis, the intermediate exchange rate regimes are no longer feasible and are 
going to disappear. Moreover, as another prevailing concept, the hypothesis of “fear of 
floating” has pointed out that the countries in lack of credibility do not do exactly what 
they say (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Such view leads to the speculation that the 
emerging economies are likely to move towards hard pegs rather than floats.  
 
In particular, the attention in exchange rate management in East Asian countries has 
been refocused after the 1997/98 financial crisis. How to characterise the exchange rate 
regimes in East Asian economies remains a research topic of considerable discussion. 
Regarding this, debates on the choice of optimum exchange rate regimes have been 
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intensified accordingly. The pre-crisis U.S. dollar pegged regime is widely deemed as 
one of the causes of the crisis. Then following doubts concerning the post-crisis 
exchange rate polices in East Asian countries arise: are the East Asian countries retuning 
to the pre-crisis U.S. dollar standard, or have they learned a lesson from the crisis and 
found another path to follow?  
 
Recent literature has confirmed the gap between de jure and de facto exchange rate 
policies conducted in several countries. Empirical studies thereby began to examine the 
actual operation of exchange rate arrangements in emerging markets, through observing 
the actual performance of exchange rates and other variables such as foreign exchange 
reserves and interest rates (Hernández and Montiel, 2001). In particular, the actual 
behaviour of exchange rate policies in East Asia after the 1997/98 currency crisis has 
been highlighted by several recent empirical studies (Baig, 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Kim, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004; 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005). Instead of reckoning on the de jure (official) 
regime classifications reported by IMF, recent researchers suggest the importance of 
analysis of the de facto exchange rate arrangements. Motivated by this doctrine, it is 
thus necessary to investigate the de facto exchange rate policies by investigating the 
flexibility of exchange rate regime in the post-crisis transition period.  
 
The objectives of this chapter are to provide an empirical investigation in the exchange 
rate regime and exchange rate behaviour of selected typical East Asian economies 
(China-mainland, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), 
and to identify and evaluate their post-crisis exchange rate practice. Our methodology 
for empirical investigation follows closely those in the previous literature, but improves 
them in some important aspects: First, this study examines a longer period that spans 
from the year of 1990 to 2005 which fully captures the transition of exchange rate 
regimes in the pre-crisis and mid-crisis periods, and in particular, the post-crisis period 
from January 1999 to December 2005, compared to the existing related studies. Second, 
a comprehensive examination on the roles of U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and Euro on the 
East Asian currencies has been conducted from a set of formal statistics tests, and our 
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analysis implies recent transition to the currency basket regime for most East Asian 
countries. Third, few studies address the coordination of exchange rate arrangements, 
this paper explores the progress of regional exchange rate policy coordination in the 
post-crisis period.  
 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 begins by briefly 
outlining the theory of exchange rate regime choice. Section 2.3 briefly reviews the 
development of exchange rate arrangements in East Asian economies over 1990s and 
assesses the recent debates and some prevailing thoughts on the appropriate regime 
choice. Section 2.4, Section 2.5 and Section 2.6 provide a thoroughly investigation on 
the actual exchange rate behaviour and exchange rate regime of East Asia in the advent 
of the 1997/98 currency crisis. The conclusion remarks together with a summary of 
implications are presented in Section 2.7.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on the Choice of Exchange Rate 
Regimes  
 
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime is one of the most fundamental 
policy issues in open economies. Each regime has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The history of debates on exchange rate regime choice can be framed in terms of the 
trade-off between credibility and flexibility (Taguchi, 2004). A conventional view 
suggests that a fixed exchange rate regime can work as a credible nominal anchor for 
monetary policy and help reduce transaction costs and exchange rate risks. Also, lower 
inflation expectations and reduced exchange rate volatility are arguments in favor of 
fixed exchange rate system. A floating exchange rate regime, on the other hand, allows 
the domestic monetary authority to pursue an independent monetary policy. In the 
following section, we selectively review three classical theories on the determination of 
exchange rate regimes.  
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2.2.1 Optimum Currency Area Theory  
 
The early literature on the subject of the exchange rate regime was based on the theory 
of optimum currency area (OCA) and focused on the characteristics that determined 
whether a country would be better off, in terms of maintaining internal and external 
balance, with different choices of exchange rate regimes. An optimum currency area is 
defined as “a region for which it is optimal to have a single currency and a single 
monetary policy” (Frankel 1999, p.11). The theory of OCA proposes a set of criteria for 
establishing a monetary union with perfectly fixed exchange rates and a common 
monetary policy among the members of country. The OCA theory can also be used as 
the argument for contrasting the relative merits of fixed regimes against floating ones. 
The traditional way of choosing exchange rate regime is derived from the OCA theory 
developed by Mundell (1961). Mundell’s work was further supplemented by important 
offerings from McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Several criteria have been 
proposed to assess and evaluate whether a country should belong to an optimal currency 
area by many authors (see, for example, Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; and Kenen, 
1969): the symmetry of external shocks, the degree of labor mobility, the degree of 
openness, and the extent of economic diversification. For instance, small open 
economies are better served by a fixed exchange rate regime. Also the less diversified a 
country’s production and export structures, the stronger the case for fixed exchange 
rates becomes. Besides the criteria that depend on the state of the economy, the policy 
oriented criteria has been emphasised in the discussion later moved toward (see, for 
example, Haberler, 1970; Fleming, 1971; Ishiyama, 1975). The desired policy trade-offs 
which include similarity of rates of inflation, degree of policy integration, degree of 
price and wage flexibility, and real exchange rate variability still play a role in the 
discussion about monetary integration.  
 
As the main part of theory of monetary integration, these traditional criteria have been 
used to assess whether a country should peg or float its currency against currencies of 
countries in a specific optimum currency area. This theory predicts that the fixed 
exchange rate is most appropriate for countries that are closely integrated through 
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international trade and factor movements (Mundell, 1961). When a country has 
geographically concentrated trade, a high degree of internal factor mobility and a low 
inflation differential relative to its main trading partners, the fixed regime is also a 
preferable arrangement for this country. Alternatively, flexible exchange rate is more 
appropriate for countries which are exposed to real shocks (Bleaney and Francisco, 
2002). In particular, McKibbin and Le (2002) suggest a flexible exchange rate is a 
better option for a country which is not well diversified and faces different external 
shocks, is relatively open in terms of trade to another country or a group of countries in 
a currency block but has negligible labor mobility across its border. Thus, the theory 
establishes certain criteria according to which a country is more or less suitable for a 
fixed or a flexible exchange rate regime choice.  
 
Nevertheless, the traditional criteria have been criticised to be incomplete and partial. 
Recent developments in international macroeconomics have led to the new elements of 
new OCA theory and highlight that participation in OCA also involves some cost. 
Therefore, country has to evaluate carefully the cost and benefits of joining to currency 
areas before participation. For instance, Tavlas (1993) points out OCA theory has 
largely been modified since the discussion has turned to expectation formation, 
credibility and time inconsistency. There have been several formal modelling efforts of 
currency areas as the development of new OCA theory (see, for example, Helpman and 
Razin, 1982; Bayoumi, 1994; Buiter, 1995; Ricci, 1997; Neumeyer, 1998).  
 
Overall, OCA theory has been an important theoretical foundation in the choice of the 
exchange rate regime for a given country. Despite of the fact that the criteria developed 
under OCA theory are not easily put into practice, the prominence of OCA theory in 
selection of an exchange rate regime has been highlighted by several studies. In 
particular, the criteria of OCA theory provide considerable insight in studying the 
monetary integration and it has been a classical theorem in the design of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
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2.2.2 Impossible Trinity Theory  
 
A large strand of literature has discussed another benefit of flexible exchange rate 
relying on the doctrine of the impossible trinity or trilemma, which simply states that a 
country cannot simultaneously maintain exchange rate stability, capital mobility and 
monetary autonomy. According to this trilemma, each country can choose no more than 
two of the following three features of its policy regime: (1) open capital market (free 
capital mobility across borders), (2) an independent monetary policy, and (3) a fixed 
(pegged) exchange rate.  
 
Historically, the monetary arrangements in the world have been dominated by various 
combinations of these three features for different eras. For instance, the benefits of free 
capital flows and the stability of a fixed relation of the currency to gold had been 
highlighted by major trading countries under the classical gold standard of the 
nineteenth century. Under the Bretton Woods system, the capital mobility had been 
given up by many countries as an attempt to maintain both fixed exchange rates and 
monetary independence. Nowadays, a regime that gives up fixed exchange rates in 
favor of capital mobility and floating exchange rates has been collectively dominated 
among major industrial regions. In terms of the impossible trinity theory, under the 
condition of high international capital mobility, a flexible exchange rate allows policy 
makers to implement the independent monetary policy. However, if domestic 
authorities cannot make good use of it, such independence of monetary policy needs to 
be surrendered in order to import stability from other countries. In addition, Christl 
(2006) suggests the trade-off between monetary independence and exchange rate 
stability might be affected by other factors such as central bank independence, 
administrative capacity, as well as depth and liquidity of foreign exchange market. 
 
More attention has been paid to the emerging countries which have opened up their 
financial markets that involved in the recent emerging market crises. Most countries hit 
by crises had pegged exchange rates. In terms of the trilemma view, the crises reflect a 
signal that open capital markets, monetary independence and pegs were incompatible 
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and “bipolar view” or “two corner solutions” have been put forward as the only viable 
options for these countries. Eichengreen (1994) is one of the first proponents of the 
so-called “Hollowing of the Middle” theory or “bipolar view” according to which only 
the two-corner solution “hard pegs” and “full floats” are feasible in a world of high 
capital mobility. This view is further supported by Fisher (2001) who argues that high 
capital mobility makes intermediate regime less viable in financially open economies. 
Since monetary policy under this circumstance cannot simultaneously achieve a stable 
exchange rate and smooth cyclical output fluctuations, these countries should pursue the 
corner solution strategy and adopt either a hard peg or a pure float. In addition, the 
effectiveness of controls for capital inflows and outflows is deemed to be very limited, 
at least on a sustained basis (Ariyoshi et al., 2000). Considering the rapid process of 
financial deepening and innovation also may reduce the effectiveness of capital control, 
the traditional trinity dilemma is usually reduced to the two options or a monetary 
policy-exchange rate stability trade-off.  
 
2.2.3 Currency Crises Theory 
 
The theoretical and political arguments regarding the exchange rate regimes have been 
intensified following the currency crises as well as the collapse of several traditional 
fixed or crawling peg arrangements in the 1990s. The merits and drawbacks of both 
fixed and floating exchange rate regimes have been compared and debated. More and 
more attention has been given to the ability of a given exchange rate regime to face 
periodic and potentially contagious financial crises. Thus, the vulnerability of countries 
to currency crises under different exchange rate regimes has been highlighted by 
extensive literature in evaluating the exchange rate regime.  
 
In the literature on exchange rate instability, one approach that often referred to as 
first-generation models 2  views a currency crisis as the unavoidable outcome of 
unsustainable policy stances or structural imbalances (Krugman, 1979). This view 
 
2 The approach was pioneered by Krugman (1979) who adapted a model by Salant and Henderson (1978) 
to the analysis of currency crises. It was further refined by Flood and Garber (1984). 
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stresses that the exchange rate regime is a component of border policy package, and the 
regime can be sustained only if it does not conflict with other monetary and fiscal 
objectives. It is further implies that the expansionary monetary policy combined with a 
fixed exchange rate leads to external imbalances (Krugman, 1979). This is because 
under a fixed exchange rate regime, domestic credit expansion in excess of money 
demand growth would lead to a gradual but persistent loss of international reserves. 
This would eventually lead to a speculative attack on the currency. Extending this logic, 
many others thereafter investigated the implications of market speculation against an 
exchange rate regime, including the precise time of collapse of a regime (see Flood and 
Garber, 1984; Connolly and Taylor, 1984, and others). Fischer (1999) and Krueger 
(1999), among others, point out that fixed exchange rate regimes often lack credibility 
and invite speculation against the pegged rate, in particular when unfavorable 
conditions arise. Rana (1998) also argues that the return to an announced peg is an open 
invitation for future speculative attacks in the context of the ongoing crisis that severe 
banking sector and low levels of reserves are evident. These scholars also claim that the 
costs associated with increases in exchange rate variability are lower when compared 
with the costs incurred when speculators attack a pegged exchange rate system. Thus, 
adherents of this view suggest the merit of floating exchange as a mechanism to prevent 
the crisis.   
 
On the other hand, some studies point out that a floating system would bring about 
considerable volatility in the exchange rates. This is particularly for the affected 
countries where financial markets are not well developed and foreign exchange rate 
markets are weak (see, for example, Rana, 1998). Several researchers argue that floating 
exchange rates indeed exhibit great volatility and such excess volatility has in some 
cases restrained the international trade (Flood and Rose, 1995; Rose, 2000; Klein and 
Shambaugh, 2004). The flexible exchange rate regime is also argued to increase risk 
premiums through increased volatility in the exchange rate, giving rise to moral hazard 
problems for poorly regulated banking system, and thereby increase nation’s 
vulnerability to currency crises (McKinnon, 2000). Fixed exchange rates, according to 
this alternative view, will result in lower risk premiums and bankers will face less 
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temptation to increase their dollar liabilities. The intermediate regime of managed 
floating become worth considering in light of these problems regarding both peg and 
floating regimes. For example, Ohno (1999) point out moving to a crawling peg system 
may be advisable in this context as it combines the advantages of both fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. Not only impose disciplines on exchange rate polices, it also provides 
flexibility if the country is affected by capital flights. Nevertheless, the intermediate 
regime is not a panacea and soft pegs (or crawling pegs) are viewed to be more 
crisis-prone than the regimes at either end of the continuum of exchange rate system 
(Fischer, 2001). Soft pegs are argued to be unsustainable and hard pegs and free floating 
extremes have been gaining ground among practitioners in favor of this argument. Haile 
and Pozo (2006), in particular, argue that pegs that are not truly pegs appear to invite 
speculation against the currency, increasing the odds of currency crisis. 
 
Nevertheless, some researchers recently argue that nations can choose, in principle, to 
pursue a fixed, floating, or intermediate exchange rate regime without being concerned 
that one or another is apt to increase the odds of currency crises. For example, Stiglitz 
(2002) suggests that neither fixed nor flexible rate can properly be blamed as the crisis 
trigger. Instead, liberalisation of capital market together with macroeconomic and 
“bail-out” policies makes countries more vulnerable to shocks and thereby is 
responsible for currency crises. In recent years, as Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) argue, 
currencies crises have been increasingly associated with financial fragilities and several 
researchers have tested for external common shocks or market contagion3. Haile and 
Pozo (2006) find no role played by the actual or de facto exchange rate regime in 
determining currency crisis periods. It is not distinguishable for different exchange rate 
regimes in terms of raising susceptibility to currency crises. They further point out 
currency crises can be propagated by economic polices and certain unsustainable 
exchange rate policies rather than alternative exchange rate regimes. Overall, the 
question that which kind of exchange rate regime contributes to the incidence of 
currency crisis still remains debatable and controversial.  
 
3 Other papers that discuss financial contagion include, for example, Eichengreen et al. (1996), Glick and 
Rose (1999), Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999).  
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2.3 A Review of Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia  
 
2.3.1 Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes: de jure vs de facto  
 
The exchange rate regimes have changed significantly in many East Asian economies 
since the financial crisis in 1997. The International Monetary Fund (henceforth, IMF) 
regularly publishes exchange rate arrangements reported by its member countries 
according to its own classification scheme. Table 2.1 reports the IMF classifications (de 
jure) of currency regimes for East Asian countries over the last 20 years. It indicates 
several facts as follows: First, East Asia has exhibited a variety of exchange rate 
arrangements, ranging from a currency board system (Hong Kong) to independently 
floating (Japan, Philippines)4. Between these two polar cases, there are conventional 
fixed pegs to a single currency (China and post-crisis Malaysia) or a currency basket 
(Singapore and pre-crisis Thailand) as well as intermediate regime/managed floating 
(pre-crisis Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore). Second, official exchange rate 
arrangements change in the direction of greater exchange rate flexibility for Korea, 
Indonesia, and Thailand after the crisis. Malaysia, in contrast, moved in the opposite 
direction and pegged to the U.S. dollar after the crisis. Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, 
and Philippines have maintained identical exchange rate regimes before and after the 
1997/98 financial crisis.  
 
It is well acknowledged that the U.S. dollar had played a dominant role as an 
international anchor currency in the East Asian economies before 1997: Hong Kong 
adopted the fixed exchange rate regime with a currency board arrangement. The 
Chinese RMB was also pegged to the U.S. dollar but with occasional adjustments. The 
Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit were similarly stable against the U.S. dollar, although 
these monetary authorities officially adopted a multiple currency basket system. 
Singapore, Korea and the Philippines also targeted their currencies to the U.S. dollar 
rather loosely by combining discretion and market pressure with varying weights. 
 
4  Note that exchange rate arrangements of Indonesia, Korea and Thailand also experienced the 
independently floating during the sample period according to the IMF classification. 
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Indonesia was on a de facto crawling peg to the U.S. dollar by sliding the rupiah by 
several percent per year to offset the inflation gap between home and abroad. After 1997, 
most of the crisis-affected Asian economies have shifted their exchange rate regimes 
from de facto U.S. dollar pegs to floating ones5. Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and 
Philippines began to adopt floating exchange rate system since the crisis. In contrast, 
Malaysia stated pegging to the U.S. dollar in September 1998. China and Hong Kong 
have also kept their currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar after the crisis. Recently, the 
Chinese government announced that the official exchange rate system have shifted to 
the managed floating in July 2005. Malaysia also gave up pegging U.S. dollar and 
began to adopt the managed floating subsequently.  
 
The recent literature on the classification of exchange rate regimes identifies a growing 
disconnect between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. The IMF classification 
(de jure) relies exclusively on official declaration by each government and shows some 
contradictions with the prevailing de facto classifications. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
argue that the de jure exchange rate arrangements do not always describe the actual 
practice of exchange rate polices, nor do they offer sufficient information on accurate 
state and evolution of exchange rate polices in emerging East Asia, particularly for 
crisis-affected countries. Thus, a number of recent studies focus on the de facto regime 
classification and mainly examine the observable outcomes and actual behaviour of 
exchange rates (Frankel et al., 2002; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Kim, 2003; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2005).  
 
2.3.2 Prevailing Thoughts on Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia 
 
Suggested Regime Types for East Asian Economies 
 
The pre-crisis U.S. dollar pegged regime was universally recognized as one of the 
causes of crisis in East Asian countries. It is suggested that the de facto pegs to the U.S. 
dollar sometimes destabilized the real effective exchange rates of these currencies in the 
 
5 See Baig (2001) for a detailed description of exchange rate behaviour in East Asia after the crisis.  
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pre-crisis period. In particular, as the Japanese yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar 
from 1995 to 1997, appreciation of the real effective exchange rates reduced the export 
competitiveness and increased current account deficits in the East Asian economies 
(Corsetti et al., 1998 and Ito et al., 1998). Regarding the desirable exchange rate 
regimes, several proposals have been brought forward for East Asian economies. The 
IMF advocates more flexible exchange rate regimes among East Asian economies, or at 
least those countries should prepare for an existed strategy if they currently adopt fixed 
exchange rates (Mussa et al., 2000). Recent experience of financial crises suggests that 
openness, higher capital mobility and low inflation, which are typical characteristics for 
emerging markets in East Asia, make flexible exchange rates more viable.  
 
In contrast, a number of authors pointed out many weaknesses of flexible exchange 
rates and various forms of fixed exchange rate regimes have been proposed for East 
Asian economies: either to the USD (dollar standard bloc) (McKinnon, 2000), or a 
common basket of USD/Euro/Yen (Goto and Kawai, 2001), the basket/band/crawl – or 
BBC (Williamson, 2000), or a common Asian currency unit (ACU) (Ogawa and Ito, 
2000). Moreover, a common arrangement such as an optimal currency area (OCA) 
among East Asian countries has been proposed. However, some other authors have 
suspicions on feasibility of East Asian OCA, considering the given immature economic 
fundamentals. De Brouwer (2001) argues that East Asian economies are so diversified 
in terms of trading partners and export components, which require very different 
monetary and exchange rate responses when dealing with external shocks.  
 
The desirability of intermediate exchange rate regime has also been proposed by several 
researchers as the intermediate exchange rate regime might stabilise their effective 
exchange rates (Bénassy-Quéré, 1999b; Williamson, 1999, 2000; Rajan, 2002). In 
contrast, the “Hollowing of the Middle” view or “bipolar” (two-corner) solution 
suggests that only hard peg and independent floating are viable regimes while the 
regimes in the middle such as a soft peg or a managed float are argued to be 
unsustainable and crisis-prone since they lack credibility and are vulnerable to 
speculation attacks (see, for example, Fischer, 2001). However, some studies recognize 
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that managed floating and other middle regimes are viable for many countries with 
certain conditions of capital mobility and economic development (for example, Mussa 
et al., 2000). According to this view, interior solutions turn out to be the best (or at least 
the second best) for many countries with low capital mobility, underdeveloped capital 
and foreign exchange markets.  
 
“Fear of Floating” Hypothesis  
 
Another concept, which has become popular in the recent literature on exchange rate 
regime choice, is the “fear of floating”. This argument suggests the actual behaviour of 
exchange rate management is close to a managed or pegged arrangement, in spite of 
their officially declared floating policy. Several studies (see, for example, Hernández 
and Montiel, 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) point out that only a short time after the 
crisis, the exchange rate regimes of East Asian economies have in fact returned to their 
previous (de facto) fixed regimes despite their official announcements that exchange 
rates are flexible. Some researchers further state that the so-called floating exchange 
rate regimes of the East Asian countries are not really floating, by showing statistical 
evidence that East Asian currencies are reverting back to de facto dollar pegs 
(McKinnon, 2000; McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004). Many countries, in which de jure 
free floating exchange rate regimes are claimed to be adopted, have attempted to reduce 
exchange rate fluctuations through foreign exchange interventions (i.e., in the case of 
Korea, see Park et al., 2001).  
 
There are many reasons can be attributed to the “fear of floating”:  
 
First, it is widely believed that exchange rate stability would significantly promote trade 
and investment while no direct implication from standard theory strongly supports this 
argument. Studies suggest that institutionally fixed exchange rates (i.e., common 
currency, currency boards or dollarization) can stimulate trade, which in turn boosts 
income. Proponents of the European Monetary Union have used such an argument 
extensively in support of a single regional currency. Some other empirical evidence 
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shows that fixed exchange rates have positive effect on investment, directly or indirectly 
through real interest rate (Ghosh et al., 1995; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001). 
Hence, the adoption of fixed exchange rates is argued to promote growth through high 
saving and investment for emerging market. This in turn may explain why these 
countries have a tendency of “fear of floating”.   
 
Second, the dollarization liability is the other factor to induce “fear of floating”. As 
pointed by Cavoli and Rajan (2003), many emerging economies are unable to borrow 
overseas in their domestic currencies and these countries thereby accumulate foreign 
currency debt liabilities which are primarily denominated by dollar or foreign currencies. 
This is commonly referred to as the “original sin” or “dollarization liability” problem 
(Hausmann et al., 2001). In addition, exchange rate stability is important to emerging 
economies because a sharp depreciation in these countries’ currencies would alter the 
domestic currency value of their external debt and thereby the net worth of the 
economies. This may further put domestic banking and corporate sectors under severe 
bankruptcy pressure, resulting in a financial crisis (Williamson, 2000). In terms of this, 
the fixed exchange rate, more or less, seems preferable to East Asian economies that 
cannot preclude themselves from the original sin. This in turn may explain why these 
countries have a tendency of “fear of floating”.   
 
Third, in order to gain credibility and keep commitment to the monetary discipline, 
policymakers in emerging countries might restrain the high volatile of exchange rates. 
Reinhart and Rajan (2008) argue that the policymakers in emerging markets have a poor 
track record in monetary and fiscal policy. As a result, emerging markets may encounter 
large and frequent shocks to exchange rate expectations or to interest rate risk premiums. 
A true floating regime allows the exchange rate to absorb these external shocks while a 
true peg regime keeps the exchange rates stable by allowing the interest rates to adjust. 
Countries with “fear of floating” will allow for some flexibility in both exchange rates 
and interest rates but the latter variable absorbs most of the shock. This might explain 
why emerging economies with officially floating exchange rates have domestic interest 
rates whose volatility is considerably higher than that in the developed countries. 
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Fourth, Reinhart and Rajan (2008) point out another reason for “fear of floating” is that 
the domestic prices of small and open economies are relatively more venerable to 
exchange rate pass-through effects. The higher exchange rate pass-through implies that 
small and open economies may be more concerned about the potential inflationary 
consequences of exchange rate fluctuations. This would indicate there is more reason 
for these countries to fear floating. In addition, currency stability is viewed as a 
necessary condition for developing countries which access to global financial markets. 
As suggested by Reinhart and Rajan (2008), a sharp depreciation in the nominal 
exchange rate will often lead to a reversal of capital flows which is associated with a 
sharp adjustment in the current account combined with a contraction in output as well as 
a collapse in credit ratings.   
 
In short, the debate over the desirable exchange rate regimes for East Asian countries 
seems to continue and it is necessary to clarify the position of this study among the 
aforementioned debates on exchange rate regimes. Our work follows the “fear of 
floating” hypothesis, considering the approach of “two-corner” solution does not seem 
to be realistic in many emerging East Asian economies under investigation. For the 
empirical analysis undertaken in the following sections, it is presumed that most 
emerging East Asian economies involved in the study have adopted “soft peg” regime in 
the exchange rate management, namely, intermediate regime placed between free 
floating and rigid fixed systems. Note that Hong Kong adopts the currency board 
arrangement in the exchange rate policy and it thus is not presumed as the “soft peg” 
group in the analysis.  
 
Then under this framework, the next sections of this chapter will adopt several 
approaches to statistically examine the actual exchange rate behaviour and exchange 
rate regimes of East Asian economies in the advent of the 1997/98 currency crisis. By 
looking at data in a more detailed way, this chapter attempts to detect the possible 
change of exchange rate regimes for a group of East Asian countries in the pre-crisis, 
mid-crisis and post-crisis periods. Our study begins with examining the relative 
importance of the anchor currency, that is, roles of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and 
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the European euro in the exchange rate polices of eight East Asian economies. The 
changing role of these anchor currencies in the East Asian exchange rate management 
before and after the crisis will be fully investigated and testified upon a set of 
hypothesis. This study also explores whether the flexibility of exchange rate regime has 
increased from the pre-crisis period towards the post-crisis period. Furthermore, through 
analysing actual exchange rate movements, the regional coordination of exchange rate 
arrangements will be discussed in this study. 
 
2.4 Empirical Investigation on the Exchange Rate Performance 
for East Asian Countries 
 
2.4.1. Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
 
The exchange rate data used in this study are monthly series obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics of IMF, for the following sample countries/economies: 
China-mainland, Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, 
Singapore, EU, Germany and USA. The sample period covers from January 1990 to 
December 2005, and is splitted into three parts: the pre-crisis period of January 1990 to 
June 1997, the mid-crisis period of July 1997 to December 1998, and the post-crisis 
period of January 1999 to December 2005. Considering the unstable economic 
environment and the troubled foreign exchange markets in East Asia during the 
financial crisis, we mainly focus on two sub-data sets, namely the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Deutsche Mark serves here as a proxy for the Euro in the regressions 
for data gathered before 1999 while Euro is used instead for data gathered since January 
1999. Thus, the partitioning of time periods allows for an examination of the particular 
significance of the Euro as a major currency since it actually came into existence. 
 
Some statistics of the data in sample are presented in Table 2.2. Also, Figure 2.1 plots 
the movements of the exchange rates against Swiss Franc for each country during the 
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whole sampled period6. Figure 2.2 illustrates the annual exchange rate volatility of each 
country in sample over 1990-2005. The annual exchange rate volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the percentage changes of local currencies against U.S. dollar. 
Greater volatility of exchange rate can be obviously identified in 1997 for most East 
Asian countries with the exceptions of China (mainland) and Hong Kong. Much more 
volatile exchange rates movements can be observed for Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand in the post-crisis period, consistently with either free floating or 
managed floating arrangements adopted by these countries after the crisis.  
 
Table 2.3 depicts correlation coefficients between the exchange rate movements (the log 
first differences in the rate) for most crisis-affected countries in sample (China-mainland 
and Hong Kong are not considered here). The pre-crisis correlation coefficients were all 
close to unity due to their de facto U.S. dollar-pegged exchange rate arrangements. 
During the crisis period, however, the correlations of cross-currency suddenly declined. 
It is interesting to note that, towards the beginning of the post-crisis period, most of the 
correlations began to somehow rise, which was a sign of the restoration of more stable 
exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. However, these correlations have remained 
lower than what they were in the pre-crisis periods due to a flexible exchange rate 
arrangement adopted by most countries after the crisis.  
 
2.4.2 Regression Based Approach to Exchange Rate Movements 
 
One of the distinctive approaches to examine the de facto exchange rate arrangements in 
East Asia is to find, through regression analyses, which major currency or currency 
basket is chosen as a target for a particular country’s exchange rate stabilisation and 
how closely such a relationship can be observed. If one country attempts to stabilize its 
exchange rate to a basket of multiple currencies, then the actual exchange rate 
arrangements can be reflected through the weights assigned by the authorities to the 
corresponding currencies in their exchange rate policies. In this way, the tasks are to 
identify specific currencies that comprise a basket used as a target for a particular 
 
6 The reason of using Swiss Franc as based currency is illustrated in the following section (Section 4.2). 
country’s exchange rate stabilisation, and to examine the influence of targeted or anchor 
currencies on local currency. We closely follow the Frankel and Wei (1994) model but 
highlight the role of Euro and take the stability analysis into account. Thus the exchange 
rate changes of each East Asian currency in this study are regressed on those of the U.S. 
dollar, the Japanese yen and the Euro. Note that Frankel and Wei (1994) and Ohno 
(1999) highlight that the impacts of other currencies such as the Euro/Deutsche Mark 
are negligible, and most previous studies mainly choose the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen 
but exclude Euro/Deustshe Mark as target currency in determining the value of East 
Asian currencies 7 . However, as suggested by Taguchi (2004), given East Asian 
diversified trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) relationships not only with the 
United States, Japan but also with the European Union, and given the continued large 
exchange rate volatility among the tripolar currencies, a reasonable exchange rate policy 
for many East Asian economies would be to stabilise rates to a basket of currencies 
consisting of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro. Therefore, the 
Euro/Deutsche Mark is taken into account in this study to re-examine its role in the 
determination of the values of East Asian currencies. The regression model is described 
as follows: 
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where, 
 
LC : Local currency   SF: Swiss Franc 
teΔ : First difference of log exchange rate on date t,  
1β : Constant term,  
Kβ (k = 2, 3, 4): the weights of the U.S. dollar (USD), Japanese yen (JPY) and Euro 
(EU) on the local currency, respectively; tε : error term. 
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7 Similar studies using Frankel and Wei (1994) model can be referred to, for example, Kwan (1995); 
Kawai and Akiyama (1998); McKinnon (2000).  
In order to measure the exchange rate variation, the Swiss Franc is chosen as an 
arbitrary numeraire. As an independently floating currency of an advanced country, the 
Swiss Franc has a desirable property as a numeraire because it is widely transacted in 
international markets but little linkage with the East Asian currency and carries little 
weight in Asian trade. The estimated coefficients Kβ  are interpreted as the degree of 
influence of the U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and Euro, respectively, on the local currency. 
The value of Kβ  implies the weights assigned by the authorities to the corresponding 
currencies in their exchange rate policies. The estimated standard error of the residual is 
interpreted as a measure of the exchange rate volatility. 
 
Exchange rate stabilisation to a single currency can be interpreted as a special case in 
which only one currency is identified with a significant and large positive weight, while 
the weights of other currencies are negligible, that is, the coefficient on the target 
currency for exchange rate pegging is close to unity, and the coefficients on the other 
currencies are all close to zero. In the case of that one country’s currency is not pegged 
rigidly but is only loosely stabilised to another currency, the estimated coefficient for 
this target currency will be close to unity and be statistically significant, the standard 
error of residuals should take sufficiently small value. If one country’s currency is 
tightly pegged, or stabilised to a basket of multiple currencies, then the estimated 
coefficient for this target currency should be statistically significant and its sum should 
approximately close to unity. In the case of a purely floating regime, no estimated 
coefficient for this target currency should be statistically significant, and the standard 
error of the residuals should be large. 
 
Unit Root Tests 
 
The estimation of Equation (2.1) requires tests for the presence of unit roots in the 
variables included in the equation. Before conducting the regression, the stationarity of 
all the data series is tested by employing Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
Philips-Perron (PP) test. The length of lags included when implementing the unit root 
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tests are selected by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). Table 2.4 reports that all 
the first-differenced data series are confirmed as stationary in both tests, thereby 
suggesting a regression analysis using all the first-differenced data series is valid.  
 
Stability Analysis: CUSUM Test  
 
It is not controversial that Asian crisis started with the Thai baht deprecation of July 
1997. Nevertheless, it is still inconclusive as to when the financial crisis finished or 
whether it is really over. Hence, dating the post-crisis period becomes somewhat 
arbitrary for most previous studies. In addition, the financial crisis may have made a 
structural break in the relationship between East Asian currencies and anchor currencies 
(U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and Euro). Therefore, analysis of stability of regression 
equation would be necessary. This study performs the CUSUM test on the estimated 
equation for the pre-crisis period (January 1990 – June 1997) and the post-crisis period 
(January 1999 – December 2005).  
 
The CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. It plots the 
cumulative sum together with the 5% critical lines and there is parameter instability if 
the cumulative sum goes outside the area between the two critical lines. To be specific, 
the CUSUM test is based on the statistic (Brown et al., 1975): 
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for , where  is the recursive residual and  is the standard error of 
the regression fitted to all T sample points. If the coefficient vector remains constant 
from period to period, then 
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diverge from the zero mean value line. The significance of any departure from the zero 
line is assessed by reference to a pair of 5 percent significance lines, the distance 
between which increases with . Thus, movement of  outside the critical lines is 
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suggestive of coefficient instability. This technique is appropriate for time series data 
and might be used if we are not sure about when a structural break might have taken 
place. It can also check if the sub-sample periods under study are properly dated. As 
illustrated in Appendices 2.1 and 2.2, the CUSUM statistics of Equation (2.1) for the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods are within 5 percent critical lines, indicating relative 
stability in the estimated parameter values for the defined sub-sample periods. Therefore, 
it is justified to define the crisis period as July 1997 – December 1998, and we can 
hence safely define starting date of the post-crisis period as January 1999. 
 
Regression Results Analysis 
 
Pre-crisis Period 
 
Table 2.5 provides a summary of regression results for the pre-crisis, mid-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. The estimation method is Ordinary Least Square (OLS). For the 
pre-crisis period, the estimated coefficients of the U.S. dollar were statistically 
significant and large (ranging from 0.711 to 1.043) in the Asia-8 currencies. Given that 
virtually all of the East Asian countries feature large magnitude of U.S. dollar 
coefficient estimates, accompanied by very small standard errors, and high 
goodness-of-fit results, it is clearly evident that currencies of East Asia maintained de 
facto pegs to the dollar in the pre-crisis period. In the cases of Singapore and Thailand, 
the magnitude of U.S. dollar coefficients were somewhat lower than those of the other 
sample countries, though generally highly significant, due to their formal or informal 
currency basket arrangements. The weights of Japanese yen and Deutsche mark were 
negligible for most currencies compared to the role of U.S. dollar, although the 
estimated coefficients of Japanese yen were also significant in some of the regressions 
(Korea, Singapore and Thailand). We also found the significant coefficients of Deutsche 
mark in Malaysia and Thailand. These results confirm the dominate role of U.S. dollar 
in the East Asian currencies and are in support of de jure or de facto dollar-stabilisation 
arrangements in many emerging East Asian economies during the pre-crisis period. 
Nevertheless, Japanese yen and Deutsche mark in general played limited role as part of 
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a currency basket in the pre-crisis period.  
 
Crisis Period 
 
The results obtained for the crisis period (July 1997 – December 1998) in most East 
Asian countries, reflecting the large swings in the regional currencies, feature poor 
goodness-of-fit, relatively smaller estimates of the dollar coefficient, as well as the large 
standard error of the regression for many crisis-affected countries in East Asia (Korea, 
Malaysia, Thailand). China and Hong Kong were relatively immune to currency 
speculation as far as the observed movements of exchange rates are concerned, and 
therefore we found no significant change in the dollar weight during the crisis. In the 
case of Philippines, the estimated coefficients on the dollar did not decline noticeably, 
but the adjusted R square declined sharply and estimated standard error of regression 
rose sharply. Even Singapore, which was not directly affected by the crisis, also 
witnessed declines in the dollar coefficients and in the adjusted R square. As the dollar 
weights declined in the mid-crisis period, the weights of the yen and Deutsche mark 
have significantly increased in some countries, particularly in Indonesia and Korea. 
However, considering the relative fewer observations in the mid-crisis period, the 
regression results might suffer from low power. During this period, Indonesia, Korea 
and Thailand switched their official classification of the exchange rate regimes from 
managed floating into independently floating. These events together with the initial 
exchange rate volatility following the regime switching can be reflected by the dramatic 
fall in the goodness-of-fit measures from the regressions. 
 
Post-crisis Period 
 
Results for the post-crisis period indicate a greater diversity in exchange rate 
arrangements than that in the pre-crisis period as shown in Table 2.5. On one hand, 
China and Hong Kong are under a stable dollar peg throughout this period, with dollar 
coefficients maintained at levels close to unity, and the adjusted R square close to one. 
The weights of U.S. dollar and adjusted R square are also close to unity in Malaysia, 
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which have returned to a formal dollar pegged arrangement in the post-crisis period. 
Considering the high Durbin-Watson statistic for Malaysia, the standard errors were also 
computed by the Heteroskedasticity consistent covariance of Newey and West (1987). 
Nevertheless, the estimation results were only marginally changed. On the other hand, 
for the countries such as Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, the 
standard error of the dollar estimates are uniformly much larger and adjusted R squares 
are substantially lower than those in the pre-crisis period, indicating that the degree to 
which currencies are linked to the dollar is relatively less than those in the pre-crisis 
period. The results from the post-crisis regression do not support the view that these 
East Asian currencies have fully reverted to behaviour that is statistically 
indistinguishable from the pre-crisis characteristics.  
 
In addition, the Japanese yen coefficients for Korea, Singapore and Thailand are 
statistically significant and much higher than values in the pre-crisis period. The 
magnitude of Euro coefficients have been detected much higher in Indonesia, Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand than they did in the pre-crisis period. Nevertheless, the only 
statistically significant Euro coefficient can be found in Singapore. These findings 
suggest that the currency regimes of Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and Thailand have 
moved in the direction of the greater flexibility, but not to the extreme pole of clean 
floating. This implies that the weights of anchor currencies in these countries 
approximately turned out to the currency basket levels recently. With regard to policy 
implications, we may conclude that these countries are not prepared to accept the 
constraints of a hard peg, or the polar extreme of free floating. However, the roles of 
Japanese yen and Euro after the crisis have become more important than those before 
the crisis in terms of determining the values of East Asian currencies.  
 
2.4.3 The Roles of U.S. Dollar on the Local Currencies 
 
According to the regression framework outlined in Equation (2.1), the extent to which 
the coefficient of U.S. dollar deviates from unity provides an indication of the flexibility 
of the currency against U.S dollar. Hence, the Wald coefficient test is applied for each 
regression in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, to test the null hypothesis that the 
dollar coefficient is equal to one.  
 
As displayed in Table 2.6, for the cases of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and 
Philippines, the null hypothesis is accepted for both pre-crisis and post-crisis periods at 
the 5 percent significance level, implying little flexibility of exchange rate against U.S. 
dollar in these four economies. In contrast, the null hypothesis is rejected by Korea, 
Singapore and Thailand for two sub-sample periods, and indicates relatively more 
flexibility of exchange rate against U.S. dollar, confirming the flexible exchange rate 
regime adopted by these countries. As for Malaysia, empirical tests show the opposite 
results for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, that is, less flexibility of exchange rate 
against U.S. dollar has been identified after the crisis than it did in the pre-crisis period. 
This result is consistent with the U.S. dollar pegged exchange rate regime officially 
adopted by Malaysia in the post-crisis period. 
 
In addition, coefficient equivalence test is conducted to compare the weights of dollar in 
the currency basket before and after the crisis. Specifically, we hypothesise that the 
degree of pegging to the U.S. dollar in the post-crisis period was the same as the 
pre-crisis period. Following the hypothesis test by McKinnon (2000), one could reject 
this null if:  
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This test is unnecessary in the cases of China, Hong Kong, which have fixed their 
exchange rates against the U.S. dollar across the whole sample period. Table 2.7 
summarises the results for the rest of sample countries. We find that four out of six 
sample countries (except Indonesia and Singapore) reject the null hypothesis of equal 
 
 48
8 In fact, if the statistics is higher than 1.96, then the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
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 these countries (Korea, Malaysia, 
hilippines, and Thailand) in the post-crisis period.  
 Japanese Yen on Local Currencies before and 
fter the Financial Crisis 
tion examines the possibility of an increased role of the Japanese yen 
ince the crisis.  
ernative, which assumes that it has increased after the financial 
risis. Specifically,  
 
U.S. dollar coefficients before and after the crisis, implying significant changes of the 
U.S. dollar weights on these local currencies after the financial crisis. This finding is 
broadly consistent with the previous regression analysis, confirming the evidence of 
changing role of U.S. dollar in the currency basket of
P
 
2.4.4 The Weights of the
a
 
For the whole sample period, we find that the weights of the Japanese yen in the 
determination of East Asian currencies are estimated to be much smaller than the 
weights of the U.S. dollar. Most previous studies, investigating the role of the Japanese 
yen in the determination of the values of East Asian currencies, reported that it was 
quite negligible despite the status of Japan as a major trading partner of most East Asian 
countries. This somewhat surprising finding can be explained by the implicit dollar peg 
policy of the East Asian local monetary authorities who had feared exchange rate 
volatility. Since most East Asian countries have been constructing more-market oriented 
foreign exchange markets and floating exchange rate systems after the financial crisis, it 
is possible to expect that the role of Japanese yen has increased after the financial crisis. 
Therefore, this sec
s
 
If the negligible role of the yen in the determination of the value of the East Asian 
currencies is the result of their explicit or implicit dollar-peg policy, the impact of the 
yen on their currencies after the crisis is expected to be greater than that before the crisis, 
reflecting the increasing importance of Japan as their major trading partner. Hence, we 
employ the similar hypothesis test as outlined in Section 2.4.3, and the null hypothesis 
that the weight of Japanese yen remains the same across the two sample periods is 
tested against the alt
c
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where  and  are the weights of the Japanese yen in the pre-crisis period and the 
post-crisis period, respectively. The null hypothesis can be tested by computing the 
following statistics: 
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where 23βˆ  and 13βˆ  are the estimated values for 23β  and 13β , and 23sˆ  is the standard 
errors of 23β . If the absolute value of statistics is higher than 1.96, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance.  
 
The statistics of hypothesis test are reported in Table 2.8. At the 5 percent significance 
level, this null hypothesis is rejected in China, Korea and Malaysia but is accepted in 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. This finding suggests that 
the weight of Japanese yen has increased in the post-crisis period for China, Korea, 
Malaysia, and implies the status of Japan as major trading partner in these three 
countries. As for other economies, the significantly increased role of the Japanese yen in 
determining the local currencies has not been found since the crisis.  
 
2.5 The Flexibility of Exchange Rate Regime  
 
As mentioned earlier, recent literature in exchange rate regimes in East Asia has 
documented a significant divergence between de facto and de jure exchange rate 
arrangements. Empirical studies like McKinnon (2001), Calvo and Reinhart (2002), and 
Fukuda (2002) suggest that exchange rates in East Asia can still be characterised as soft 
U.S. dollar pegs, while other studies (see, for example, Baig, 2001; Hernández and 
Montiel, 2001, Kawai, 2002) point out that exchange rates in East Asia have become 
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more flexible after the crisis. The diversity in these results, however, might be attributed 
to the different methodologies and measurements adopted by these empirical studies. In 
addition, different time periods and frequency of data used (daily, monthly or quarterly) 
could lead to the diverse conclusions. In this section, we revisit the evidence regarding 
the extent of flexibility of exchange rate regime for countries which either previously 
adopted the intermediate regime or have officially changed their exchange rate 
arrangements after the crisis. Hence, six East Asian countries including Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are examined in this section. 
China-mainland and Hong Kong are dropped from the analysis here due to the fact that 
there are no officially changes of exchange rate arrangements for both economies after 
the financial crisis. Extending the literature, data of recent years (up to 2005) are 
concerned in this study to examine the recent trend of regime flexibility. For the purpose 
of consistency of dataset and sample period covered in this whole study, still, monthly 
frequency data series for the period from 1990 to 2005 are used in this section. 
 
To detect the degree of flexibility, or inversely, the extent of intervention, an exchange 
rate flexibility index, similar to the work done by Glick and Wihlborg (1997), Bayoumi 
and Eichegreen (1998), and Baig (2001), is defined as follows: 
 
Flexibility Index = )/( NFAERER σσσ +                                      (2.5) 
 
where ERσ  is the annual standard deviation of monthly (log) percentage changes in the 
exchange rate, NFAσ  is the annual standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in 
reserves (the ratio of net foreign assets divided by lagged base money) 9 . The 
movements of exchange rate or reserves, in isolation, might not provide an accurate 
picture of exchange rate regime. However, the combination of exchange rate and 
reserves can be viewed as a more informative indicator of exchange rate flexibility, 
which, could be used for further analysis of exchange rate regime behaviour. This index 
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9 Line 11 of the IFS database (foreign assets of the monetary authorities) is used as the measure of 
foreign exchange reserves. The monetary base is obtained as Line 14 of the IFS. 
combines the volatilities of exchange rates, and provides insights into the possible 
effects of reserve intervention from a policy perspective. By construction, the index 
ranges from 0 to 1. A low value in this instance implies less flexibility or a high degree 
of intervention. Other things being equal, high reserve volatility will reduce the index 
value, possibly indicating that reserves are being employed as a monetary policy tool in 
order to limit exchange rate flexibility, that is, the relatively highly pegged regime is 
operated accordingly. Thus, the closer index is to 1 )0( →NFAσ , the more flexible the 
exchange rate regime; and the closer to 0 )0( →ERσ , the more pegged the regime. 
 
For comparative purpose, the whole sample is divided into the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
sub-samples to examine the discernible change before and after the 1997/98 financial 
crisis for each country. The results summarised in Table 2.9 tracks the flexibility of 
exchange rate regime based on the flexibility index defined in Equation (2.5) for each 
East Asian economies in the pre-crisis, mid-crisis and post-crisis period, respectively. It 
is apparent that there is relatively low flexibility index in the pre-crisis period (Table 2.9 
(A)), suggesting an inflexibility of exchange rate regime for most sample countries. The 
index reflected in Table 2.9 (B) illustrates the crisis-related movements and reveals an 
increase in exchange rate flexibility during the crisis period, accompanied by the greater 
volatility of exchange rates. However, the post-crisis figures (Table 2.9 (C)) are broadly 
consistent the findings in the previous section: for Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, the exchange rates have become somewhat less flexible than 
the crisis period, but they remain consistently more flexible than pre-crisis years. In 
short, it is evident that most East Asian economies have been adopting exchange rate 
arrangements with greater flexibility after the crisis. The only exception can be found in 
Malaysia, whose exchange rate regime has become completely inflexible vis-à-vis the 
U.S. dollar. This finding is consistent with its pegged U.S. dollar exchange rate 
arrangements officially announced after the crisis.  
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2.6 Regional Coordination of Exchange Rate  
 
As aforementioned, a group of countries in East Asia have subsequently changed their 
exchange rate arrangements after the crisis in 1997-98. A question arises is how this 
new environment influences on the East Asian economy. Researchers and policy 
markers are especially keen to investigate in the change in the economic linkages 
among these countries, as many of the East Asian countries are seeking for economic 
cooperation in various forms. It is generally believed that regional cooperation and 
integration have increased fast in trade, investment, and finance. The Asian financial 
crisis, to a certain extent, acted similarly as an exogenous shock to promote Asian 
monetary cooperation. For example, aside from the already established ASEAN free 
trade agreement, both China and Japan have shown much interest in forming a Free 
Trade Agreement with Korea. East Asian countries are also considering deepening 
monetary cooperation, indicated by the discussions followed by the Chiang Mai 
Initiative. The Chiang Mai Initiative agreed upon by the ASEAN plus 3 which mainly 
acted as a form of self-insurance in case of another financial crisis. It was the first 
significant regional financing arrangement to enable countries to cope with disruptive 
capital flows and maintain exchange rate stability. Subsequently, a more significant step 
was the decision by the Executive’s Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks to set 
up the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in dollar-dominated instruments in 2003. Aiming at 
developing a regional bond market, the ABF creates an operational framework which 
should advance and focus monetary cooperation. These endeavours have achieved 
considerable results, although somewhat slowly (Jung, 2008).  
 
As the recent debates over the exchange rate regimes in East Asia are going further, 
some researchers argued that there must be coordination in selecting an exchange rate 
regime among countries in the region with similar trading structures and with high 
intra-regional trading shares. In particular, Bayoumi et al. (2000) analyse the possibility 
of an optimal currency area in East Asia but find ASEAN today is less suitable for a 
regional monetary arrangement than the euro area, after reviewing evidence on patterns 
of trade, economic shocks, the extent of factor mobility and the monetary transmission 
mechanism. They further highlight the role of political commitment in forming a 
regional monetary arrangement. Ogawa and Ito (2000) point out an optimal exchange 
rate regime of country A depends on the exchange rate regime of country B, with which 
country A has a high proportion of trade. Kawai (2002) also highlights the greater 
coordination on the currency basket policy would be desirable for intra-regional 
exchange rate stability, and this needs to be supported by regional surveillance and 
financing mechanisms.  
 
Our research does not intend to be involved in the above arguments on the feasibility of 
regional currency unit and exchange rate coordination in East Asia. Instead, we are 
interested in testing whether the regional exchange rate coordination has been 
strengthened after the Asian crisis. To materialize regional coordination in exchange rate, 
Granger causality test is conducted on bilateral relation among regional currency values.  
This is because the strong regional currency interdependence is the most important 
rationale for the regional exchange rate cooperation. The procedure employed is utilised 
in testing whether changes in one variable are a “cause” of changes in another. It also 
helps us to determine the predictability relation between the two variables. If 
coordination of exchange rate for two countries in the East Asian region has been 
increased, we may expect the evidence of significant predictability relation between 
their currencies. Hence, the following bivariate system can be constructed and estimated 
for all possible pairs of ( tx , ty ) series in the group: 
 
t
N
j
jtjjt
N
j
jt xyy μγβα +Δ+Δ+=Δ ∑∑
=
−−
= 11
                                 (2.6)           
t
N
j
jtjjt
N
j
jt yxx εγβα +Δ+Δ+=Δ ∑∑
=
−−
= 11
                                   (2.7)           
 
where ty  denotes currency of country  and y tx denotes currency of country x . All 
currencies are expressed against the U.S. dollar. The first differences of all log-level 
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series are used and marked as the operator of Δ . Therefore, not to reject 
0...: 210 ==== kH γγγ  in Equation (2.6) implies that changes of tx  do not Granger 
cause changes of ty . Likewise, not to reject 0...: 10 =2 === kH γγγ  in Equation (2.7) 
implies that changes of ty  do not Granger cause changes of tx .  
 
Table 2.10 presents the results of Granger causality test on East Asian currencies pairs. 
The reported F-statistics with probabilities are the Wald statistics for the joint 
hypothesis 0...1
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2 ==== kγγγ . First, in the pre-crisis period, the null hypothesis is 
rejected on the causality from Chinese yuan to Malaysia ringgit, Japanese yen to Hong 
Kong dollar, Malaysia ringgit to Chinese yuan, Singapore dollar to Hong Kong dollar, 
and Thail baht to Hong Kong dollar at the five percent significance level, but accepted 
in other bilateral relations. This finding suggests a certain degree of predictability 
relation between currencies of some countries. Second, in the post-crisis period, the 
only evidence of causality can be found from Japanese yen to Philippine peso, 
Indonesia rupiah to Singapore dollar. The null hypothesis of non-causality cannot be 
rejected for other bilateral relations. Therefore, the results of Granger causality suggest 
little evidence of regional exchange rate coordination. This kind of coordination in the 
East Asian region has not been strengthened as a whole in the post-crisis period either. 
Our finding is in line with other empirical studies like Bayoumi et al. (2000) who 
suggest that little progress has been achieved in the monetary and exchange rate 
arrangements. It seems that the recent liberalisation and deregulation of financial 
markets in East Asian countries has driven them to closer integration into global 
financial markets rather than strengthening regional financial integration. This is 
possibly owing to the differences in the stages of development and in the legal and 
regulatory environments between these countries. Regarding this, East Asian countries 
still have to make strong efforts to promote regional monetary and financial cooperation. 
The firm political commitment to exchange rate decisions, at the same time, would be 
crucial to ensuring the form of a regional monetary and exchange rate arrangement.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an empirical study on the exchange rate arrangements of East 
Asian countries. It examined the development of exchange rate arrangements in East 
Asian economies over the last 15 years. It considered both “official” and “observed” 
exchange rate arrangements and exchange rate behaviours of eight economies including 
both non-crisis affected countries and crisis-hit countries in order to provide a 
comparative study from an international perspective.  
 
By examining the changing weights of the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, and the Euro as 
anchor currencies on the exchange rate stabilisation of East Asian countries, this study 
confirmed that the U.S. dollar played a dominant role as a de jure or de facto anchor for 
emerging East Asia until the 1997/98 currency crisis. We found that the distribution of 
exchange rate arrangements of the East Asian economies after the financial crisis is 
classified into two broad categories. One group is the case in some economies such as 
China, Hong Kong and Malaysia, where the weight of the dollar has regained or kept 
prominence. The other group is the case of Indonesia, Korea, Singapore, Philippines, 
and Thailand in which the dollar dominance reduced and maintained a de facto currency 
basket regime after the crisis. Moreover, the flexibility of exchange rate regime has 
indeed been increased for most East Asian countries which officially adopted the 
floating regime in the post-crisis period. The results suggest that the currency regimes of 
Indonesia, Korea, Singapore and Thailand have moved in the direction of the greater 
flexibility, but not to the extreme pole of clean floating. This again implies that the 
weights in these countries approximately turned out to the currency basket levels 
recently. The exchange rate regime of Malaysia has become completely inflexible 
vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, consistent with its pegged U.S. dollar exchange rate 
arrangements officially announced after the crisis. In addition, the importance of 
regional financial cooperation in East Asia has been highlighted after the financial crisis 
of 1997/98. There is a storing perception about more effective regional frameworks 
which could help to prevent and manage the crisis. Given the changes of exchange rate 
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arrangements for a group of East Asian countries, we may expect the possible change in 
the regional coordination of exchange rate after the 1997/98 financial crises. However, 
the results of Granger causality tests provide little evidence on the increased regional 
coordination of exchange rate in the post-crisis East Asia.  
 
A noteworthy implication from our empirical study is that a regime switch in an East 
Asian country indeed had an impact on the behaviour of exchange rates. Exchange rate 
policy plays an important role in influencing the movements of exchange rates. Despite 
more flexibility can be observed after experiencing transitional regime, the managed 
floating regimes rather than the free floating ones have been dominated for many 
emerging East Asian economies. Recently, the currencies of East Asian countries mainly 
move within a given band with their center targeted to a basket of anchor currencies 
including dollar, yen and Euro, given their diversified trade and foreign direct 
investment relationships with the United States, Japan and the European Union. This 
study further supports the argument of less possibility of forming an optimal currency 
area for East Asia region. Given the little evidence on the increased regional 
coordination in exchange rate after the crisis, strong efforts and firm political 
commitments are needed for East Asian countries to promote regional monetary and 
financial cooperation. 
Figures: 
 
Figure 2.1 Movements of Exchange Rates against Swiss Franc 
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(Continued) Figure 2.1 Movements of Exchange Rates against Swiss Franc 
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Figure 2.2 Standard Deviation of Exchange Rate against U.S. dollar 
(Percentage Changes) 
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(Continued) Figure 2.2 Standard Deviation of Exchange Rate against U.S. dollar 
(Percentage Changes) 
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(Continued) Figure 2.2 Standard Deviation of Exchange Rate against U.S. dollar 
(Percentage Changes) 
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Tables: 
 
Table 2.1 Official Exchange Rate Arrangements in the East Asian Economies 
 
 
Country Periods Official Exchange Rate 
Regimes 
 
China 
Oct 1986-Sep 1998 
Jan 1999-June 2005 
 
July 2005-Present 
Managed floating; 
Conventional fixed peg to 
the dollar; 
Managed floating 
 
Hong Kong 
 
Oct 1983-present 
Currency board 
arrangement with a peg to 
the dollar 
 
Indonesia 
Dec 1983-July 1997 
Aug1997-Sep 2001 
Sep 2001-Present 
Managed floating; 
Independently floating; 
Managed floating with no 
preannounced path for 
exchange rate 
Japan July 1982-Present Independently floating  
Korea June 1982-Nov 1997 
 
Nov 1997-present 
Managed floating 
 
Independently floating 
 
 
Malaysia 
Sep 1975- June 1993 
 
June 1993-Sep 1998 
Sep 1998-June 2005 
July 2005 
Peg to other currency 
composite; 
Managed floating; 
Peg to the dollar; 
Managed floating 
Philippines Nov. 1984-Present Independently floating 
 
 
Singapore 
 
Dec 1987-Present 
Managed floating with no 
preannounced path for 
exchange rate 
 
Thailand 
Nov 1984-June 1997 
 
July 1997-Sep 2001 
Sep 2001-Present 
Peg to other currency 
composite; 
Independently floating; 
Managed floating with no 
preannounced path for 
exchange rate 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Sample Mean and Standard Deviation 
 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev 
C
tEX  
5.420 1.168 
H
tEX  
5.551 0.619 
 
I
tEX  
3970.059 2483.759 
M
tEX  
2.292 0.440 
K
tEX  
706.634 
 
149.080 
 
P
tEX  
26.948 
 
9.295 
S
tEX  
1.174 0.113 
T
tEX  
23.809 
 
5.478 
J
tEX  
83.431 10.319 
U
tEX  
0.715 0.080 
D
tEX  
1.176 0.044 
E
tEX  
0.652 0.019 
Note:  denotes the monthly exchange rate of the country ’s currency against 
the Swiss Franc, where: 
i
tEX i
C= China,  
H= Hong Kong,  
I= Indonesia,  
M= Malaysia,  
K= Korea,  
P= Philippines,  
S= Singapore,  
T= Thailand,  
J= Japan,  
U= US,  
D= Germany,  
E= Europe.  
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Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix of Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Pre-crisis Period 
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Indonesia  1.000  0.973  0.937  0.875  0.965  0.993 
Korea  0.973  1.000  0.919  0.850  0.956  0.977 
Malaysia  0.937  0.919  1.000  0.825  0.934  0.943 
Philippines  0.875  0.850  0.825  1.000  0.851  0.870 
Singapore  0.965  0.956  0.934  0.851  1.000  0.976 
Thailand  0.993  0.977  0.943  0.870  0.976  1.000 
 
Mid-crisis Period  
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Indonesia  1.000 -0.003  0.587  0.351  0.445  0.631 
Korea -0.003  1.000  0.096  0.498  0.263  0.341 
Malaysia  0.587  0.096  1.000  0.607  0.814  0.933 
Philippines  0.351  0.498  0.607  1.000  0.571  0.743 
Singapore  0.445  0.263  0.814  0.571  1.000  0.852 
Thailand  0.631  0.341  0.933  0.743  0.852  1.000 
 
 
 Post-crisis Period 
 
 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
Indonesia  1.000  0.465  0.421  0.582  0.598  0.655 
Korea  0.465  1.000  0.756  0.668  0.819  0.769 
Malaysia  0.421  0.756  1.000  0.782  0.901  0.769 
Philippines  0.582  0.668  0.782  1.000  0.793  0.835 
Singapore  0.598  0.819  0.901  0.793  1.000  0.834 
Thailand  0.655  0.769  0.769  0.835  0.834  1.000 
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Table 2.4 Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Countries ADF Statistics 
(Trend and Intercept) 
PP Statistics 
(Trend and Intercept) 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
China 
Post-crisis 
-8.704*** 
-3.512* 
-7.897*** 
-8.684*** 
-3.504* 
-7.844*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
HongKong 
Post-crisis 
-7.810*** 
-3.563* 
-7.850*** 
-7.810*** 
-3.568* 
-7.784*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Thailand 
Post-crisis 
-7.933*** 
-3.526* 
-8.899*** 
-7.933*** 
-3.516* 
-8.953*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Philippines 
Post-crisis 
-8.727*** 
-3.854** 
-8.050*** 
-8.723*** 
-3.871** 
-8.057*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Korea 
Post-crisis 
-8.186*** 
-3.915** 
-8.404*** 
-8.149*** 
-3.914** 
-8.403*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Indonesia 
Post-crisis 
-7.964*** 
-3.837** 
-10.028*** 
-7.964*** 
-6.060*** 
-11.169*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Malaysia 
Post-crisis 
-8.031*** 
-4.032** 
-7.959*** 
-7.966*** 
-4.343** 
-7.892*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Singapore 
Post-crisis 
-8.328*** 
-3.601* 
-8.772*** 
-8.297*** 
-3.585* 
-8.801*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
USA 
Post-crisis 
-7.853*** 
-3.502* 
-7.950*** 
-7.853*** 
-3.491* 
-7.882*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
 
Japan 
Post-crisis 
-7.759*** 
-4.474** 
-9.106*** 
-7.679*** 
-4.468** 
-9.106*** 
Pre-crisis 
Mid-crisis 
Deutsch 
mark 
/ Euro Post-crisis 
-8.725*** 
-4.110** 
-10.056*** 
-8.726*** 
-4.109** 
-10.056*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote rejection of the null of unit root for the ADF and PP 
tests at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively. The currencies for each 
country in these tests are expressed as the log first difference exchange rates 
against Swiss Franc.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Numeraire: Swiss Franc 
 
Chinese RMB  
Period Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
0.927 
(0.176) 
 
-0.029 
(0.175) 
 
0.539 
(0.416) 
 
0.910 
 
2.060 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
0.999 
(0.002) 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
 
0.999 
 
1.604 
 
Post-crisis 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
1.005 
(0.012) 
 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
 
0.014 
(0.029) 
 
0.994 
 
1.965 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Hong Kong Dollar 
Period  Constant 
 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 
0.996 
(0.005) 
 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
 
-0.011 
(0.013) 
 
0.999 
 
2.470 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
1.80E-06 
(0.000) 
 
1.003 
(0.010) 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
 
0.999 
 
2.002 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
2.67E-05 
(0.000) 
 
0.989 
(0.005) 
 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
 
0.005 
(0.013) 
 
0.999 
 
1.862 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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(Continued) Table 2.5 Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Numeraire: Swiss Franc 
 
Indonesian Rupiah 
Period  Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
0.003 
(0.000) 
 
0.986 
(0.010)
 
0.007 
(0.010) 
 
0.020 
(0.023) 
 
0.996 
 
1.766 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.083 
(0.069) 
 
-2.879 
(0.076)
 
0.771 
(1.667) 
 
0.869 
(1.785) 
 
0.276 
 
2.030 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
0.001 
(0.006) 
 
0.603 
(0.261)
 
0.298 
(0.241) 
 
1.049 
(0.654) 
 
0.616 
 
2.164 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Korean Won 
Period  Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
0.003 
(0.001) 
 
0.926 
(0.029)
 
0.112 
(0.029) 
 
-0.064 
(0.068) 
 
0.959 
 
1.667 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.017 
(0.033) 
 
0.260 
(1.461)
 
0.790 
(0.792) 
 
0.907 
(0.740) 
 
0.145 
 
2.234 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
 
0.583 
(0.096)
 
0.488 
(0.089) 
 
0.262 
(0.240) 
 
0.694 
 
1.594 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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(Continued) Table 2.5 Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Numeraire: Swiss Franc 
 
 
Malaysian Ringgit 
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1
Period  Constant 
 
β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
0.852 
(0.467)
 
0.085 
(0.047) 
 
0.253 
(0.111) 
 
0.893 
 
1.818 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.027 
(0.022) 
 
-0.324 
(0.967)
 
0.185 
(0.524) 
 
0.849 
(0.475) 
 
0.178 
 
1.976 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
-6.98E-05 
(0.000) 
 
1.003 
(0.008)
 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
 
0.014 
(0.020) 
 
0.997 
 
 
2.668 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  
 
Philippine Peso 
Period  Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
1.043 
(0.086) 
 
-0.021 
(0.086) 
 
0.321 
(0.205) 
 
0.767 
 
1.848 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.016 
(0.017) 
 
1.023 
(0.769) 
 
0.330 
(0.417) 
 
0.406 
(1.970) 
 
0.211 
 
2.243 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
0.004 
(0.002) 
 
0.823 
(0.097) 
 
0.051 
(0.090) 
 
0.274 
(0.249) 
 
0.627 
 
1.998 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Continued) Table 2.5 Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements 
 
Numeraire: Swiss Franc 
 
 
Singapore Dollar  
Period  Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
 
0.711 
(0.025)
 
0.146 
(0.025) 
 
0.190 
(0.060) 
 
0.957 
 
2.292 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.009 
(0.008) 
 
0.235 
(0.364)
 
0.346 
(0.197) 
 
0.294 
(0.933) 
 
0.490 
 
2.271 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
 
0.626 
(0.047)
 
0.228 
(0.043) 
 
0.285 
(0.118) 
 
0.862 
 
2.427 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Thai Baht 
Period  Constant 
 
1β  
US 
Dollar 
2β  
Japanese 
Yen 
3β  
Deutsch 
Mark/Euro 
4β  
Adjusted 
R square 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistic 
 
Pre-crisis 
 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
0.827 
(0.005)
 
0.107 
(0.005) 
 
0.055 
(0.012) 
 
0.998 
 
2.167 
 
Mid-crisis 
 
 
0.011 
(0.025) 
 
-0.109 
(1.095)
 
0.377 
(0.593) 
 
0.300 
(0.803) 
 
0.201 
 
1.987 
 
Post-crisis  
 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 
0.624 
(0.088)
 
0.208 
(0.081) 
 
0.443 
(0.219) 
 
0.642 
 
 
1.915 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70
 71
 
Table 2.6 Wald Coefficient Test 
 
Null: the dollar coefficient is equal to one 
 
Countries Period F-statistic/ Chi-square Reject Null Hypothesis 
1st 0.17 No China 
2nd 0.17 No 
1st 0.51 No Hong Kong 
2nd 2.83 No 
1st 2.25 No Indonesia 
2nd 2.30 No 
1st 6.70 Yes Korea 
2nd 18.89 Yes 
1st 9.95 Yes Malaysia 
2nd 0.14 No 
1st 0.24 No Philippines 
2nd 2.99 No 
1st 131.10 Yes Singapore 
2nd 63.16 Yes 
1st 108.02 Yes Thailand 
2nd 18.49 Yes 
 
   Note: 1st denotes the pre-crisis period, 2nd denotes the post-crisis period.  
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Table 2.7 Hypothesis Test of Coefficient Equivalence (U.S. Dollar) 
 
Null: coefficients of U.S. dollar are equal before and after the crisis  
 
Countries Statistics Reject Null Hypothesis 
Indonesia -1.47 No 
Korea -3.57 Yes 
Malaysia 18.88 Yes 
Philippines -2.1 Yes 
Singapore -1.81 No 
Thailand -2.31 Yes 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8 Hypothesis Test of Coefficient Equivalence (Japanese Yen) 
 
Null: coefficients of Japanese yen are equal before and after the crisis  
 
Countries Statistics Reject Null Hypothesis 
China 2.09 Yes 
Hong Kong 1.25 No 
Indonesia 1.21 No 
Korea 4.22 Yes 
Malaysia -12.57 Yes 
Philippines 0.8 No 
Singapore 1.91 No 
Thailand 1.25 No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2.9 Degree of Exchange Rate Flexibility in the Period of 1990-2005  
 
(A) Pre-crisis period 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Indonesia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Korea 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.08 
Malaysia 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.13 
Philippines 0.43 0.11 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.02 
Singapore 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 
Thailand 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 
 
 
 (B) Crisis period 
 
 1997 1998 
Indonesia 0.24 0.33 
Korea 0.39 0.15 
Malaysia 0.50 0.22 
Philippines 0.36 0.37 
Singapore 0.11 0.09 
Thailand 0.20 0.27 
 
 
 (C) Post-crisis period 
 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Indonesia 0.27 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 
Korea 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 
Malaysia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Philippines 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.10 
Singapore 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 
Thailand 0.14 0.24 0.31 0.16 0.10 0.32 0.26 
 
Notes: the index is calculated by )/( NFAERER σσσ +  where ERσ  is the annual standard 
deviation of monthly (log) percentage changes in the exchange rate, NFAσ  is the annual 
standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in reserves (the ratio of Net Foreign 
Assets divided by lagged base money). 
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Table 2.10 Results of Granger Causality Tests on Bilateral Currency Values 
 
A. Pre-crisis period (1990:1-1996:12) 
 
 F-Statistics (Probability) 
Cause 
Caused   
CNY    HKD   JPY   KRW   IDR   MYR  PHP   SGD   THB  
CNY  
 0.177 
(0.838) 
0.820 
(0.444) 
1.160 
(0.319) 
3.218** 
(0.046) 
1.534 
(0.222) 
0.094 
(0.910) 
0.108 
(0.898) 
0.557 
(0.575)
HKD 
0.120 
(0.887) 
 0.010 
( 0.990) 
0.798 
( 0.454) 
1.025 
( 0.364) 
1.566 
( 0.216) 
0.621 
( 0.540) 
0.007 
( 0.993) 
0.244 
(0.784)
JPY 
0.213 
(0.809) 
5.573*** 
(0.006) 
 0.371 
(0.691) 
1.324 
(0.272) 
0.782 
(0.461) 
1.056 
(0.353) 
1.689 
(0.192) 
0.101 
(0.904)
KRW 
0.098 
(0.907) 
1.111 
(0.335) 
0.059 
(0.943) 
 0.895 
(0.413) 
1.141 
(0.325) 
0.060 
(0.942) 
0.804 
(0.451) 
0.340 
(0.713)
IDR 
13.669*** 
(0.000) 
1.081 
(0.345) 
1.556 
(0.218) 
0.931 
(0.399) 
 1.065 
(0.350) 
0.671 
(0.514) 
0.223 
(0.801) 
0.527 
(0.593)
MYR 
0.944 
(0.394) 
0.886 
(0.416) 
0.485 
(0.617) 
2.258 
(0.111) 
1.467 
(0.237) 
 0.186 
(0.831) 
0.080 
(0.924) 
0.229 
(0.796)
PHP 
0.780 
(0.462) 
0.285 
(0.753) 
0.577 
(0.564) 
0.104 
(0.902) 
1.114 
(0.334) 
0.791 
(0.457) 
 0.175 
(0.840) 
0.656 
(0.522)
SGD 
1.653 
(0.198) 
8.572*** 
(0.000) 
0.080 
(0.923) 
0.143 
(0.867) 
1.759 
(0.179) 
0.075 
(0.928) 
2.188 
(0.119) 
 0.025 
(0.975)
THB 
0.475 
(0.624) 
5.404*** 
(0.006) 
0.545 
(0.582) 
0.580 
(0.563) 
2.705 
(0.073) 
0.690 
(0.505) 
1.477 
(0.235) 
2.631 
(0.079) 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is each currency in the first row does not Granger cause each 
currency in the first column. All currencies are in terms of units of U.S. dollar. The lag 
length is two months. ***, ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5 % 
significance level, respectively. P-values are in parentheses. CNY denotes Chinese Yuan; 
HKD denotes Hong Kong Dollar; JPY denotes Japanese Yen; KRW denotes Korean 
Won; IDR denotes Indonesia Rupiah; MYR denotes Malaysia Ringgit; PHP denotes 
Philippine peso; SGD denotes Singapore Dollar; THB denotes Thai Baht. 
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(Continued) Table 2.10 Results of Granger Causality Tests on Bilateral Currency 
Values 
 
B. Post-crisis period (1999:01-2005:12) 
F-Statistics (Probability) 
Cause 
Caused   
CNY   HKD   JPY   KRW   IDR   MYR   PHP   SGD   THB  
CNY  
 1.505 
 (0.229) 
0.259 
 (0.772) 
0.172 
(0.843) 
1.820 
(0.169) 
 0.352 
(0.704) 
 0.094 
(0.910) 
 0.522 
(0.596) 
 0.296 
(0.745)
HKD 
1.938 
(0.151) 
  0.608 
 (0.547) 
 0.112 
(0.894) 
0.974 
 (0.382) 
 0.163 
 (0.850) 
 0.128 
(0.880) 
0.644 
(0.528) 
0.520 
(0.596)
JPY 
0.643 
 (0.529) 
0.297 
 (0.744) 
 0.186 
(0.831) 
0.246 
 (0.782) 
0.429 
 (0.653) 
4.009** 
(0.022) 
0.347 
(0.708) 
 0.862 
(0.427)
KRW 
 0.354 
(0.703) 
 0.297 
(0.744) 
0.515 
(0.600) 
  0.257 
 (0.774) 
 0.085 
(0.919) 
 1.370 
(0.260) 
0.600 
(0.551) 
 0.381 
(0.685)
IDR 
 0.073 
(0.930) 
0.748 
(0.477) 
0.209 
(0.812) 
0.207 
(0.814) 
  0.513 
 0.601 
0.102 
(0.903) 
0.607 
(0.548) 
0.239 
(0.788)
MYR 
0.108 
(0.898) 
0.212 
(0.810) 
2.246 
(0.113) 
0.492 
 (0.613) 
0.124 
(0.884) 
 1.909 
 (0.155) 
 4.228** 
(0.018) 
1.038 
(0.359)
PHP 
 0.809 
(0.449) 
0.274 
(0.761) 
1.123 
(0.331) 
2.002 
 (0.142) 
1.328 
 (0.271) 
1.548 
 (0.219) 
 2.122 
(0.127) 
1.366 
(0.261)
SGD 
0.825 
 (0.442) 
 0.353 
(0.703) 
 0.600 
(0.551) 
1.257 
 (0.291) 
 0.538 
(0.586) 
0.794 
(0.456) 
0.881 
 (0.419) 
 0.152 
(0.859)
THB 
0.904 
(0.409) 
0.941 
(0.395) 
0.749 
(0.476) 
0.368 
(0.694) 
1.076 
 (0.346) 
 0.818 
 (0.445) 
 0.587 
(0.559) 
 0.332 
(0.718) 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is each currency in the first row does not Granger cause each 
currency in the first column. All currencies are in terms of units of U.S. dollar. The lag 
length is two months. ***, ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% and 5 % 
significance level, respectively. P-values are in parentheses. CNY denotes Chinese Yuan; 
HKD denotes Hong Kong Dollar; JPY denotes Japanese Yen; KRW denotes Korean 
Won; IDR denotes Indonesia Rupiah; MYR denotes Malaysia Ringgit; PHP denotes 
Philippine peso; SGD denotes Singapore Dollar; THB denotes Thai Baht.
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 (Continued) Appendix 2.1 CUSUM Tests for the Pre-crisis Period 
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(Continued) Appendix 2.1 CUSUM Tests for the Pre-crisis Period 
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 (Continued) Appendix 2.1 CUSUM Tests for the Pre-crisis Period 
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Appendix 2.2 CUSUM Tests for the Post-crisis Period 
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(Continued) Appendix 2.2 CUSUM Tests for the Post-crisis Period 
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 (Continued) Appendix 2.2 CUSUM Tests for the Post-crisis Period 
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(Continued) Appendix 2.2 CUSUM Tests for the Post-crisis Period 
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Chapter 3  
Exchange Rate Regimes and Monetary Independence: 
the Transmission of Interest rates in East Asia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The choice of exchange rate regime – fixed, floating, or intermediate – has been an 
important question in international monetary economics. As one of the most 
fundamental policy issues in open economies, the advantages and disadvantages of 
different exchange rate regimes have been extensively discussed and debated. It is well 
known that the fixed exchange rate regime, worked as a credible anchor for monetary 
policy, can reduce transaction costs and exchange rate risk. On the other hand, the 
flexible exchange rate allows monetary authorities to retain domestic interest rates as 
policy instrument used for other macroeconomic goals, such as long-term growth, full 
employment, or price stability, which suggest an independent monetary policy 10 . 
Therefore, the decision of whether to peg or not may determine the options of monetary 
policy and the ability to maintain open capital markets.  
 
From the perspective of theoretical predictions, with a pegged exchange rate under free 
capital movements, monetary policy is committed to the single goal of maintaining the 
exchange rate at its announced level and domestic interest rates cannot be set 
independently. According to the theory of “impossible trinity”, without restrictions on 
capital flows, monetary authority that wishes to retain domestic interest rate as a policy 
instrument must adopt a flexible exchange rate arrangement. Hence, theoretically, 
domestic interest rates will follow closely changes in foreign (U.S.) interest rates, and 
are highly sensitive to foreign (U.S.) monetary policy under a pegged exchange rate 
regime. In contrast, economies with floating exchange rate regime can in principle 
accommodate international interest rate shocks by allowing the exchange rate to adjust. 
 
10 For a more complete exposition of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative exchange rate 
regimes, see Frankel et al., (2002). 
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Actually, the extent to which domestic interest rates react should depend on the 
monetary policy framework adopted by one country. For instance, under inflation 
targeting, if an increase in U.S. interest rate causes the domestic currency to depreciate 
significantly, the central bank is likely to tighten monetary policy to temper the increase 
in inflation resulting from the pass-through of the depreciation into domestic prices. 
Thus, the overall effect of the increase in U.S. interest rates will be some increase in 
domestic interest rates and some exchange rate depreciation, whereas the effect should 
be felt fully by domestic interest rates in a pegged regime.  
 
Despite these predictions, we may encounter the possibility of tightly integrated capital 
markets and the non-pegged countries are also short of monetary freedom. This “could 
occur if any interest rate policy, other than following the base interest rate, generated 
immediate exchange rate fluctuations beyond the amount most countries are willing to 
tolerate” (Shambaugh, 2004, p. 1). Indeed, the concept of “fear of floating” is proposed 
as an alternate view to explain countries with de jure flexible regimes do not allow their 
exchange rates to move freely (Hausmann et al., 2001 and Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
These authors pointed out factors like lack of credibility, exchange rate pass-through, 
and foreign-currency liabilities prevent countries from pursuing an independent 
monetary policy, regardless of their announced regimes. Shambaugh (2004) further 
suggests in this case, there is an open economy dilemma, not trilemma: the choice is to 
have monetary freedom or open capital markets. Since most countries have liberalised 
capital flows, or are in the process of doing so, this would suggest that only few 
countries have monetary freedom in today’s world. Under this scenario, all countries 
would display a tight connection to the relevant base economy. There would be no 
difference between countries adopting pegged and non-pegged exchange rate regimes.  
 
In addition, recent studies argue that the standard proposition that flexible exchange rate 
arrangements allow a country to retain its monetary independence so that domestic 
interest rates can be used as an economic policy instrument does not hold for emerging 
markets. Due to credibility problems, strong inflation pass-through of exchange rates, or 
wide-spread currency substitution, emerging countries cannot utilise interest rates and 
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nominal exchange rates effectively to absorb shocks from abroad. For example, Frankel 
et al. (2002) point out the developing countries with a flexible exchange rate policy 
suffer from having to pay risk premia11. Since risk premia could be affected by 
international interest rates, the interest rates in developing countries adopting a flexible 
exchange rate policy might be sensitive to the U.S. more than those adopting a fixed 
exchange rate policy. The emerging market economies subject to sharp changes in 
international investor confidence cannot benefit from the use of the interest rate 
instrument, and would in fact be worse off by leaving that possibility open (see, 
Hausmann et al., 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). 
Motivated by the above theoretical issues discussed in the current literature, this chapter 
aims to examine whether the adoption of new exchange rate regime has affected 
monetary autonomy in the context of East Asian economies, concerning the sensitivity 
of domestic interest rates to international interest rates under different currency regimes 
during 1994-2004. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the regimes adopted by the emerging 
East Asian countries in the wake of the 1997/98 financial crisis have varied significantly. 
Some officially adopted for fixed exchange rate regimes, either in a hard peg currency 
board system (Hong Kong, Malaysia) or a combined form with restriction on capital 
flows (China), while others especially for most crisis-affected East Asian economies 
including Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand have shifted their exchange rate 
regimes from de facto U.S. dollar pegs to floating ones. It is argued that East Asian 
central banks have intervened heavily in foreign exchange rate markets in order to 
prevent the appreciation of their currencies for the pursuit of an “export-led growth 
strategy” (Dooley et al., 2003). Then we come to the following questions: Has the 
adoption of a new exchange regime in the post-crisis period have enabled East Asian 
countries to retain their monetary autonomy? How did local interest rates of East Asian 
economies react to foreign rates such as U.S. interest rates under their different regimes 
of exchange rate in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods?  
 
                                                        
11 The risk premia can be both currency premia to compensate for devaluation risk and country premia to 
compensate for default risk. 
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This study will take the short-term interest rate as a measure for monetary policy and 
assume autonomy or independence of monetary policy can be measured by movements 
in short-term interest rates. We then seek to understand the effect of exchange rate 
regimes on monetary policy by establishing the extent to which local interest rates 
follow base country’s interest rates, and whether this is any different for countries with 
different exchange rate arrangements. Eight East Asian economies (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) with typical 
exchange rate arrangements and their monetary independence for the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis period have been examined accordingly. The methodology for empirical 
investigation in this chapter follows closely to the previous work, while extending the 
literature in three aspects. First, considering the classification of exchange rate regime 
might be sensitive to results, this study employs the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) coding 
as an alternative instead of official or de jure classification of exchange rate regime to 
test the robustness of results. Second, the choice of the sample period in this study 
depends on the possibility of contrasting the alternative exchange rate regime. Third, 
this study adopts the Generalised Method of Movements (GMM) technique developed 
by Hansen (1982) in order to control for the endogeneity problem of international 
interest rate shocks as well as heteroskedasticity of unknown form in the disturbance 
terms.  
 
This reminder of chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the effects of 
exchange rate regime on monetary autonomy. Section 3.3 provides a review of literature 
and empirical evidence. Section 3.4 explains the empirical framework and methodology. 
Section 3.5 discusses the empirical results and Section 3.6 concludes this chapter by 
providing the implication of results.   
 
3.2 Effects of Exchange Rate Regime on Monetary Autonomy  
 
In principle, with a pegged exchange rate under free capital movements, monetary 
policy is committed to the single goal of maintaining the exchange rate at its announced 
level. Therefore, the monetary authority conducts interventions in the foreign exchange 
markets to assure exchange rate stability. The domestic interest rates cannot be set 
independently. By contrast, under a flexible exchange rate arrangement, the domestic 
interest rate should be less sensitive to changes in international interest rates, if other 
things equal. Changes in the exchange rates would absorb the shocks of international 
interest rate and thereby provide “insulation” for domestic interest rates. Countries with 
intermediate regimes should also display less sensitivity to international interest rates 
than countries with firm pegs. The argument in favor of monetary independence pointed 
out that monetary policy is always diverted, at least to some extent, in dealing with the 
balance of payments under fixed exchange rate. Under the combination of fixed 
exchange rate and complete integration of financial markets, monetary policy becomes 
completely powerless. In contrast, under floating exchange rate, the country can 
respond to a recession by means of monetary expansion and depreciation of the 
currency. This stimulates the demand for domestic products and returns the economy to 
desired levels of employment and output more rapidly than the case under a fixed 
exchange rate. The aforementioned issues are actually involved in a basic proposition of 
international macroeconomics, the notion of the open economy trilemma. This notion 
suggests an “impossible trinity” scenario: countries can pursue two of three 
options—fixed exchange rates, domestic monetary autonomy, and capital mobility. 
Thus, without capital controls, the monetary authority that wishes to retain domestic 
interest rate as a policy instrument must adopt a flexible exchange rate arrangement.  
 
In order to explain the way that foreign interest rates affect local rates under different 
exchange rate regimes, here we can employ the interest rate parity equation: 
 
[ ] tttttt eeErr π+−+= +1*                                               (3.1) 
 
where  denotes the domestic interest rate, is the foreign interest rate, 
denotes the expected value of a change in log nominal exchange rate, and 
tr
te−
*
tr
)( 1teE +
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tπ denotes the country risk premium. With perfect capital mobility, this equation 
provides the following predictions: In case of the credibly pegged exchange rate, that is, 
when )( 1 tt eeE −+ =0, local interest rate is equal to the foreign interest rate plus a risk 
differential. If investment opportunities in two countries are equally risky, then tπ  is 
zero and the interest rate differential should be equal to the expected change in the 
exchange rate. If the risk differential is extremely small or does not change with the 
change in interest rates, the local interest rate changes with the base interest rate. 
Furthermore, the previous work by Frankel and Froot (1987) suggest that most of the 
bias in a forward market or any difference in domestic and foreign interest rates can be 
better explained by expectations, not a risk premium. Their suggestion provides a 
justification for the assumption that local rate changes with the base rate. 
 
Based on the above assumptions and concerns, we could come to the following equation 
where the domestic interest rate follows changes in the foreign interest rate: 
 
t
lc u= tr +Δ+ *βαtrΔ                                                          (3.2) 
 
The standard theory suggests that countries with non-pegged exchange rate should have 
more monetary autonomy than those with fixed exchange rate. According to the 
Equation (3.2), the β  coefficient for countries with pegged exchange rate should be 
significantly larger than those of countries with fixed exchange rate. If a peg is rigid and 
perfectly credible, capital markets are open and arbitrage costless, risk premiums are 
constant, and investors are optimistic, we would expect the coefficients to be 1. Under a 
fully flexible exchange rate regime, the local interest rate does not have to respond to 
changes in the expectations, but can instead allow the exchange rate to adjust 
immediately so that the expected change in the exchange rate is equal to any interest 
rate differential that develops. Thus, there is no reason for the local interest rates to react 
to the base rates or to expectations or to the risk premium, and standard theory would 
imply a lower β  driven by the correlation of shocks. In the intermediate case—when 
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exchange rates are allowed to move within a certain limit—a less flexible exchange rate 
regime is associated with a larger transmission of external shocks into domestic interest 
rates.  
 
Note that the above discussion rests on capital mobility. The open-economy trilemma 
suggests that countries with open capital markets cannot pursue domestically oriented 
monetary policy and fixed exchange rates at the same time. Thus, we expect these 
results to hold only for countries with open capital markets. Nevertheless, some authors 
suggest that the effectiveness of controls for capital inflows and outflows is very limited, 
at least on a sustained basis (see, for example, Ariyoshi et al., 2000). Considering the 
rapid process of financial deepening and innovation also may reduce the effectiveness 
of capital control, the traditional trinity dilemma is usually reduced to the two options or 
a monetary policy-exchange rate stability trade-off.  
 
Recent literature has also identified other factors that could affect the correlation 
between domestic and foreign interest rates. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) point 
out factors such as the degree of financial integration, the degree of real international 
integration, and the common shocks could determine the degree of co-movement of 
local and foreign interest rates. In fact, in the presence of barriers to international capital 
flows, the response of local interest rates to changes in foreign interest rates can be 
dampened. If the same exchange rate arrangements had been maintained, an increase in 
the degree of capital account liberalisation would have reduced monetary independence. 
If business cycles are highly synchronised across countries, we may expect domestic 
and foreign interest rates are highly correlated. In addition, common shocks12 might 
affect many countries simultaneously and could lead a high correlation between interest 
rates for given degrees of international and financial integration. Nevertheless, the focus 
of this study is not to explore the role of the above factors but examine the link between 
local and foreign interest rates under alternative exchange rate regimes. The estimation 
of the long-run relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates, and the 
 
12 Unlike country specific idiosyncratic shocks, common shocks such as financial and climatic ones can 
affect many countries simultaneously, which tend to be reflected in closer correlation of interest rates. 
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monetary independence hypothesis under different exchange rate regimes across the 
studied sample period will be addressed in this chapter.  
 
3.3 Literature Review 
 
Recently, several studies has formally investigated the impacts of the currency regimes 
on the independence of monetary policy (Frankel, 1999; Hausmann et al., 2001; 
Borensztein et al., 2001; Frankel et al., 2002; Kim and Lee, 2004; Shambaugh, 2004). 
By estimating the sensitivity of local interest rates to changes in foreign (base) interest 
rates, these researchers attempted to examine whether local rates are less sensitive to 
foreign interest rate changes under a floating exchange rate regime than under a pegged 
one.  
 
Frankel (1999) find that, at first glance, pegged countries follow the base more than 
intermediate or floating countries. However, their early version of regressions on 
individual Latin American countries in the 1990s suggests the possible existence of unit 
roots in the data. The regression analysis on first-differences does not support the 
intuition. Apply the PSS technique (see Pesaran et al., 2001), Frankel et al. (2002) 
examine twenty developing and industrial countries in the 1990s to see if there is a 
consistent levels relationship and test the speed of adjustment to foreign interest rate 
shocks. They find full transmission of interest rates cannot be rejected in the long run in 
most cases, even for countries with floating regimes. However, short-run effects differ 
across regimes. They point out that interest rates of countries with more flexible regimes 
adjust more slowly to changes in international rates, suggesting some capacity for 
monetary independence.  
 
Focusing on some countries whose exchange rate regimes can be clearly defined as 
either currency boards or floating regimes, Borensztein et al. (2001) find evidence 
supporting the traditional view that local rates are less sensitive to base interest rate 
changes under floating exchange rate regimes than under pegged regimes. In order to 
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avoid the problem of spurious correlation, they consider the changes in local interest 
rates and examine them in response to estimated monetary policy shocks in the base 
rates. Their paper tests autonomy in the face of certain types of shocks but does not 
answer the question of whether credible fixed exchange rate regimes enforce interest 
rate equal the interest rate of the base economy as theory says it should.  
 
On the other hand, evidence during 1997-1999 reported in Hausmann et al. (1999) is 
consistent with an alternative view. They point out that Argentina with peg regime 
reacts the least to U.S. interest rate changes, Mexico (the float) the most, with Venezuela 
(a weak peg) in the middle and concluded that the monetary freedom associated with 
floating exchange rates does not exist for all countries. In addition, they examine real 
interest rate reactions for eleven countries and find that pegged countries react to U.S. 
real interest rates less or equal to floating countries. Nevertheless, their regressions are 
run on levels rather than first differences leaving the interpretation unclear. 
 
Shambaugh (2004) includes both the base currencies and the U.S. dollar in his study. He 
examines the impact of capital controls, as well as other control variables. He also 
considers the time series properties of the data and uses cointegration and other 
levels-relationship analysis to provide additional insights. The general conclusion of his 
paper is that fixed exchange rates do in fact force countries to follow the monetary 
policy of the base country more closely than floating rate countries. He suggests that, in 
general, the trilemma presents a sensible framework for policy analysis. Hard pegs are 
not a panacea; they come with costs. In particular, this chapter demonstrates that fixed 
exchange rates involve a loss of monetary policy autonomy. 
 
Focusing on the East Asian countries, however, the previous studies provide 
inconclusive evidence. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Borensztein et al. 
(2001) show that interest rates in Hong Kong, which has a fixed exchange rate regime, 
is much more sensitive to U.S. interest rates than interest rates in Singapore, which has 
a floating exchange rate regime. In contrast, Frankel et al. (2002) find that local interest 
rates are adjusted fully to international interest rates in the long run regardless of the 
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exchange rate regime for Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand. But their 
study does not consider the change of the regimes after the crisis explicitly. Kim and 
Lee (2004) employ a regime-switching model that allows for the possibility of a 
structural break in the sensitivity of local interest rates to changes in international 
interest rates over the sample period. They take into account the possibility that the 
timing of actual structural break in the degree of monetary independence and the timing 
of de jure exchange rate regime change may not coincide. Their empirical findings 
suggest that greater exchange rate flexibility offers a higher monetary independence for 
East Asian economies, which supports the conventional predictions.  
 
Although these results from existing studies are suggestive, they raise questions about 
robustness, in particular to the way in which the regressions are specified and the 
relationship between domestic and international interest rates is captured. In addition, 
the classification of exchange rate regime, the estimation technique applied, as well as 
the specific sample period focused might contribute to the regression outcome. 
Focusing on eight East Asian economies with typical exchange rate arrangements and 
their monetary policies spanning 1994 to 2004, this study provides a further 
investigation on the relationship between local interest rates and foreign interest rates 
under different exchange rate arrangements. In particular, we take both pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods into account to assess the conventional theory regarding the impact 
of exchange rate regime on the independence of monetary policy. The strategy that we 
followed will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.4 Methodology Description 
 
3.4.1 Basic Model Specification 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the primary concern of this study is to empirically 
examine the relationship between domestic and foreign interest rates under different 
exchange rate regimes. Frankel et al. (2002) suggest countries could temporarily isolate 
themselves from fluctuations in world interest rates, and the length of time until full 
adjustment of the local interest rates to its based foreign interest rates can be a measure 
of the degree of monetary autonomy. As an efficient way to test the conventional view 
using time series data, it is likely to require a full dynamic specification, in the sense of 
allowing for lags in the dependent variables. In this study, we pay particular attention to 
the reaction of local rates to the foreign rates and its lagged form. Thus the following 
equation will be estimated to combine the long-run relation between local and 
international interest rates and to capture the dynamic of interest rate adjustment: 
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where  represents the changes of domestic nominal interest rate in the local 
currency of each country at time t; 
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a risk premium;  is the international interest rate; *tr β  represents the sensitivity of 
the local interest rates to foreign rates. We assume that the error term  has a mean of 
zero and is independently distributed across countries, but is possibly heteroskedastic 
and serially correlated. In this model, the parameter ∑ (henceforth, ,) 
captures the country heterogeneity in adjustment speed. Thus the speed of adjustment of 
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long-run adjustment of local interest rates to international interest rates is measured by 
δβ −1/ .  
 
As aforementioned, although other variables may enter the relationship between the 
local interest rate and a base (foreign) interest rate, our primary interest is the coefficient 
on the base rate, β . The size of the coefficient β  can be used to classify degrees of 
floating/pegged exchange rate regimes both across countries and across time within a 
country. We estimate the dynamic specification in Equation (3.3) for each sampled 
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country-currency regime episode separately rather than pooling the data 13 . The 
parameter β  will be compared across economies and across time within a country in 
order to assess whether the monetary independence is influenced by the choice of 
currency regime. According to the conventional view, more flexible exchange rate 
regimes should allow countries additional room to pursue their monetary policy. Hence, 
the sensitivity of local interest rates to international rates should increase with the 
rigidity of the exchange rate regime. For a given degree of capital mobility, real 
integration and other factors, we would expect FloatingteIntermediaFixed βββ >>
Fixed
 . 
 
In a fixed exchange rate regime with full capital mobility, β  is expected to be 1. In 
the case of intermediate regime, including “dirty floating” arrangement, the exchange 
rate absorbs little of the international shocks, so local interest rates have a relatively 
high correlation with those abroad. Thus, we would expect teIntermediaFixed ββ > . As for 
countries with similar exchange rate regimes, the sensitivity of the local interest rates to 
the foreign rates increases with the degree of capital account liberalisation. We might 
expect “fear of floating” scenario for non-pegs as recent arguments suggest. This is 
because the exchange rate policy may lack credibility and we thereby could see a case 
where floats react to the base rate more than pegs. As suggested by Shambaugh (2004), 
the non-zero β  coefficient can be generated by other reasons causing foreign and local 
interest rates to be correlated. Exchange rates could be one of the factors driving 
domestic inflation and thereby could be a part of most monetary rules. Hence, it is likely 
that countries without any international exchange rate policy will still respond to 
changes in the exchange rates. Svensson (2000) also shows that depending on the type 
of inflation targeting pursued, the reaction function of the coefficient on the foreign 
interest rate could be quite close to one. In addition, Parrado and Velasco (2002) argue 
that optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float which means foreign interest rate 
shocks are met partially by adjusting home interest rates and partially by allowing the 
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13 Frankel et al. (2002) suggest that heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics may exist among countries 
with similar exchange rate regimes due to factors such as the degree of development of the financial 
system and the openness of the capital account. Pooled estimation of Equation (3.3) would yield 
inconsistent estimates.  
exchange rate to move. Thus, many floaters also might show some reaction to foreign 
shocks and they might not appear to pure floats. Under this circumstance, an estimate of 
β  would simply equal the correlation of base and local shocks.  
 
We also expect that, all other factors being equal, the adjustment speed is higher (i.e., a 
lower value of δ ) in fixed exchange rate regime but lower in floating exchange rate 
regime. With no barriers to capital movements we should find 11 →−δ  (that is, 
0→δ ) under fixed exchange rates. Conversely, in the limit, with flexible exchange 
rates and full monetary independence policy we would expect to find 01 →−δ , so that 
the local interest rate does not revert to a long-run equilibrium relation with the foreign 
interest rate. 
 
3.4.2 Estimation Technique  
 
There have been some important issues in the estimation of the basic equation. Previous  
studies (for example, Frankel et al., 2002) often view the foreign interest rates as 
exogenous variables and thereby assume the changes in foreign interest rates are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term. However, as suggested by Kim 
and Lee (2004), this assumption ignores a potential endogeneity problem between U.S. 
and domestic interest rates due to the fact that East Asian economies are highly linked 
to the U.S. in trade. We may expect shocks to U.S. activities are likely to affect the 
outputs of Asian economies, leading to co-movements of the U.S. and domestic interest 
rates (Borensztein et al., 2001). When the error distribution cannot be considered 
independent of the regressor’s distribution, the application of the instrument variables 
(IV) is usually called for. However, the conventional IV estimator (though consistent) is 
inefficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In order to account for aforementioned 
endogeneity problem as well as heteroskedasticity of unknown form of in the 
disturbance term, Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) technique introduced by 
Hansen (1982) can be employed in this kind of estimation.  
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GMM has been an effective approach which makes use of the orthogonality conditions 
to allow for efficient estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
The GMM estimator can be viewed as a class of estimators known as M-estimators that 
are defined by minimising a criterion function. It is based upon the assumption that the 
disturbances in the equations are uncorrelated with a set of instrumental variables. As a 
robust estimator, it does not require information of the exact distribution of the 
disturbances. By appropriately choosing the weighting matrix in the criterion function, 
GMM can be made robust to heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation of unknown form. 
The theoretical relations that the parameters should satisfy are usually orthogonality 
conditions between a possibly non-linear function of the parameters )(θf  and a set of 
instrument variables  (Hansen, 1982): tz
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where θ  are the parameters to be estimated. The GMM estimator selects parameter 
estimates so that the sample correlations between the instruments and the function  
are as close to zero as possible, as defined by the criterion function (Hansen, 1982): 
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where Zfm )()( ′= θθ  and  is a weighting matrix. The weighting matrix 
determines how each moment condition is weighted in the estimation. The principle is 
that more accurate moment conditions should be weighted more than less accurate ones.  
Any symmetric positive definite matrix  will yield a consistent estimate of . 
However, it can be shown that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to obtain an 
(asymptotically) efficient estimate of  is to set  equal to the inverse of the 
covariance matrix of the sample moment . Therefore, in this study, a vector of 
instrumental variables  is introduced, which is required to correlate with 
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not with . Then, Equation (3.3) implies the following orthogonality conditions: te
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which is used as the basis for the GMM estimation of the parameters of the model.  
 
3.5 Empirical Analysis of Monetary Independence in East Asia 
 
3.5.1 Data, Regime Classification and Statistics  
 
Data  
 
Monthly data are drawn from the IMF International Financial Statistics database 
covering the period from 1994 to 2004. This study employs (90-days) money market 
rates as local interest rates since they can reflect market forces better than deposit rates. 
The latter ones, however, are often subject to administrative controls and in many cases 
display little movement over prolonged periods, which do not suit the purpose of this 
study. The 90-day U.S. T-bill rates are used as foreign interest rates. It makes sense to 
split the whole sample into sub-periods and treat the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods as 
separate regime. We define the pre-crisis period as starting from January 1994 to June 
1997, and the post-crisis period as starting from January 1999 to December 2004. Note 
that the crisis period (July 1997-December 1998) has been excluded in the regression in 
order to eliminate the large uncertainty in the interest rate differentials. We also assume 
that a structural break in Equation (3.3) occurred during the crisis period. Such a choice 
for the baseline sub-sample periods and assumption of structural break can be justified 
by the fact that, for the countries under investigation with either de jure or de facto 
exchange rate regime changes, the dates of the changes fall within the crisis period.  
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In addition, the degree of interest rate interdependence could be influenced by changes 
in the stringency of capital controls. It is likely that monetary policy cannot remain the 
same across varying degrees of capital control. In this vein, a proxy of capital control 
variable which could interact with the base rate would be demanded. However, our 
study mainly deals with the monthly data and there is no index for capital control 
available at the monthly frequency. Moreover, considering that the effectiveness of 
controls for capital inflows and outflows is very limited (at least on a sustained basis) in 
East Asia, our primary concern of this study is not to explore the effect of capital 
controls on the interdependence of interest rates. Instead, we aim to examine the role of 
currency regime on the monetary independence.  
 
Regime Classification 
 
An assessment of the impact of a country’s exchange rate regime on its monetary 
performance must firstly settle on definitions for alternative regimes. The de jure 
classification system has been the typical method used for coding currency regime. 
Recently, though, some researchers have started to examine the de facto behaviour of 
countries rather than their declared intent because many countries do not characterise 
their behaviour accurately. Different from the de jure IMF classification that relies 
exclusively on each government’s own declaration of its exchange rate regime, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) classification together with the recent studies such as Levy-Yeyati 
and Strurzenegger (2005) highlight the contrast between the actual practice of exchange 
rate polices and the countries’ official declarations. These studies classify the exchange 
rate regimes in terms of the way one country actually conducts exchange rate policy.  
 
Our study makes a case for using Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) de facto coding or 
“natural” classification for characterising true regimes. In building up their 
comprehensive “natural” classification scheme, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) seek to 
address the potential misclassification by separating episodes of macroeconomic 
instability that are characterised by very high inflation rates into a “freely falling” 
category. Their classification also employs a rolling five-year horizon to measure true 
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flexibility of regime which helps distinguish between longer-term “regimes” and 
shorter-term “spells” within a regime, such as the widening of a horizontal band or a 
one-time devaluation followed by a re-peg. Appendix 3.1 (A and B) reports the de jure 
and de facto classifications of currency regimes for East Asian countries, respectively.  
 
Comparison of regime classifications across the de jure and de facto (natural) 
classifications not only renders similar conclusion in terms of broad categories, but also 
highlights some divergence between the regimes countries say they have and those they 
actually operate in terms of narrow categories. As Appendix 3.1 (A and B) illustrated, 
both the de jure and de facto definitions seem to have reflected changes of exchange 
rate regime in the post-crisis East Asian countries. Specifically, if we look at in terms of 
three broad categories - fixed, intermediate and floating regimes, we can find that there 
are similar classifications of exchange rate regime for each of the East Asian using both 
two classifications in 1990s. Philippines is the only exception which defined the 
country’s exchange rate regime as floating since October 1984 based on the IMF de jure 
classification, while the de facto one was deemed as intermediate before August 1995, 
fixed between September 1995 and June 1997, and intermediate from December 1997 
until 2002. Another distinctive aspect of the de facto one that different from the de jure 
one is the presence of “freely falling” category which stresses the episodes of 
macroeconomic disturbances or instability characterised by high inflation rates that 
often reflected in high and frequent exchange rate depreciation.  
 
Statistics 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the local interest rate against the U.S. interest rate for each East Asian 
economy. The bilateral exchange rates against U.S. dollar are plotted together as well. 
The exchange rate regimes that we denote in this figure are de facto regimes reported by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). According to this classification, Hong Kong, Japan and 
Singapore have never changed their exchange rate regimes while Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand have changed their exchange rate regimes at least 
once during the whole sample period (1994-2004).  
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Table 3.1 displays a summary of statistics of monthly interest rates for sample countries. 
The means of the short-term interest rates in seven East Asian economies (Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) increased 
significantly in 1997 and then continued at the high level until 1998. In the case of 
Indonesia, the mean even reached a much higher level in 1998 where it rose by around 
200 percent from the mean in 1997. In order to prevent a collapse of the currency values 
or defend exchange rate, these countries were forced to raise domestic interest rates to 
exceedingly high levels. Obviously, the tight monetary policy through maintaining high 
short-term interest rates has been adopted by many crisis-affected countries during the 
crisis period, and such tight monetary policy has been supported by IMF and Fischer 
(1999). Since 1999, the short-term interest rates for these countries in sample have 
moved toward lower levels. As for the standard deviations of the short-term interest 
rates, most East Asian economies (except Japan) also increased sharply and reached 
peaks either in 1997 or 1998, but dropped down after the crisis. However, Indonesia still 
maintained a relatively high level of standard deviations of the short-term interest rates 
among the sample countries. In Japan, there was a significant decrease in interest rate 
since 1996 and the zero interest rates policy was adopted by central bank in 2001 to 
hold back deflation. The money rates of Japan kept at extremely low level with quite 
small standard deviation.  
 
3.5.2 Stationarity Analysis 
 
As with many time series of macroeconomic data, interest rates data are usually treated 
as if the series have a unit root14. This study conducts Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit 
root tests on interest rates variables prior to carrying out the estimation. The results 
reported in Table 3.2 indicate a failure to reject the null of a unit root for each variable 
for levels but accept stationarity for first differences for both pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods at the 1% significance level15. Furthermore, the stationarity for all series in the 
 
14 See Wu and Zhang (1997) and citations therein. 
15 For the pre-crisis period, 1% critical value of ADF unit root test is -4.19 for levels, and -4.21 for first 
differences for all variables. For post-crisis period, 1% critical value is -4.09 for levels, and -4.10 for first 
differences for all variables. 
first-differenced form cannot be rejected from a KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt, and Shin, 1992) for both of the two sub-sample periods, confirming the fact 
that variables of basic model are specified in the first-differenced manner.  
 
3.5.3 Analysis of Estimation Results 
 
In the next stage, we apply GMM technique to estimate the dynamic specification in 
Equation (3.3) for the eight East Asian economies in each sub-sample period. Based on 
the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), as well as the J-statistics testing the validity of 
overidentifying restrictions from GMM estimation16, the instrument variables employed 
in GMM estimation are the four lags of domestic and U.S. interest rates ( , , 
, , , , , ). 
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Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 report a summary of GMM estimation results, using three broad 
categories of currency arrangements. For each country, we report the parameterα ,β , 
and δ , as well as the p-value from the Wald test on the full long-run adjustment (the 
null hypothesis is 1=β ). Table 3.3 presents the estimation results for three economies 
(Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore) which have never changed their exchange rate 
regimes throughout the whole sample period. By comparing the β  coefficients across 
sample countries in the post-crisis period, the estimate of sensitivity (β ) is 1.35 (s.e.= 
0.21)17 for Hong Kong, 0.47 (s.e.= 0.19) for Singapore, and -0.01 (s.e.= 0.01) for Japan. 
The estimate of the contemporaneous response of local interest rates to U.S. rates is the 
largest and statistically significant in Hong Kong (fixed regime). It is still statistically 
significant but smaller in Singapore (intermediate regime), but not significantly 
different from zero in Japan (floating regime). The estimates of β  for pre-crisis period 
                                                        
16 See Newey and West (1987) for the J-statistic used to carry out hypothesis tests from GMM 
estimation; a simple application of the J-statistic is to test the validity of over-identifying restriction when 
you have more instruments than parameters to estimate. The J-statistic times the number of observations 
is asymptotically distributed with chi square with degree of freedom equal the number of 
over-indentifying restrictions.    
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17 s.e. denotes the standard error.  
exhibit a similar pattern among these three countries, with the exception that the β  
coefficient is found to be insignificant in Singapore. These findings confirm 
conventional predictions: interest rates in Hong Kong, which has maintained a fixed 
exchange rate regime, react more to changes in the U.S. interest rate than interest rates 
in Singapore with intermediate regime, and far more than interest rates in Japan with 
free floating regime.  
 
As defined in Section 3.4.1, the parameter δ  captures the country heterogeneity in 
adjustment speed. We expect that, all other factors being equal, the speed of adjustment 
of domestic interest rates towards the long-run equilibrium would be high (i.e., a low 
value of δ ) under a fixed exchange rate regime, but low under a floating one. The 
estimates of δ  are found to be the lowest in Hong Kong (-0.57) but the largest in 
Japan (0.35) for the pre-crisis period, and similar pattern is also found in the post-crisis 
period. These findings imply the highest adjustment speed under pegged regime like 
Hong Kong, while under fully flexible regime like Japan—the local interest rate does 
not revert to a long-run equilibrium relation with the U.S. interest rates.   
 
In order to test the full long-run adjustment of local interest rates to U.S. interest rates, 
we also conduct Wald Test with the null hypothesis of the unity of long-run slope 
coefficient, that is β =1. As for Hong Kong with the pegged currency regime, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5 percent significance level (p-value equals 0.08 for the 
pre-crisis period, and 0.10 for the post-crisis period), indicating a full adjustment of its 
local interest rate to the U.S. interest rate in both sub-sample periods. As for Singapore 
with intermediate regime, the null hypothesis of full long-run adjustment is accepted in 
the pre-crisis period but rejected in the post-crisis period. In the case of Japan, the null 
hypothesis is always rejected for both sub-sample periods. 
 
Table 3.4 displays the regression results for the other five countries, namely Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand, which have changed their exchange rate 
regime at least once during the whole period (note that the exchange rate regimes in 
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these five countries were not changed during the crisis period). By examining theβ  
parameter in each country across the sub-sample periods, we find the interest rates in 
Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand, are consistent with the theory that the 
sensitivity of local interest rates to international rates should increase with the rigidity of 
the exchange rate regime: the estimates of sensitivity turn out to be large and 
statistically significant in the pre-crisis period when the countries adopt intermediate or 
de facto pegged regimes. For instance, the estimate of β  is 3.35 (s.e.= 1.42) for 
Indonesia, 7.82 (s.e.= 2.31) for Korea, 3.57 (s.e.= 1.02) for Philippines, and 7.54 (s.e.= 
2.72) for Thailand, respectively. As expected, the β  estimates become smaller, close 
to zero for Indonesia and Korea in the post-crisis period when these countries adopt a 
floating exchange rate regime subsequently. The estimates of β  in Philippines and 
Thailand are found to be still statistically significant in the post-crisis period, but the 
magnitudes of β  estimates become smaller than those in the pre-crisis period as well, 
which confirm the traditional prediction, that is, FloatingteIntermediaFixed βββ >> .  
 
In contrast to the conventional view, local interest rates in Malaysia do not become 
more sensitive to foreign rates after its adoption of pegged exchange rate regime in the 
post-crisis period. The observed β  coefficient is not statistically significant despite its 
large magnitude in the post-crisis period. One possible explanation for this could be the 
tight capital controls adopted by the Malaysian government after the crisis. The 
imperfect capital mobility might prevent full adjustment of local interest rates in the 
long run, and higher capital mobility could exhibit a relatively high degree of interest 
rate adjustment.  
 
The parameter δ  tells the same story that a relatively higher adjustment speed can be 
found in the intermediate regime than that in the floating regime. The magnitudes of δ  
become larger for most countries after they adopt floating regime in the post-crisis 
period, confirming a lower adjustment speed in the floating arrangement than in the 
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intermediate one. The Wald Test with null hypothesis of full long-run adjustment is 
only accepted for Indonesia in both two sub-sample periods, and for Philippines in the 
pre-crisis period at the 5 percent significance level. As for the other countries, the null 
hypothesis has been always rejected for both sub-sample periods.  
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
The impact of the exchange rate regimes on the independence of monetary policy is an 
important question in the context of the debate on the choice of currency regime. Under 
floating exchange rate regimes, countries are free to choose the optimal levels of 
inflation and interest rates. Under fixed exchange rate regimes, countries are forced to 
import monetary policy from abroad. Obviously, the desirable feature of a floating 
exchange rate regime is that it allows for monetary policy independence and resilience 
to large external shocks. 
 
This chapter aims to examine the influence of exchange rate regime choices on the 
monetary independence from a representative mixture of East Asian economies before 
and after the 1997/98 currency crisis. We take the short term interest rate as a measure 
for monetary policy and attempt to determine the degree of international interest rates 
interdependence for East Asian local interest rates. The empirical findings of this study 
are broadly consistent with the traditional view and prediction theory. The observed 
sensitivity of local interest rates to U.S. interest rates has declined for most studied 
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Thailand) since they adopted floating 
exchange rate regimes in the post-crisis period. We also find that countries with more 
floating exchange rate regimes such as Japan had greater independence in monetary 
policy than intermediate regime such as Singapore, and far more than economies with 
pegged regimes such as Hong Kong. This finding is broadly consistent with the study 
by Kim and Lee (2004). In contrast, due to imperfect capital mobility, the local interest 
rates in Malaysia do not become more sensitive to foreign rates after its adoption of 
pegged exchange rate regime in post-crisis period. In addition, the higher long-run 
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adjustment can be observed under pegged regime, while floating regime witnessed 
lower interest rates adjustment.  
 
In summary, this study highlights the role of exchange rate regime in the autonomy of 
monetary policy: floating exchange rate regimes indeed offer East Asian countries a 
considerable degree of monetary independence. Our findings confirm the effectiveness 
of traditional doctrine of impossible trinity or trilemma. A country that tries to 
simultaneously achieve the three goals including fixed exchange rates, domestic 
monetary autonomy, and capital mobility will suffer from policy inconsistency, which 
could lead to a currency crisis. This was what encountered by East Asian economies in 
the event of the 1997/98 financial crisis. Especially, the 1997/98 financial crisis has 
taught East Asian economies the lesson that the pace and scope of capital account 
liberalisation must be approached with great caution. With the development of 
globalisation, broad-ranging capital controls will gradually disappear and East Asian 
countries will eventually continue to move towards full financial integration. This will 
leave East Asian with two options: that is, either to achieve both exchange rate stability 
and financial integration sacrificing monetary independence or aim for monetary 
independence and financial integration. Therefore, before moving on to full capital 
account convertibility, East Asian economies should effectively manage the forces of 
financial globalisation, and strengthen monitoring of capital flows and exchange market 
developments and supervision over domestic financial systems. They also need to make 
efforts to promote the regional financial cooperation and prevent crises.  
 
Figures: 
 
Figure 3.1 Exchange Rates and Interest Rates in East Asia 
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(Continued) Figure 3.1 Exchange Rates and Interest Rates in East Asia 
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(Continued) Figure 3.1 Exchange Rates and Interest Rates in East Asia 
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(Continued) Figure 3.1 Exchange Rates and Interest Rates in East Asia 
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Note: In each figure, EX line denotes the exchange rates, INT line denotes the interest 
rates, and USTB line denotes the U.S. T-bill rates. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Monthly Interest Rates (Money Market Rates) 
 
Hong Kong Japan US Indonesia Years 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
1994 4.28 0.72 2.20 0.09 4.35 0.83 9.74 1.74 
1995 5.86 0.36 1.21 0.70 5.65 0.21 13.64 1.15 
1996 5.40 0.32 0.47 0.01 5.14 0.09 13.96 1.01 
1997 6.06 0.97 0.48 0.03 5.20 0.09 27.82 19.11 
1998 6.68 3.56 0.37 0.09 4.90 0.37 62.79 12.08 
1999 5.59 0.62 0.06 0.07 4.77 0.30 23.58 12.42 
2000 5.95 0.55 0.11 0.11 6.00 0.26 10.32 0.74 
2001 3.93 1.08 0.06 0.09 3.48 1.17 15.03 2.56 
2002 1.78 0.25 0.01 0.01 1.63 0.20 13.54 3.25 
2003 0.83 0.52 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.12 7.76 2.77 
2004 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.39 0.47 5.38 1.98 
 
Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Years 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
1994 12.45 1.50 4.20 0.34 13.99 4.82 3.68 0.42 7.25 1.48 
1995 12.57 1.58 5.60 0.50 11.93 4.58 2.56 0.58 10.96 2.11 
1996 12.44 1.95 6.92 0.30 12.77 1.16 2.93 0.52 9.23 2.28 
1997 13.24 2.79 7.61 1.65 16.16 6.99 4.35 1.64 14.59 5.06 
1998 14.98 7.13 8.46 1.83 13.90 0.97 5.00 1.93 13.02 7.12 
1999 5.01 0.49 3.38 1.17 10.16 1.71 2.04 0.41 1.77 0.60 
2000 5.16 0.17 2.66 0.13 10.84 2.30 2.57 0.21 1.95 0.31 
2001 4.69 0.48 2.79 0.03 9.75 1.12 1.99 0.53 2.00 0.37 
2002 4.21 0.14 2.73 0.02 7.15 0.25 0.96 0.18 1.76 0.11 
2003 4.00 0.23 2.74 0.03 6.97 0.15 0.74 0.08 1.31 0.25 
2004 3.65 0.18 2.70 0.01 7.05 0.11 1.04 0.31 1.23 0.29 
Note: Std = Standard Deviation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Variables Sub-sample 
periods  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
Statistics 
(Trend and Intercept) 
KPSS Statistics 
(Trend and 
Intercept) 
  Level 1st difference 1st difference 
HKr  Pre-crisis  -2.110 -11.804*** 0.101 
 Post-crisis  -1.870 -9.485*** 0.115 
INDOr  Pre-crisis  -2.627 -8.564*** 0.107 
 Post-crisis  -2.713 -15.470*** 0.081 
JAPr  Pre-crisis  -2.210 -4.628*** 0.108 
 Post-crisis  -3.074 -5.608*** 0.059 
KORr  Pre-crisis  -2.969 -6.477*** 0.034 
 Post-crisis  -3.027 -4.980*** 0.108 
MALAr  Pre-crisis  -2.250 -9.045*** 0.080 
 Post-crisis  -2.508 -4.678*** 0.106 
PHILr  Pre-crisis  -2.524 -5.620*** 0.040 
 Post-crisis  -3.054 -5.420*** 0.066 
SINGAr  Pre-crisis  -2.480 -6.491*** 0.058 
 Post-crisis  -2.170 -10.815*** 0.105 
THAIr  Pre-crisis  -3.040 -7.225*** 0.008 
 Post-crisis  -3.044 -9.064*** 0.072 
USr  Pre-crisis  -2.528 -4.605*** 0.054 
 Post-crisis  -1.378 -4.195*** 0.108 
Notes: *** denotes rejection of the null of unit root for the ADF test at the 1% 
significance level with critical values taken from MacKinnon (1996). For the pre-crisis 
period, 1% critical value of ADF unit root test is -4.19 for levels, and -4.21 for first 
differences for all variables. For post-crisis period, 1% critical value is -4.09 for levels, 
and -4.10 for first differences for all variables. The lengths of lags were chosen by the 
Schwarz information criterion. The Asymptotic critical values for KPSS statistics in 
first difference are: 0.216 for 1% level, 0.146 for 5% level, and 0.119 for 10% level. 
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Table 3.3 Estimation Results for Countries with One Exchange Rate Regime 
 
 
A. Pre-crisis period 
1994.1-1997.6  
Country 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Regime 
α  β  δ  Test for 
long-run 
slope =1 
Hong Kong Fixed 0.03 
(0.05) 
2.93*** 
(0.68) 
-0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.08 
Japan Floating 0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.02) 
0.00 
Singapore Intermediate -0.00 
(0.04) 
0.55 
(0.77) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.56 
Notes: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Level of 
significance indicated by asterisks, *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. The 
column of the test for long-run slope shows the p-value for the significance level 
associated with the test for the hypothesis that the long-run response of local to U.S. 
interest rats is one. 
 
B. Post-crisis period 
1999.1-2004.12  
Country 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Regime 
α  β  δ  Test for 
long-run 
slope =1 
Hong Kong Fixed -0.07** 
(0.03) 
1.35*** 
(0.21) 
-0.41*** 
(0.10) 
0.10 
Japan Floating -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.00 
Singapore Intermediate 0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.47*** 
(0.19) 
-0.38*** 
(0.08) 
0.01 
Notes: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Level of 
significance indicated by asterisks, *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. The 
column of the test for long-run slope shows the p-value for the significance level 
associated with the test for the hypothesis that the long-run response of local to U.S. 
interest rates is one. 
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Table 3.4 Estimation Results for Countries with an Exchange Rate Regime 
Change 
 
A. Pre-crisis period 
1994.1-1997.6  
Country 
 
Exchange 
Rate  
Regime 
α  β  δ  Test for 
long-run 
slope=1 
Indonesia Intermediate 0.11 
(0.15) 
3.35*** 
(1.42) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
0.11 
Korea Intermediate 0.08 
(0.14) 
7.82*** 
(2.31) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.01 
Malaysia Intermediate 0.17 
(0.05) 
-0.34 
(0.59) 
-0.85 
(0.11) 
0.03 
Philippines Intermediate 
/Fixed 
-0.13 
(0.24) 
3.57*** 
(1.02) 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.21 
Thailand Fixed 0.01 
(0.30) 
7.54*** 
(2.72) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
0.02 
Notes: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Level of 
significance indicated by asterisks, *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. The 
column of the test for long-run slope shows the p-value for the significance level 
associated with the test for the hypothesis that the long-run response of local to U.S. 
interest rats is one. 
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 (Continued) Table 3.4 Estimation Results for Countries with an Exchange 
Rate Regime Change 
 
B. Post-crisis period 
1999.1-2004.12  
Country 
 
Exchange 
Rate 
Regime 
α  β  δ  Test for 
long-run 
slope=1 
Indonesia Floating -0.43** 
(0.22) 
-0.28 
(1.43) 
-0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.37 
Korea Floating -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
0.00 
Malaysia Fixed 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.17 
(0.05) 
0.00 
Philippines Floating -0.02 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.15) 
0.49*** 
(0.06) 
0.00 
Thailand Intermediate 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.55*** 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.02 
Notes: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Level of 
significance is indicated by asterisks, *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. The 
column of the test for long-run slope shows the p-value for the significance level 
associated with the test for the hypothesis that the long-run response of local to U.S. 
interest rates is one. 
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Appendix 3.1 Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia 
 
A. De jure Regime (Official Classification by the IMF) 
 
Source: Frankel et al. (2002) and IMF annual report on exchange arrangements and 
exchange restriction.  
 
Note: This classification of exchange rate regimes is based on a quarterly database from 
the IMF which encompasses a total of ten regime categories, based on officially 
reported exchange arrangements.  
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(Continued) Appendix 3.1 Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia 
B. De facto Regime (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004) 
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). 
 
Note: Free falling is a new separate category for countries whose twelve – month rate of 
inflation is above 40%. 
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Chapter 4  
Exchange Rates Volatility and Its Contagion/Spillover 
Effect from the Evidence of East Asia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A distinct aspect of the crises in the 1990s was their occurrence across several countries 
and fast regional spread. For instance, the Asian financial crisis started with the collapse 
of the Thai baht on 2 July 1997. The sharply declined baht was quickly followed by 
pressure on the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Philippines. The collapse 
of the currency markets also affected the stock market within and across the Asian 
region, leading to the collapse of several commercial banks, large securities and 
companies. In October 1997, equity prices collapsed in Hong Kong which led to a 
second round of turbulence in Asian markets. Not only restricted to the East Asian 
region, this second round of collapse of Asian markets was so massive that it resulted in 
a significant fall in stock prices throughout the world including Western markets. In fact, 
not only for the case of Asia, the crises in Latin America (1994) and Russia (1998) are 
also examples of such shocks spreading from one region to another. The significant 
increase in the number of financial crises and financial market collapses in various 
regions around the globe has provoked a growing concern among researchers and policy 
markers to investigate the cause and effect of such crises. Hence, there is a growing 
body of literature on the issue of “contagion” or “spillover effect”, which is the 
transmission of a crisis across countries. Such studies have most often been associated 
with high frequency events and contagion/spillover effect is usually measured on stock 
market returns, interest rates, exchange rate or linear combinations of them.  
 
Most of the existing research (see Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, among others) in general aim to identify the linkages and 
transmission mechanisms across countries. These studies mainly examine whether the 
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occurrence of a currency crisis in one country or group of countries increases the 
probability of a crisis in another country. The tranquil periods and crisis periods, 
however, are not distinguished clearly. More recent studies make a distinct difference 
between normal interdependence and contagion (see, for example, King and Wadhwani, 
1990; Baig and Goldfajn, 1998; Forbes and Rigobón, 2002). The former one is also 
often referred to spillovers, which is the propagation of shocks due to fundamental real 
and financial linkages that are also prevalent during tranquil periods. Contagion, on the 
other hand, implies a regime change in the factors driving the transmission of negative 
shocks.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide an empirical investigation on the exchange 
rate volatility and its cross-country transmission effect for a group of East Asian 
economies in the context of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis 18  and the period 
afterwards. Our concern is not to judge channels through which the crisis is transmitted 
across countries as extensive empirical literature did. Instead, we restrict our attention to 
the volatility of East Asian currencies, and aim to answer the following questions: Did 
volatility of one exchange rate market transmit to others in some way? If so, to what 
extent did this volatility contagion/spillover effect work during the specific time period? 
We address two types of volatility transmission: the contagion effect for the crisis period, 
and the spillover effect for the tranquil period. In order to identify the presence of 
contagion/spillover effect in the exchange rate volatility, particular interests of this 
chapter are to look into the possible exchange rate volatility transmission from Korea, a 
crisis-affected country, to other regional markets during the crisis period; and from 
Hong Kong to other regional markets over the tranquil period. Daily exchange rates 
(expressed as local currency per U.S. dollar) covering the period since 4 January 1997 
until 31 December 2002 have been used in this study in order to sharpen our analysis. 
The problem of using a low frequency data (semi-annual, quarterly, and monthly), on 
which many previous literature are based, lies in that it smoothes out a lot of shorter 
duration interactions between the financial markets. The small but important events in 
 
18 Adding to the existing literature, this chapter examines volatility and contagion/spillover in the foreign 
exchange market, which has, in contrast to stock and bond markets contagion/spillover, received limited 
attention. 
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the sample period are not easily to be captured by low frequency data. In this study, the 
GARCH-type techniques are applied to high frequency data, and the long memory 
characteristics of exchange rates and the nature of their volatility have been thoroughly 
examined. Financial return time series often exhibit some well-known characteristics. 
For instance, volatility clustering has been identified in financial returns data. Large 
changes tend to be followed by large changes and small changes tend to be followed by 
small changes. Financial time series also often exhibit leptokurtosis which implies that 
the distribution of their returns is fat-tailed (Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965). In addition, 
changes in asset prices tend to be negatively correlated with changes in volatility (i.e. 
volatility is higher after negative shocks than after positive shocks of same magnitude. 
This has been called “leverage effect” by many empirical studies (see, for example, 
Black, 1976; Nelson, 1991). The ARCH models introduced by Engle (1982) and 
generalised as GARCH by Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986) have proven success in 
capturing the above characteristics. The GARCH-type techniques are widely used in 
financial econometrics, especially in financial data series volatility modeling and 
forecasting.  
 
This chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 4.2 provides a brief review of 
the existing literature on the currency crises and financial market contagion/spillover. 
Section 4.3 discusses data issues and presents the preliminary analysis. Section 4.4 
describes the empirical frameworks and their implications. Section 4.5 gives the 
interpretation of the empirical results. Finally, the conclusion remarks and implications 
are drawn in Section 4.6.  
 
4.2 A Review of Literature 
 
4.2.1 Theoretical Perspective on Financial Market Contagion 
 
When it comes to the interpretation of currency instability, the fundamental and 
self-fulfilling views of currency crises are two main analytical and conceptual 
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frameworks in the literature. The first generation of models viewed crises as the 
unavoidable result of unsustainable polices or fundamental imbalances. As suggested by 
Krugman (1979), the expansionary monetary policy combined with a fixed exchange 
rate leads to external imbalances. In second generation models, the costs and benefits of 
the maintenance of a peg have been taken into account in the political choice which 
decides whether a fixed exchange rate should be abandon or not. The second generation 
of models stresses the possibility of self-fulfilling exchange rate crises. The interaction 
between investors’ expectations and actual policy outcomes can cause self-fulfilling 
crises (see Obstfeld, 1986, 1994, 1996; Cole and Kehoe, 1996, 1998; Chang and 
Velasco, 1998, and others for studies on self-fulfilling crises). When private agents 
expect a devaluation, the policy measures required to maintain the peg make such an 
outcoming maintenance more costly. Hence, devaluation expectations become 
self-fulfilling. However, it has been argued that these two traditional models provide a 
partial explanation but they cannot account for the severity of the crisis (Pesenti and 
Tille, 2000). Several features played central roles in the turmoil of the 1990s, especially 
for the Asian crisis, have been emphasised in the post-Asia crisis literature. Among 
them, the role of mechanisms of crisis transmission across countries, or contagion has 
been one of the distinct features explored by extensive empirical literature.  
 
A variety of explanations for the channels of contagion have been documented by 
theoretical literature (see, for instance, Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; 
Buiter et al., 1998; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1999; Ahluwalia, 2000; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 2000, and among others). First, the common shocks can contribute to a 
financial crisis that spreads from one country to another. Common shocks often refer to 
the factors that may affect exchange or stock markets of several countries 
simultaneously (Khalid and Rajaguru, 2006). Second, the strong trade linkage is viewed 
as one of the important causes of currency crisis, particularly of its rapid transmission. 
Due to the speculative attacks on country A, there would be a real depreciation of 
country A’s currency. The currency depreciation of country A would enhance its export 
competitiveness which in turn would lead to a trade deficit for its corresponding 
competitor, country B. Therefore, we may expect a loss of foreign exchange reserves in 
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country B. Thus, the probability of speculative attacks on the currency of country B will 
be increased. Third, strong financial linkages are another major cause of contagion. A 
crisis in one country will drive investors to alter their portfolio and consequently lead 
capital flight in countries closely financial linked, even if no significant changes of 
economic fundamentals can be found in these countries. Moreover, Khalid and Rajaguru 
(2006) point the shift in investor’s sentiment is another possible reason for the crisis 
which spread from one country to another. They further suggest countries with weak 
financial fundaments are more vulnerable to speculative attacks and more likely to 
suffer from adverse shocks.  
 
It should also be noted that the concept of “contagion” varies from author to author. For 
one case, a currency crisis can be considered as being contagious if it spreads from the 
initial crisis country to another. Masson (1999) argues based on a multiple equilibria 
model that crisis contagion can be referred as an equilibrium switch under some 
economic fundamental conditions. The contagion effect can also be viewed as an 
increase in the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency (see, for 
example, Eichengreen et al., 1996). In particular, a distinct difference between normal 
interdependence and contagion has been emphasised by a group of recent studies that 
focus on transmission effect (see King and Wadhwani, 1990; Baig and Goldfajn, 1999; 
Forbes and Rigobón, 2002; among others). According to these studies, the former one, 
namely normal interdependence often refers to spillovers. It is the propogation of 
shocks due to fundamental real and financial linkages that are also prevalent during 
tranquil time. The latter one, contagion, implies a regime change in the factors driving 
the transmission of negative shocks. For the purpose of this study, the contagion and 
spillover effect are considered as two different concepts: the notion of contagion is 
defined as the spread of a shock from one country to another during the “crisis” period. 
The spillover effect is defined as the spread of a shock from one country to another 
during the “tranquil” period. 
 
 
 123
4.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Currency Crises and Contagion 
 
There is a growing literature on the large scale speculative attacks and currency crisis 
episodes in the 1990s. For recent related studies in this field, see, for example, 
Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Buiter et al. (1998) on the European Monetary 
System crisis of 1992-93; Sachs et al. (1996) and Calvo and Mendoza (1996) on the 
Mexican peso crisis of 1994; and Corsetti et al. (1998, 1999), Mishkin (1999) and 
Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b) on the Asia crisis of 1997-98. Here we briefly survey 
the empirical studies focusing on contagion. Specifically, the possible channels or 
causes of contagion have been identified by a group of studies. For instance, 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Glick and Rose (1999) identify trade links as an important 
channel for contagion. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999) highlight financial market 
linkages as the source of spillovers from one country to others in the region. Ahluwalia 
(2000) suggests common macroeconomic weaknesses to important similarities between 
countries as a channel for contagion. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) find the evidence 
of the existence of the common creditor channel when they examine the Mexican, Asian 
and Russian crisis.  
 
Regarding measuring the presence of contagion, several methodologies have been 
applied in the literature which can be broadly divided into four groups. The first group 
usually employs probit/logit approach to examine whether the possibility of a crisis in a 
specific country increases when another country (or a group of countries) is hit by a 
crisis (see, for example, Eichengreen et al., 1996; Glick and Rose, 1999; De Gregorio 
and Valdés, 2001). The second group of studies conducts the correlation analysis to test 
whether correlation coefficients, regarding stock prices, exchange rates, or interest rates, 
change during a financial crisis. In this literature, a significant increase in correlation is 
considered the evidence of contagion. The related papers of this group can be found in 
Calvo and Reinhart (1996); Frankel and Schmukler (1996); Baig and Goldfajn (1999); 
Forbes and Rigobón (2002), and among others. The third group of papers study 
contagion within a region applying Granger causality based on a VAR model (see, for 
example, Fratzscher, 1998; Khalid and Kawai, 2003; Hernández and Valdés, 2001).   
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It is to be noted most of the existing literature from the above discussion heavily 
emphasised how the exchange rates (or stock price returns) in one country affects the 
exchange rates (or stock price returns) of others under the assumption that the variance 
of studied variable is constant overtime. However, for the time series research, the 
assumption of a constant variance might ignore important information especially using 
high frequency data such as daily observations over the crisis period. Recently the 
GARCH-type approach is applied by a few of studies to examine the issue of contagion, 
which can be deemed as the fourth group of studies. This set of studies focus on the 
volatility analysis of contagion, that is, to estimate whether conditional variances of 
financial variables are related to each other among markets in different countries during 
the crisis period. In the following section, we mainly provide an overview of recent 
empirical evidence based on the GARCH models.  
 
In order to test whether volatility is transmitted between countries, Chou et al. (1994) 
and Hamao et al. (1990) find evidence of significant spillovers across markets after the 
U.S. stock market crash in 1987. By comparing the behaviour of short-term interest rate 
volatility in Argentina and Chile during the period of 1992-1998, Edwards (1998c) 
identifies a different effect of Mexico’s volatility spillovers in these two countries. 
Habib (2002) investigates the impact of external factors on the behaviour of interest 
rates and exchange rates in Central and Eastern Europe. By modelling and comparing 
the time-varying volatility of both interest rates and exchange rates, he tests for the 
significance of additional regressors in the conditional variance equation. Using a 
mean-exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(M-EGARCH) model for five different future contract lengths and six developed 
economies, Aguirre and Saidi (1998) find that an M-EGARCH (1,1) model effectively 
describes the exchange rate future’s daily dynamic behaviour, which sheds light on the 
determinants of both the mean and the volatility of exchange rate futures.  
 
Fernandez-Izquierdo and Lafuente (2004) employ a GJR-GARCH model to examine 
the dynamic linkages between international stock market volatility during the Asian 
crisis and find a support for contagion. Using the daily data for the period of Asian 
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Currency Crises, Ito and Hashimoto (2004) examine high-frequency contagion among 
Asian countries. By distinguishing the “origin” and “affected” countries in the causality 
relationship, they find the evidence of statistically significant high-frequency contagion 
effect among Asian countries in both the exchange rate and the stock prices. They also 
find that the spillover effect in stock markets has been intensified after the crisis in most 
of the Asian countries. Their study further points out the important role played by the 
bilateral trade linkage in the transmission of financial pressures across international 
borders. Using a GARCH approach and data from Istanbul stock exchange (ISE), Alper 
and Yilmaz (2004) find support for volatility contagion from stock markets. Using high 
frequency data and a Granger causality tests within a multivariate GARCH framework, 
Khalid and Rajaguru (2006) investigate the spread of contagion in the Asian financial 
markets during the 1997/98 Asian crisis. They find evidence of strong intermarket 
linkages within Asian currency markets during the crisis and post-crisis periods, but not 
look into volatility transmission.  
 
This study follows the fourth approach mentioned above and uses GARCH-type models 
which allow the variance to vary across the time, and hence explicitly account for 
conditional volatility in the time series data. Our aim is thus to test whether volatility is 
transmitted across countries. Two types of volatility transmission-the contagion effect 
over the crisis period and the spillover effect over the tranquil period, are of particular 
interest in this study. To be specific, applying the GARCH approach on high frequency 
data, we firstly examine the long memory characteristics of the exchange rates and then 
use a time–variance specification to identify the possible contagion/spillover effect 
within a sample of selected East Asian countries. If this is the case, then the volatility of 
one exchange rate market should be in some way correlated with the volatility of other 
foreign exchange markets in the region.  
 
 
 
4.3 The Data and Preliminary Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Data Description and Statistics 
 
Many previous studies based on monthly or quarterly data (even weekly data), may 
limit analytical capability of crisis correlations among countries during a specific period 
(especially for the crisis period). To overcome this problem, the daily data of the 
nominal exchange rate (vis-à-vis U.S. dollar) from 4 January 1997 to 31 December 
2002 have been used as a full sample in this study. Forward market rates should help to 
isolate the central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market, and can reflect the 
true movements of the exchange rate. However, forward rates are not available for most 
of the sample countries. We therefore use the spot exchange rates expressed as local 
currency per U.S. dollar, obtained from the Datastream database. According to 
Bollerslev’s (1990) study, the log difference of exchange rates are adequately modeled 
with a simple (1) martingale process. This is described below:  
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where: 
 
tiR , = the return on currency i between t-1 and t, 
tis , = the spot rate of currency i at time t (expressed against the U.S. dollar), 
iμ = a long-term drift coefficient, 
ti,ε = the error term for currency i at time t. 
 
Therefore, the daily return of exchange rates is log differenced to convert them into 
continuously compounded returns for Hong Kong (HKD), Indonesia (IDR), Malaysia 
(MYR), Singapore (SGD), Philippines (PHP) and Thailand (THB). 
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Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 plot the daily frequency of spot exchange rates returns against 
U.S. dollar for the two sub-periods: the crisis period (July 2, 1997--Aug 31, 1998) and 
the post/non-crisis period (Jan 4, 1999--Dec 31, 2002), respectively. It is obvious that 
the volatility of all variables changes over time. The graph of the return series clearly 
shows the presence of volatility clustering. Note that all of the variables exhibit greater 
volatility in the crisis-period, as shown in Figure 4.1, indicating the possibility of 
volatility contagion during the crisis period. The post-crisis exchange rates movements, 
as depicted in Figure 4.2, reflect different characteristics: the volatility of Hong Kong 
dollar and Malaysia ringgit are smaller, with the fixed exchange rate arrangement 
adopted by both countries; while volatile exchange rates movements are identified in 
Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, confirming the fact that these 
countries conduct managed/free floating exchange rate regime after the financial crisis.  
 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of statistics for all daily exchange rates. Commonly for 
financial time series, all currencies at daily frequency exhibit excess kurtosis, indicating 
that the distribution is characterised by leptokurtosis. Jarque-Bera statistic is used to test 
whether the standardised residuals are normally distributed or not. If the standardised 
residuals are normally distributed, the Jarque-Bera statistic should not be significant. 
The calculated Jarque-Bera statistics provide clear evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
of normality for the unconditional distribution of the daily exchange rate changes. Table 
4.1 also reports the standard deviation of the variables in sample. Most exchange rates 
across crisis-affected countries present higher volatility in the crisis period. Regarding 
the comparison of volatility across countries, exchange rates of Indonesia present the 
highest volatility, while Hong Kong as non-crisis affected region, its exchange rates 
present the least volatility. During the post-crisis period, as expected, the Hong Kong 
dollar and Malaysia ringgit witnessed the lowest volatility due to the dollar pegged 
regime adopted by both economies. 
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4.3.2 Preliminary Volatility Correlation Analysis 
 
A simple way to quantify the degree of co-movement among the volatility of these 
currencies is to calculate their correlations. As a preliminary analysis before conducting 
the regression, we calculate the sample standard deviation for each currency in 
four-week centred rolling window for the crisis and non-crisis (post-crisis) periods. The 
volatility correlation among East Asian currencies, as shown in Table 4.2 (Panels A and 
B), presents interesting results as follows: Firstly, correlation coefficients among most 
East Asian currencies are always significant and positive in the crisis period, especially 
for the crisis-affected countries. The correlation between Malaysia and Indonesia is the 
highest (0.83) while Hong Kong has relative low correlations with both Korea (0.00) 
and Thailand (0.09). Secondly, the computed correlations appear lower for most 
currencies in the post-crisis period, indicating the relatively less volatility transmission 
during the tranquil period. The volatility of Hong Kong dollar, Singapore dollar and 
Thailand baht are detected to be positively correlated with other currencies while the 
negative correlations can be found between Korean won and Indonesian rupiah (-0.10), 
as well as Philippines peso and Malaysian ringgit (-0.03). In particular, the volatility of 
Hong Kong dollar has been most correlated with Singapore dollar (0.35) and least 
correlated with Philippines peso (0.13) in the post-crisis period.  
 
In short, it is possible to note that the exchange rates volatility increased during the 
crisis period, in terms of inspection of volatility charts and volatility correlations 
discussed above. In fact, it is more likely that volatility will be higher and returns will 
be lower when asset markets are under stress. It has been shown in the finance literature 
that in such conditions, correlations between asset markets tend to increase. In particular, 
these results preliminarily imply the possibility of existence of volatility transmission in 
the East Asian region. In order to examine the time-varying volatility of currencies and 
detect any significant impact of the volatility transmission among these currencies, we 
formally construct a set of GARCH models in the next section.  
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4.4 Models Descriptions and Implications 
 
4.4.1 GARCH Model  
 
The ARCH/GARCH models have been the standard econometrical tools to analyse the 
volatility. According to the basic version of the least squares model, the expected value 
of all error terms, when squared, is assumed to be the same at any given point. This 
assumption is known as the homoskedasticity. Nevertheless, financial data may suffer 
from heteroskedasticity, in which the variances of the error terms are not equal and the 
error terms may reasonably be expected to be larger for some points than for others. In 
the presence of heteroskedasticity, the standard errors and confidence intervals 
estimated by conventional least squares procedure will be too narrow and this would 
produce a false sense of precision (Engel, 2001). Instead, ARCH and GARCH models 
can treat heteroskedasticity as a variance to be modeled. The application of these 
models in finance can not only correct the deficiencies of least squares but also compute 
the prediction of variance of each error term. In addition, the amplitude of the return 
series has been identified to vary over time and financial analysts usually describe this 
as “volatility clustering”. The ARCH and GARCH models are designed to capture this 
set of issues. They have become widespread tools for dealing with time series 
heteroskedastic models and provide a robust volatility measure of the high frequency 
financial data.  
 
Prior to the introduction of ARCH/GARCH models, there have been no methods 
available for the variance when using the information to forecast the mean and variance 
of the return, conditional on the past information. Engel (2001), in particular, point out 
the traditional descriptive tool such as rolling standard deviation is based on a fixed 
number of the most recent observations. It assumes that the variance of tomorrow’s 
return is an equally weighted average of the squared residuals from the last periods, and 
such assumption of equal weights seems unattractive. Nevertheless, as further suggested 
by Engel (2001), the ARCH/GARCH model is a weighted average of past squared 
residuals and it gives parsimonious models that are easy to estimate. Thus, the 
ARCH/GARCH model allows the data to determine the best weights used in forecasting 
the variance and this kind of model has been successful in predicting conditional 
variances.  
 
The descriptive validity of the univariate ARCH and GARCH models in characterising 
the exchange rate dynamics have been well documented, see, for instance, Engle and 
Bollerslev (1986), Bollerslev (1987), Diebold and Pauly (1988), Diebold and Nerlove 
(1989), Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), among many others. The fact that high frequency 
financial data exhibit volatility clustering is widely recognised by a large body of 
empirical studies. It has also long been known that exchange rates exhibit volatility 
clustering so that large changes tend to be followed by large changes of either sign and 
periods of tranquility alternate with periods of high volatility. One of the most popular 
models that allows us to model the dynamic process of the conditional volatility is the 
GARCH model developed by Bollerslev (1986), following the seminal work of Engle 
(1982). In order to give a general description of exchange rate volatility for a particular 
country, a GARCH (p, q) model of exchange rates can be written as follows: 
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where  represents the first differences of the logarithm of daily exchange rates in the 
selected countries at time t, 
ty
tε  is the innovation to exchange rate changes, given the 
information set  at the time t-1. We assume market efficiency which implies that 1−tI
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daily exchange rate changes are distributed with mean zero. Thus, tε  is distributed as a 
normal with zero mean and time-varying conditional variance . The p is the 
autoregressive lag and the q is the moving average lag. When 
2
t
,0
σ
=iβ  , the 
above model reduces to ARCH (q) which is proposed by Engle (1982). The 
non-negativity conditions on the parameters implied a non-negative variance and the 
condition on the sum of the 
pi ,...2,1=
iβ ’s and iα ’s required for wide sense stationarity. The 
volatility shocks are quite persistent if the sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients is 
very close to one. In fact, the persistent volatility is usually observed in high frequency 
financial data.  
 
The conditional distribution of the error term is assumed to be normal (Gaussian) 
distribution and the estimation method employed here is Quasi-Maximum Likelihood 
(QML), computing Bollerslev-Wooldridge (1992) robust standard errors. When the 
assumption of conditional normality does not hold, the GARCH parameter estimates 
will still be consistent, provided the mean and variance functions are correctly specified. 
Therefore, the QML estimators are robust in the sense that they can produce consistent 
estimates of the parameters of a correctly specified conditional mean, even if the 
distribution is incorrectly specified. 
 
4.4.2 EGARCH Model 
 
Note that for the above traditional GARCH models, positive and negative past values 
have a symmetric impact on the conditional variance. In practice, financial data series 
may have strong asymmetric influence on the conditional variance. The tendency for 
returns and volatility to be negatively correlated is a well established characteristic of 
many equity markets. It implies that negative returns are more likely to be associated 
with greater volatility than positive returns. The early studies such as Black (1976) and 
Christie (1982) sought to explain this asymmetry in volatility by reference to a 
“leverage effect”. In finance, the leverage effect predicts that an asset’s returns may 
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become more volatile when its price decreases. Our study thereby takes into account the 
potential existence of asymmetry in exchange rates, and attempts to investigate the 
possible leverage effect in the exchange rates data. The Exponential GARCH or 
EGARCH model proposed by Nelson (1991) has been widely used to model and 
capture the leverage effect. This model allows the conditional variance to be depended 
on the magnitude as well as the sign of the innovations (that is, error term). This means 
that the variance of the exchange rate process is an asymmetric function of past error 
terms. That is, negative and positive innovations can have different impacts on 
expectational errors. Furthermore, this technique does not require the imposition of 
non-negativity constraints on coefficients in order to ensure positive variance. The 
specification of the conditional variance for the EGARCH (p, q) model can be written 
as follows: 
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Different from the basic GARCH model, on the left-hand side of Equation (4.5), it is the 
log of the conditional variance. This implies that the leverage effect is exponential 
rather than quadratic, and forecasts of the conditional variance are guaranteed to be 
non-negative. As mentioned previously, the leverage effect occurs when an asset’s 
return become more volatile as its price decreases. This is the type of behaviour seen in 
an EGARCH process when 0<θ . Therefore, the presence of leverage effects can be 
tested by the hypothesis that 0<θ and the impact is asymmetric if 0≠θ . 
 
Especially, the specification of the EGARCH (1, 1) conditional variance is described as 
follows:  
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The component )( 11 −− − tt zEz captures the size effect and indicates how the magnitude 
of past innovations increases or decreases the current volatility of exchange rates,  
captures the sign effect of the lagged residuals. A negative sign implies that negative 
innovations (expectations of exchange rates’ appreciations) increase volatility more than 
positive innovations (expectations of exchange rates’ depreciations). On the other hand, 
the positive sign implies that negative innovations (exchange rates’ appreciations) 
increase volatility less than positive innovations (exchange rates’ depreciations). Finally, 
the last term is the logarithm of the last period conditional variance. The degree of 
volatility persistence depends on the size of the coefficient 
1−tz
φ . For φ  = 1, the 
unconditional variance does not exist. Therefore, it is a random walk, implying that the 
conditional variance is an integrated process of degree 1. For φ < 1, the unconditional 
variance exists and is a mean reverting process. 
 
The parameters in the Equation (4.7) can be obtained by maximising the log likelihood 
function. In most empirical studies the normal density is used even though the 
standardised residuals obtained from ARCH-type models, which assume normality, 
remain leptokurtic. As suggested by Nelson (1991), the errors can be assumed to follow 
a Generalised Error Distribution (GED). The advantage of using a more general 
distribution is that parameter estimates are not excessively influenced by extreme 
observations that occur with low probability, such as during speculative attacks.  
 
4.5 Interpretation of the Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
It is well known that the data generating process for most macroeconomic time series 
are characterised by unit roots, which puts the use of standard econometric methods 
under question. Therefore, it is important to analyse the time series properties of the 
data in order to avoid the spurious results due to unit roots in the data. GARCH 
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techniques require variables to be stationary. Hence, the unit root tests are conducted to 
test the stationarity of series before conducting the estimation. As mentioned in Section 
4.3.1, the daily return of exchange rates (log differenced to convert them into 
continuously compounded returns) is recommended to use for analysis of this study. 
This section further demonstrates the validity of this proposition. Table 4.3 reports the 
results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for levels and first differences of 
logarithms of exchange rates in East Asian countries. As one would expect, exchange 
rates of most countries (expect Hong Kong and post-crisis Malaysia) are not stationary 
and integrated of order one. These results suggest that it is more convenient to continue 
the analysis of volatility working with the first differences of the variables, calculating 
the daily changes in the logarithm of the exchange rate instead of their levels for most 
countries in sample. 
 
4.5.2 Residual Tests  
 
In the first step of the analysis, we have estimated Equation (4.2) for each East Asian 
currency by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method in order to check the presence 
of heteroskedasticity in the residuals. The lag length in the mean equation for each 
regression is determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The 
Correlogram-Q-statistics, which display the correlogram (autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations) of the standardised residuals, help test for remaining serial correlation 
in the mean equation and check the specification of the mean equation. If the mean 
equation is correctly specified, all Q-statistics should not be significant. Moreover, the 
ARCH LM test can be carried out to check whether the standardised residuals exhibit 
additional ARCH. If the variance equation is correctly specified, there should be no 
ARCH left in the standardised residuals. The statistics presented in Table 4.4 are 
Ljung-Box Q statistics for the squared residuals and the p-value related to the test for 
ARCH effects. The former test is based on the null hypothesis that no auto-correlation 
up to the order k, while the Lagrange multiplier (LM) principle is to test the null 
hypothesis of no ARCH effects versus the alternative that the conditional error variance 
is given by an ARCH (q) process. This test approach is to generate the squared residuals 
on a constant and q lagged values of the squared residuals. According to the results 
from Table 4.4, the  test statistics suggest that conditional homoskedasticity can 
be rejected for most currencies except for Hong Kong dollar (HKD) and Thai baht 
(THB) in the crisis period. The LM tests, as shown in Panel A, further confirm that all 
currencies exhibit ARCH (1) effects in their error terms at the daily frequency during 
the crisis period. Regarding the post-crisis period (as shown in Panel B), on the other 
hand, the results clearly indicate the presence of conditional heteroskedasticity 
according to the Q squared statistics. In every case, LM test shows that the null 
hypothesis of absence of ARCH can be rejected at the conventional levels. Overall, the 
slow decline of the auto-correlation function of the squared residuals, as well as the 
presence of ARCH effects, suggest that a GARCH (1, 1) process may be suitable for 
describing the errors for both sub-sample periods. 
)10(2Q
 
4.5.3 Results of GARCH and EGARCH Estimations 
 
Table 4.5 provides a summary of exchange rate volatility results, by using both GARCH 
and EGARCH estimations. First, the GARCH (1, 1) model in general performs rather 
well for most regressions in both sub-sample periods, with the coefficients of both 
lagged squared innovations and the lagged variance being always positive and 
significantly different from zero (Note that the lagged squared innovations are not 
significant in the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia for the non-crisis period). Higher 
order GARCH representations did not perform well, when measured by the value of the 
log likelihood function.  
 
Alternatively, the EGARCH (1, 1) estimation results, provided in the Table 4.5, can 
interpret the size effect, sign effect and persistence effect on the volatility of exchange 
rate dynamic. The size effect, captured by 1α , indicates how the magnitude of 
innovations increases or decreases the current volatility or risk of exchange rate. It is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent level for all currencies for both sub-sample 
periods with the exception of Hong Kong for the crisis period. Thus, the magnitude of 
 135
the past innovations increases the current volatility or risk of exchange rate. Also, the 
size effect is obviously larger during the crisis period, but declines during the non-crisis 
period for most currencies. The sign effect is captured by θ . The negative sign implies 
that negative innovations (expectations of exchange rate appreciations) increase 
volatility more than positive innovations (expectations of exchange rate depreciations). 
On the other hand, the positive sign implies that negative innovations increase volatility 
less than positive innovations. As for the crisis period, θ  is positive but insignificant 
for most currencies expect the Indonesia Rupiah, which suggests no presence of 
leverage effects can be identified among these markets. As for the non-crisis period, the 
leverage effects can be found only in the case of Hong Kong and Singapore, according 
to the negative sign of coefficient θ . However, θ  is still insignificant for most 
currencies (except Hong Kong), indicating there is little evidence of asymmetric impact 
of past error terms on the variance of the exchange rate process. The coefficient φ , 
which measures the persistence of innovations on volatility, is positive and significant 
for all currencies for both crisis and non-crisis periods. In particular, for the non-crisis 
period, all φ  values in the sample currencies are close to 1, indicating the volatility 
shocks are quite persistent.  
 
4.5.4 Volatility Transmission Analysis 
 
The second objective of this paper is to detect the evidence of exchange rates volatility 
contagion or spillover in the region. Regarding the analysis of volatility contagion over 
the crisis period, our particular interest is to examine the volatility transmission effect 
from Korean won to other currencies in the region. Thus, guided by the previous 
volatility analysis for each of seven currencies, the estimated conditional variance from 
a GARCH (1, 1) model of Korean exchange rates volatility (KRWVOL) has been used 
as an exogenous regressor included in the conditional variance of other currencies. As 
for the analysis of volatility transmission in the non-crisis period, since our interest is to 
identify the evidence of exchange rate volatility transmission from Hong Kong to other 
currencies, the estimated conditional variance form GARCH (1, 1) models of Hong 
 136
Kong exchange rates volatility (HKDVOL) has been used as an exogenous regressor 
included in the conditional variance of other currencies. Therefore, the Korea-specific 
volatility variable (KRWVOL) and Hong Kong-specific volatility variable (HKDVOL) 
will be included in the estimation of the conditional variance equation for each currency 
in question.  
 
Specifically, a general specification of the new model can be written as follows:  
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The exogenous regressor  in the conditional variance equation refers to indicators 
of external exchange rates volatility during the specific period. The estimation of 
coefficient 
tVOL
γ  captures the effect of these external exchange rates volatility on the 
conditional variance of . The hypothesis of “exchange volatility contagion/spillover 
effect” will be accepted if the coefficient 
ty
γ  is positive and significantly different from 
zero. 
 
The estimation of these equations allows us to address a number of issues: First, the 
estimation of these equations will allow us to compute estimated series of conditional 
exchange rate volatility for each country. Parameters α  and β  provide an idea of the 
nature of volatility of these currencies, including their degrees of persistence. Second, 
the estimation of Equation (4.8) will provide information on whether during the specific 
period there has been a presence of volatility transmission effect. If such effect exists, 
the estimated coefficient of VOL will be positive and significantly different from zero. 
Third, the comparison of the estimated value of γ  for each East Asian country can 
provide some information on the process of exchange rates volatility in these countries. 
If, as the authorities expected, capital controls in country A have been effective, then we 
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would expect a smaller coefficient of γ  in this country than others. This is because 
effective and appropriate capital controls on international capital moments can avoid 
currencies volatilities from speculative activities.  
 
Crisis Period  
 
Table 4.6 reports a set of GARCH estimations results, with exogenous regressor 
KRWVOL included conditional variance of daily foreign exchange returns. N is the 
number of observation, ARCH LM test is Engle’s test for the presence of residual 
conditional heteroskedasticity; and IGARCH is a Wald  test for the null hypothesis 
that 
2χ
1=+ βα . Several findings are summarised as follows:  
 
First, the GARCH (1, 1) model seems to perform rather well for most regressions, with 
the coefficients of both lagged squared innovations and the lagged variance being 
always significantly different from zero19. Second, according to Engle’s LM test, the 
null hypothesis that no conditional heteroskedasticity remains in the residuals cannot be 
rejected in most cases (except Indonesia). Note that the GARCH (1, 1) model of 
Indonesia Rupiah volatility performs unwell due to the negative coefficient in the 
lagged squared innovations. Third, and more important for the current study, the results 
show a very different transmission effect of Korean won’s volatility on other currencies’ 
conditional variances during the crisis period. On one hand, coefficients of KRWVOL 
for HKD, MYR and PHP are statistically significant different from zero at the 5 percent 
level, indicating the presence of volatility contagion effect from Korea exchange rates to 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Philippines over the crisis period. On the other hand, in the 
cases of Singapore and Thailand, while the coefficients of Korea exchange rates 
volatility are always positive, they are not significant different from zero at the 5 
percent level. This might suggests the less evidence of exchange rates volatility 
spillovers effect from Korea to both two countries during the crisis period.  
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19 Higher order GARCH representations did not perform well, when measured by the value of the log 
likelihood function. 
Finally, in several regressions the sum of the GARCH coefficients (α andβ ) is close to 
one, implying that volatility shocks are quite persistent. When this sum is equal to one, 
the GARCH process is defined as Integrated in variance, or IGARCH. The presence of a 
high degree of persistence in GARCH models is a common feature of many high 
frequency financial time series. Table 4.6 also reports the tests of the presence of 
Integrated GARCH process in the estimation. The Wald statistics indicate that the 
hypothesis that 1=+ βα  can be rejected in most regressions at the 5 percent level 
with the exception of Hong Kong, suggesting the presence of IGARCH (1, 1) models in 
Hong Kong. In this case the unconditional variance does not converge 
to ))1/(( βαϕ −− , as in the most common case when 1<+ βα . 
 
Tranquil (Non-Crisis) Period  
 
A second set of estimations included the variable that capture Hong Kong exchange 
rates volatility (HKDVOL) to identify the evidence of exchange rate volatility 
transmission from Hong Kong to other currencies during the tranquil period. The main 
findings reported in Table 4.7 can be interpreted as follows: 
 
First, coefficients of the HKDVOL are always positive in most regressions with the 
exception of Philippines over the non-crisis period. Second, the impact of Hong Kong 
exchange rate volatility on Korean won; Malaysian ringgit and Singapore dollar are 
statistically significant, since coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 5 
percent level. As for Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, the HKDVOL coefficients 
are not significant over the post-crisis period. These outcomes are broadly consistent 
with results from the previous correlation analysis, providing evidence of volatility 
transmission of Hong Kong dollar to currencies of Korea, Malaysia and Singapore 
during the tranquil period. Third, it is worthwhile noting that the hypothesis that no 
residual conditional heteroskedasticity remains in the residuals cannot be rejected for all 
cases. The Wald tests show that the hypothesis of IGARCH presence is rejected in 
Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Thailand, but accepted in Indonesia and Korea.  
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Investigating the sources of financial crisis has emerged as an important research focus 
in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. The strong trade linkages and 
macroeconomic similarities have been proved by several theoretical and empirical 
researchers as major sources spreading the crisis from one market to the entire or even 
other regions. The empirical literature also finds the presence of contagion effect in the 
financial crises and generally suggests currency contagion may have been a cause of the 
crises. The focus of this paper is to expand the existing research by looking into the 
nature of exchange rate volatility and the presence of volatility transmission effect in the 
selected East Asian economies.  
 
Using high frequency data, the volatility of seven foreign exchange markets has been 
modeled in the frameworks of GARCH and EGARCH for both crisis and tranquil 
periods. According to the regressions, the GARCH (1, 1) model performs rather well for 
most currencies in both crisis and non-crisis periods, with the coefficients of both 
lagged squared innovations and the lagged variance being always positive and 
significantly different from zero. As an alternative estimation, the EGARCH (1, 1) 
model is applied to interpret the potential size effect, sign effect and persistence effect 
on the volatility of exchange rates. However, little evidence of asymmetric impact of 
past error terms on the variance of the exchange rates process can be found for most 
exchange rate markets through the EGARCH estimation. Both GARCH and EGARCH 
estimations confirm the volatility shocks are quite persistent in the foreign exchange 
markets under the time period of study.  
 
In order to identify the presence of volatility contagion/spillover effect, particular 
interests of this chapter are to look into the possible exchange rates volatility 
transmission from Korea to other regional markets in the crisis period; and from Hong 
Kong to other regional markets in the tranquil period. Thus, guided by previous 
volatility analysis for each of seven currencies, we construct the GARCH (1, 1) 
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extension model and find evidence of volatility transmission from Korea won to Hong 
Kong dollar, Malaysia ringgit, and Philippine peso over the crisis period. We also find 
the fact that movements of Hong Kong dollar have a significant impact on other 
regional currencies (Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, and Singapore dollar) during the 
tranquil period.  
 
Overall, empirical results in general provide the evidence of the volatility transmission 
among the East Asian foreign exchange markets. The presences of volatility contagion 
effect during the financial collapse, as well as the volatility spillover effect over the 
tranquil period, can be found in this study. These results imply a certain degree of 
interdependence among East Asian exchange rate markets, which may signal tight trade 
and financial linkages and macroeconomic similarities in East Asian region. Exploring 
the interdependence and intra-regional transmissions of exchange rate volatility in East 
Asia region has important policy implication. This is because a thorough understanding 
of the dynamic properties of cross-market volatility transmission is crucial for 
evaluating the level of integration between markets. From a broader perspective, closer 
integration with Korea and Hong Kong would represent closer co-movements of 
economic fundamentals and may facilitate the transmission of shocks between Korea or 
Hong Kong and other economies in the region. Our study of volatility 
contagion/spillovers provides useful insights into how information is transmitted from 
Korea or Hong Kong foreign exchange market to other Asian exchange markets. The 
nature of co-movements between Korea or Hong Kong and other Asian foreign 
exchange rates sheds some light on how, and to what extent, the volatility of Asian 
currencies are affected by Korea won and Hong Kong dollar. Accordingly, given the 
empirical findings generated from this study, policy markers or financial managers from 
other Asian economies might design appropriate exchange rate polices in case an 
adverse shock is observed in Korea and Hong Kong foreign exchange markets where 
contagion/spillover effect is empirically evident. 
Figures: 
 
Figure 4.1 Daily Frequencies of Spot Exchange Rates Returns against U.S. Dollar 
in the Crisis Period (02/07/1997-31/08/1998) 
 
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
HKD
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
IDR
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
KRW
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
MYR
-.06
-.04
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
PHP
-.05
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
SGD
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
1997M10 1998M01 1998M04 1998M07
THB
 
Notes:  
HKD=Hong Kong Dollar 
IDR= Indonesia Rupiah 
KRW= Korean Won  
MYR= Malaysia Ringgit 
PHP= Philippine peso 
SGD= Singapore Dollar 
THB= Thai Baht. 
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Figure 4.2 Daily Frequencies of Spot Exchange Rates Returns against U.S. Dollar 
in the Post-crisis Period (04/01/1999-31/12/2002) 
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Notes:  
HKD=Hong Kong Dollar 
IDR= Indonesia Rupiah 
KRW= Korean Won  
MYR= Malaysia Ringgit 
PHP= Philippine peso 
SGD= Singapore Dollar 
THB= Thai Baht. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Exchange Rates (Daily Returns) 
 
Panel A. Crisis period (02/07/1997-31/08/1998) 
 
Currency Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Observations
HKD 1.23E-06 0.000 -2.325 24.261 5782.629 293 
IND 0.0052 0.052 0.576 10.666 733.726 293 
KRW 0.0014 0.030 -1.479 26.551 6877.939 293 
MYR 0.0017 0.017 -0.022 5.105 54.142 293 
PHP 0.0017 0.014 0.826 6.904 219.446 293 
SGD 0.0007 0.008 -0.845 7.036 233.657 293 
THB 0.0018 0.020 1.365 17.321 2594.931 293 
Note: all currencies are in terms of units of U.S. dollar. 
 
Panel B. Post-crisis period (04/01/1999-31/12/2002) 
 
Currency Mean Std.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Observations
HKD 6.54E-06 0.0002 0.2311 109.6271 474678.4 1002 
IND 0.000134 0.0152 -0.2305 11.4668 3001.758 1002 
KRW 0.0000 0.0048 0.3719 5.4438 272.447 1002 
MYR 7.88E-08 0.0006 0.1681 187.6907 1424125. 1002 
PHP 0.00032 0.0067 -6.4145 134.5386 729246.2 1002 
SGD 4.47E-05 0.0027 -0.1638 5.3111 227.4793 1002 
THB 0.000175 0.0042 -0.1786 11.0188 2689.91 1002 
Note: all currencies are in terms of units of U.S. dollar. 
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Table 4.2 Correlation Analysis of the Currencies Volatility among East Asian 
Economies 
 
Panel A. Crisis period  
Currency HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB 
HKD 1.00        
IDR 0.31  1.00      
KRW 0.00  0.35 1.00     
MYR 0.47  0.83 0.16 1.00    
PHP 0.41  0.47 0.51 0.49 1.00    
SGD 0.14  0.65 0.13 0.64 0.34  1.00   
THB 0.09  0.34 0.16 0.42 0.69  0.28  1.00 
 
 
Panel B. Post-crisis period  
Currency HKD IDR KRW MYR PHP SGD THB 
HKD 1.00        
IDR 0.15  1.00      
KRW 0.18  -0.10 1.00     
MYR 0.29  0.44 0.17 1.00    
PHP 0.13  0.05 0.30 -0.03 1.00    
SGD 0.35  0.21 0.32 0.16 0.02  1.00   
THB 0.25  0.42 0.14 0.06 0.31  0.25  1.00 
 
Note: Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the variables in 4-week centred 
rolling windows.  
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Table 4.3 Unit Root Tests 
 
 
ADF statistics 
(Trend and Intercept) 
Exchange Rates  Period 
Levels First Differences 
Crisis  -3.137**  -22.012***  Hong Kong (HKD) 
Non-crisis  -2.878** -22.879***  
Crisis  -1.275  -16.467***  Indonesia (IDR) 
Non-crisis  -1.938  -31.165***  
Crisis  -1.450  -14.249***  Korea (KRW) 
Non-crisis  -1.321  -32.158***  
Crisis  -1.969  -15.720***  Malaysia (MYR) 
Non-crisis  -10.306*** -18.290***  
Crisis  -2.100  -14.360***  Philippines (PHP) 
Non-crisis  -1.054  -21.735***  
Crisis  -1.638  -19.205***  Singapore (SGD) 
Non-crisis  -2.029  -31.892***  
Crisis  -1.481  -16.097***  Thailand (THB) 
Non-crisis  -1.729  -31.498***  
Notes: ***, **, and * denote rejection of the null of unit root for the ADF test at the 1%, 
5%, 10% significance levels, respectively. The chosen lag length is automatically based 
on SIC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Results of Residual Tests 
 
 
Panel (A) Crisis period  
 
Currency  )10(2Q  valuep −  
LM ARCH(1)  
valuep −  
HKD 7.296 0.697 5.693  0.017 
IND 99.850 0.000 19.236  0.000  
KRW 89.805 0.000 40.720 0.000  
MYR 71.258 0.000 14.455  0.000  
PHP 33.740 0.000 18.565  0.000  
SGD 74.908 0.000 12.192 0.000  
THB 2.058 0.996 7.602 0.006 
 
Panel (B) Post-crisis period  
 
Currency  )10(2Q  valuep −  
LM ARCH(1)  
valuep −  
CNY 240.92 0.000 239.875  0.000  
HKD 240.01 0.000 238.687  0.000  
IND 50.911 0.000 16.194  0.000  
JPY 32.137 0.000 8.526  0.004  
KRW 156.16 0.000 26.322  0.000  
MYR 252.98 0.000 247.525  0.000  
PHP 31.184 0.001 12.222  0.000  
SGD 48.595 0.000 11.293  0.004  
THB 254.85 0.000 17.577  0.000  
Notes: The Ljung-Box Q statistics for the squared residuals is based on the null 
hypothesis that no auto-correlation up to the order k, while the Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) principle is to test the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects versus the alternative 
that the conditional error variance is given by an ARCH (q) process. 
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Table 4.5 Estimates of Conditional Variance with GARCH (1, 1)  
and EGARCH (1, 1) 
 
 
 Panel A. Crisis period (02/07/1997-31/08/1998) 
 GARCH (1,1) EGARCH (1,1) 
Currencies 
0α  1α  1β  0α  1α  θ  φ  
HKD 3.26E-08 
(0.0002) 
0.3792 
(0.0010) 
0.5195 
(0.0000) 
-4.1094 
(0.0932) 
0.3862 
(0.0503) 
0.0759 
(0.4770) 
0.7575 
(0.0000) 
IDR 3.09E-05 
(0.0002) 
0.1142 
(0.0000) 
0.8852 
(0.0000) 
-0.4760 
(0.0001) 
0.2378 
(0.0038) 
0.1564 
(0.0045) 
0.9526 
(0.0000) 
KRW 3.82E-07 
(0.0036) 
0.2620 
(0.0000) 
0.8209 
(0.0000) 
-0.4119 
(0.0000) 
0.4171 
(0.0000) 
0.0862 
(0.1388) 
0.9849 
(0.0000) 
MYR 7.27E-06 
(0.0222) 
0.0891 
(0.0000) 
0.8862 
(0.0000) 
-0.3866 
(0.0442) 
0.2003 
(0.0107) 
0.0486 
(0.2963) 
0.9709 
(0.0000) 
PHP 5.65E-05 
(0.0001) 
0.3143 
(0.0001) 
0.3943 
(0.0007) 
-2.9596 
(0.0074) 
0.7147 
(0.0018) 
0.1116 
(0.4140) 
0.7125 
(0.0000) 
SGD 5.35E-06 
(0.0150) 
0.1696 
(0.0004) 
0.7550 
(0.0000) 
-0.8250 
(0.0590) 
0.2929 
(0.0025) 
0.0863 
(0.1641) 
0.9371 
(0.0000) 
THB 7.68E-05 
(0.0000) 
0.3818 
(0.0000) 
0.3840 
(0.0000) 
-1.6799 
(0.0049) 
0.4583 
(0.0008) 
0.0581 
(0.5056) 
0.8388 
(0.0000) 
Notes: The estimation method for both is Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148
 
(Continued) Table 4.5 Estimates of Conditional Variance with GARCH (1, 1) and 
EGARCH (1, 1) 
 
 
Panel B. Non-crisis period (04/01/1999-31/12/2002) 
 GARCH (1,1) EGARCH (1,1) 
Currencies 
0α  1α  1β  0α  1α  θ  φ  
HKD 5.93E-09 
(0.2679) 
0.2349 
(0.0082) 
0.6753 
(0.0000) 
-0.5145 
(0.0000) 
0.2747 
(0.0000) 
-0.1738 
(0.0000) 
0.9832 
(0.0000) 
IDR 3.34E-07 
(0.5785) 
0.0418 
(0.0879) 
0.9578 
(0.0000) 
-0.4882 
(0.0002) 
0.2776 
(0.0000) 
0.0117 
(0.7284) 
0.9647 
(0.0000) 
KRW 3.83E-07 
(0.0226) 
0.1559 
(0.0000) 
0.8442 
(0.0000) 
-0.7391 
(0.0001) 
0.3612 
(0.0000) 
0.0193 
(0.5193) 
0.9561 
(0.0000) 
MYR 6.83E-08 
(0.4647) 
0.1496 
(0.3296) 
0.5993 
(0.0000) 
-2.7788 
(0.0000) 
0.2368 
(0.0003) 
0.1024 
(0.0958) 
0.8500 
(0.0000) 
PHP 7.26E-07 
(0.0000) 
0.3988 
(0.0003) 
0.7077 
(0.0000) 
-1.1687 
(0.0000) 
0.4555 
(0.0000) 
0.0497 
(0.2170) 
0.9219 
(0.0000) 
SGD 6.02E-07 
(0.0180) 
0.0786 
(0.0031) 
0.8392 
(0.0000) 
-1.1156 
(0.0418) 
0.1699 
(0.0020) 
-0.0104 
(0.7013) 
0.9169 
(0.0000) 
THB 6.04E-07 
(0.0019) 
0.1309 
(0.0001) 
0.8353 
(0.0000) 
-0.6895 
(0.0008) 
0.2575 
(0.0000) 
0.0227 
(0.3588) 
0.9556 
(0.0000) 
Notes: The estimation method for both is Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. P-values are in 
parentheses. 
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 Table 4.6 Estimates of the Regressors KRW in a GARCH (1, 1) Model of Daily 
Exchange Rates (Returns) in the crisis period  
 
Variable  HKD IDR MYR SGD PHP THB 
C  1.81E-08 
(0.0283) 
1.99E-05 
(0.0000) 
6.24E-06 
(0.0031) 
4.06E-06 
(0.0266) 
7.31E-05 
(0.0000) 
7.36E-05
(0.0000) 
2
1−tε  0.3009 (0.0037) 
-0.0432 
(0.0000) 
0.0457 
(0.0170) 
0.1166 
(0.0007) 
0.3276 
(0.0028) 
0.2864 
(0.0006) 
2
1−tσ  0.6449 (0.0000) 
1.0129 
(0.0000) 
0.9151 
(0.0000) 
0.8059 
(0.0000) 
0.1208 
(0.4319) 
0.3792 
(0.0000) 
KRWVOL 0.0034 
(0.0131) 
0.0573 
(0.0000) 
0.0035 
(0.0137) 
0.0008 
(0.2830) 
0.0105 
(0.0071) 
0.0238 
(0.1650) 
Wald / 
IGARCH 
2χ 2.5119 
(0.1130) 
38.1440 
(0.0000) 
9.0928 
(0.0026) 
4.0325 
(0.0446) 
17.0850 
(0.0000) 
14.2432 
(0.0002) 
LM Test 0.1868 
(0.6655) 
5.1773 
(0.0228) 
0.5765 
(0.4477) 
0.0171 
(0.8958) 
0.0556 
(0.8135) 
0.2700 
(0.6034) 
Notes: The estimation method is Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, computing 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients 
in bold denote significance at the 5 percent level of positive coefficients of exogenous 
variable.  
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Table 4.7 Estimates of the Regressors HKD in a GARCH (1, 1) Model of Daily 
Exchange Rates (Returns) in the Post/non-crisis Period 
 
Variable  IDR KRW MYR SGD PHP THB 
C  3.25E-07 
(0.0901) 
3.08E-07 
(0.0006) 
6.78E-08 
(0.0000) 
5.55E-07 
(0.0053) 
7.98E-07 
(0.0000) 
5.71E-07 
(0.0000) 
2
1−tε  0.0417 (0.0000) 
0.1535 
(0.0000) 
0.1488 
(0.0000) 
0.0766 
(0.0001) 
0.3820 
(0.0000) 
0.1313 
(0.0000) 
2
1−tσ  0.9577 (0.0000) 
0.8409 
(0.0000) 
0.5978 
(0.0000) 
0.8313 
(0.0000) 
0.7129 
(0.0000) 
0.8328 
(0.0000) 
HKDVOL 2.0608 
(0.6527) 
3.2248 
(0.0025) 
0.0080 
(0.0197) 
2.5235 
(0.0078) 
-0.9739 
(0.1714) 
1.3885 
(0.3161) 
Wald / 
IGARCH 
2χ 0.1524 
(0.6963) 
0.2996 
(0.5841) 
22.0038 
(0.0000) 
8.8131 
(0.0030) 
53.6180 
(0.0000) 
10.4603 
(0.0012) 
LM Test 0.0843 
(0.7715) 
3.9665 
(0.0464) 
0.19145 
(0.6617) 
1.1116 
(0.2917) 
0.0642 
(0.7999) 
0.1237 
(0.7251) 
Notes: The estimation method is Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, computing 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. Coefficients 
in bold denote significance at the 5 percent level of positive coefficients of exogenous 
variable.  
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Chapter 5 
Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy in the 
Post-crisis East Asia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It is generally believed that a managed floating exchange rate regime began to 
predominate for most industrialised economies after the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s. For the countries with a managed floating regime, the 
monetary authorities allow some exchange rate flexibility but often intervene in the 
foreign exchange market to influence the path of the exchange rate. Thus, more and 
more attention from both academic and political worlds has been recently received to 
the development of the exchange rate and the actions of the monetary authority, leading 
to a growing concern on the pressure of exchange rate market as well as the degree of 
foreign exchange intervention or management. Regarding the tensions of foreign 
exchange market, measuring the speculative pressure of currency is one of the centered 
issues. One of the possible approaches to this is building an exchange market pressure 
(EMP) index, whose extreme values on the depreciation side indicate the event of 
currency crisis. The performance of monetary policy in response to the pressure of 
emerging foreign exchange markets, on the other hand, has been extensively debated 
since the financial crisis of 1990s. One of the frequently argued questions is that 
whether monetary policy was tight or loose over and after the crisis. The traditional 
view suggests that tighter monetary policy, as implemented through lower domestic 
credit growth or higher interest rates, should in principle help strengthen a currency 
whether this is reflected in the exchange rate, in addition to foreign reserves, or both 
(see, for example, Backus and Driffill, 1985).  
 
However, recent debates have doubted the validity of traditional theory regarding the 
experience of crisis-affected Asian countries during 1997-1998. It is questioned that 
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whether tight monetary policy (especially those adopting higher interest rates) could 
successfully defend exchange rates. While the IMF has argued that the steep rise in 
interest rates was vital in stabilising Asian exchange rates, the World Bank points out 
that interest rate hikes destabilised the currencies further by increasing the risk of 
bankruptcy, which led to a further loss of confidence in these economies (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Furthermore, a “revisionist” view proposed that raising interest rates could actually 
exacerbate the currency deprecation and a “Laffer curve” could exist, following which 
contractionary monetary policy induces a panic among investors and a loss of a 
currency’s value (Corsetti et al., 1998; Furman and Stiglitz, 1998; Radelet and Sachs, 
1998a, 1998b; Pakko, 2000). In terms of this view, high interest rates can cause actual 
or expected bankruptcies, or fears of default on debt, which weaken not only the 
economy but the banking system as well, resulting in a higher risk premium. The 
expected return on domestic assets declines as the risk premium rises, even though 
domestic interest rates rise (Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista, 2005). Some studies also 
put forward a fiscal-based theory in which high interest rates indicate a high burden on 
the public sector, implying that the currency would not strengthen without a 
corresponding adjustment of the primary surplus (see Flood and Jeanne, 2000; Lahiri 
and Vegh, 2000, 2001). 
 
With respect to the dilemma regarding the appropriate monetary policy reaction to the 
pressures on the domestic currency, drawing out policy lessons from episodes such as 
the Asian crisis is clearly vital for safeguarding international financial stability in the 
future. Contributing to this key policy debate, this chapter not only provides an 
investigation on the measurement of foreign exchange market pressure and currency 
crisis proneness, but also examines interrelation between exchange market pressure 
(henceforth, EMP) and monetary policy for a representative group of East Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Rather than focusing 
on exchange rate movements alone as most previous empirical studies did, we gauge the 
strength of the domestic currency through building and measuring EMP, which not only 
captures tensions on the foreign exchange market but also sheds light on the degree of 
exchange rate management by monetary authorities.  
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Specifically, the following issues will be covered in this study: First, this study 
measures tensions (pressure) on the exchange rate market and countries susceptibility to 
currency crisis for a group of East Asian economies. In doing this, we construct and 
evaluate the model-independent EMP indices for monthly data series covering the 
period from January 1995 to December 2005 which fully involve the currency collapse 
of 1997 and 1998. We also conduct the robustness (sensitivity) analysis to check 
whether the number of crises episodes and incidences are sensitive to the arbitrary 
choice of EMP construction. Second, we aim to explore the relationship between 
exchange market situation and monetary policy stance, especially for the post-crisis 
period that has not mainly taken into account in previous studies. Monthly data series 
from January 1999 to December 2005 have been employed for these five East Asian 
countries which experienced a temporary and significant monetary policy tightening 
during the Asian financial crisis and then moved towards more flexible exchange rate 
and inflation-targeting regimes in the post-crisis period. On one hand, we are interested 
in the way monetary policy affect EMP: Does contractionary (expansionary) monetary 
policy reduce (raise) EMP as the traditional theory suggests in the post-crisis East Asia? 
On the other hand, what is the reaction of monetary policy to EMP? To address these 
issues, this study employs vector autoregression (henceforth, VAR) technique and a 
similar approach as Tanner (2001) to present a framework that examines the 
relationships between monetary policy and EMP in both directions. Such a framework 
not only yields the response of EMP to the monetary policy shocks, but also generates a 
policy reaction function to EMP.  
 
The remainder of the study is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a review of 
literature on the concept and measurement of EMP, and the empirical studies on the 
relationship between EMP and monetary policy. Section 5.3 constructs a 
model-independent EMP index and measures countries susceptibility to currency crises. 
Section 5.4 explores the interaction between EMP and monetary policy in the post-crisis 
East Asia. Section 5.5 offers concluding remarks.  
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5.2 A Review of Literature 
 
5.2.1 Literature on the Measure of Exchange Market Pressure  
 
The exchange rate policy can be reflected by movements of the exchange rate, foreign 
exchange reserves, and the interest rate. A central bank can control exchange rate 
fluctuations with two policy instruments: foreign exchange reserves and interest rate. It 
is generally believed that the managed floating exchange rate regime, which allows 
some exchange rate flexibility but often intervenes in the foreign exchange market to 
influence the behaviour of exchange rate, has been prevailing in the most industrialised 
economies after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. Recent 
studies have argued that under a managed floating regime monetary authorities should 
focus on the pressure on the exchange rate market, rather than changes in exchange 
rates and foreign exchange reserves alone (Tanner, 2001). Li et al. (2006) further point 
out that measures of currency depreciation only capture crises and “successful”20 
speculative attacks. Nevertheless, there are many cases of unsuccessful speculative 
attacks which are not addressed by the measures of currency depreciation. For instance, 
although there were intense and sustained speculative attacks on the currency through 
sharp interest rate hikes in the 1997/98 financial crisis, Hong Kong still was able to 
maintain its U.S. dollar-based currency board arrangement. A similar case can also be 
found in Argentina which defended its currencies in the year of 1995 by allowing a 
drain in reserves. Thus, in order to capture such “unsuccessful” currency attacks and 
incidences, there have been a growing number of studies focusing on the measures of 
EMP.  
 
Model-dependent Measurement  
 
The notion of EMP is firstly put forward by Girton and Roper (1977, G-R thereafter) 
from the insight that excess demand or supply on the foreign exchange market can 
 
20 Successful speculative attacks are those that lead the monetary authority to give up the pegged 
exchange rate with consequent depreciation of the currency. 
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result in a change in the price of foreign exchange as well as in a change in the level of 
foreign reserves. The G-R model is based on the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments posited by Johnson (1972). The EMP is measured as the sum of exchange rate 
depreciation and reserve outflows, scaled by base money. According to this idea, 
changes in exchange rates or balance of payments can be regarded as adjustments 
reflecting some monetary disequilibrium, and any disequilibrium of the foreign 
exchange market must be resolved either by an exchange rate adjustment, or an official 
intervention, or both of them simultaneously. According to Girton and Roper (1977), 
such construction of the EMP index is applicable to all exchange rate regimes and to 
different degrees of exchange rate management. If the authorities keep the exchange 
rate fixed, they must neutralise exchange market pressure by foreign exchange 
interventions. On the other hand, in case of a free float the possibility of exchange rate 
defense is by definition excluded and the whole speculative pressure is reflected by 
exchange rate changes. In all intermediate exchange rate systems, some mixture of 
adjustments in official reserves and the exchange rate resolves the disequilibrium. Thus 
the concept of EMP can be used to identify and examine the exchange rate regimes: in a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the change of exchange rate will be zero, while in a flexible 
exchange rate regime, the change of international reserves will be zero, and in a 
managed float, EMP is absorbed by either currency depreciation, or reserve losses, or a 
combination of them. 
 
A number of studies have developed monetary models similar to the G-R (see, for 
example, Connolly and Dantas Da Silverira, 1979; Kim, 1985; Mah et al., 1998; 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Shiva, 1998; Pentecost et al., 2001). Based on a small 
open-economy monetary model, Weymark (1995, 1997, and 1998) introduces a more 
general framework to provide a measure of exchange market pressure and the degree of 
intervention. Spolander (1999), as a further extension, incorporates into the model a 
monetary policy reaction function and sterilised foreign exchange intervention. This 
group of studies on EMP measure, together with previous literature such as Girton and 
Roper (1977), Roper and Turnovsky (1980) are the well known attempts to analytically 
construct an operational model-dependent statistic of exchange market pressure. 
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Model-independent Measurement  
 
On the other hand, many researchers have criticised the most undesirable aspect of the 
EMP measure that largely depends on a particular model. For example, Eichengreen et 
al. (1996, p. 278) argue that “model-dependence is not a desirable characteristic of an 
operational index because empirical models linking macroeconomic variables to the 
exchange rate have little explanatory power at short and intermediate horizons”. Rather 
than concentrating on a specific model for the EMP variables, an EMP index that was 
originally introduced by Eichengreen et al. (1996) is a simple measure and fully 
model-independent. According to Eichengreen et al. (1996), this EMP index is a 
weighted sum of exchange rate changes, foreign reserve changes and interest rate 
changes. Rather than estimating any model, the weights are usually calculated from 
sample variances of those three components. This simplicity made the 
model-independent EMP measure widely used by several empirical studies in the 
context of currency crises literature (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Glick and Hutchison, 2001; Pentecost et al., 2001, 
Edison, 2003; and others). The currency attacks have often been identified as an 
unusually large EMP. Hence, EMP acted as a crisis indicator can generally measure 
tensions on the foreign exchange market and countries susceptibility to crisis.  
 
However, some recent studies point out the limitations of the model-independent based 
approach to constructing EMP. In particular, the conventional method of defining 
currency crisis has been argued statistically to be flawed or inaccurate in capturing the 
“true” dispersion of any given EMP series. For example, Pontines and Siregar (2004) 
point out it may be inappropriate to use the standard deviation as the parametric 
measure of volatility. This is because any standard deviation measure is a form of 
averaging and is only as appropriate with the underlying conformity of the data to a 
conventional parametric assumption of normal distribution needed to employ such a 
method. In fact, speculative price series such as the exchanges rate and the interest rates 
have already been widely recognised as the non-normality distribution. The weighting 
of EMP components is becoming one of disputed issues. Bertoli et al. (2005) argue that 
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financial time series are characterised by volatility clustering and constant weights do 
not allow researchers to adequately smooth volatility when they are time-varying or 
undergo structural break. Some studies also point out such model-independent measures 
of EMP have little clear economic interpretation since they result from a combination of 
market generated volatilities and policy reaction functions (see Nitithanprapas and 
Willett, 2000; Willett et al., 2005). Basically, the observed combination of exchange 
rate changes, reserve changes and interest rate changes described the policy response 
function of the monetary authority. Thus all three components are considered policy 
variables and their volatilities partially reflect the preference of authority’s policy 
strategies. Since monetary authority can heavily intervene in the foreign exchange 
market through buying or selling foreign reserves, we may expect a higher volatility or 
a greater variance of reserves, which, does not necessarily imply the large volatility of 
reserves itself but reflect the monetary authority’s policy.  
 
In summary, despite two alternative (model-dependent and model-independent) 
measurements of EMP index, various combinations of EMP indices depend on at least 
two of the three variables: exchange rates, international reserves and interest rates. 
Although both approaches of EMP construction have been assessed in the literature, it is 
not always possible to rank which measure is superior to others since different choices 
can be defended on different empirical and theoretical grounds.  
 
5.2.2 Existing Literature on the Relationship between Monetary Policy and 
Exchange Rate/EMP 
 
The recent financial crises with episodes of capital flight and currency depreciation 
have created policy difficulty for the countries affected by the crises. The standard 
prescription of policy contains fiscal restraint and the maintenance of high interest rates 
to prevent capital outflows. Nevertheless, the contractionary effects of these policy 
prescriptions have been argued to exacerbate problem associated with currency 
depreciation as well as capital outflows. Regarding the relationship between monetary 
policy and the exchange rate, the traditional view, on which the IMF position is based, 
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is that a tight monetary policy strengthens the exchange rate by sending a signal that the 
authorities are committed to maintaining a fixed rate, thereby increasing capital inflows 
(Backus and Driffill, 1985). Some recent studies such as Nadal-De-Simone and Razzak 
(1999) and Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) also find support for traditional theory. However, 
in the case of the Asian financial crisis, a number of economists have argued against the 
signaling value of tighter monetary policy by pointing to the effects of higher interest 
rates on the probability of bankruptcy of highly leveraged borrowers (see, for example, 
Radelet and Sachs, 1998a, 1998b; Feldstein, 1998; Stiglitz, 1999). These studies suggest 
a larger country risk premium, a lower expected return to investors and capital flight, 
generating downward pressure on the exchange rate. This situation is termed as a 
perverse effect of a tight monetary in the literature (see also Gertler et al., 2000; and 
Aghion et al., 2001). Thus, there is a “foreign exchange-interest rate Laffer curve” 
predicted by the “revisionist” view: higher interest rates are counterproductive for 
defending the exchange rate after some point. That is, an increase in domestic interest 
rates fails to reverse capital outflows and support a country’s exchange rate. In 
particular, Pakko (2000) evaluates the conditions when a “Laffer curve” type of effect 
occurs. He finds the possibility of unorthodox effect of high domestic interest rates on 
capital flows can enter through the risk premium. If raising interest rates increases the 
probability associated with a default on outstanding debt, the result can be a worsening 
of the country’s capital account position. Nevertheless, Krugman (1998) argues that for 
countries with a large external debt dominated in foreign currency, even very high 
interest rates might be preferable to a free fall in the exchange rate in these countries.  
 
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between exchange rate and 
monetary policy is mixed. For instance, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) examine nine 
emerging markets with episodes of temporarily high interest rates and find that both the 
magnitude and duration of such interest rate hikes are associated with exchange rate 
depreciation. Using a model for the behaviour exchange rates in the long run, 
Nadal-De-Simone and Razzak (1999) find that an increase in the nominal interest rate 
differential leads to appreciation of the domestic currency. Using monthly data from 80 
countries covering the period of 1980-98, Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) also find that 
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higher interest rates are associated with real currency appreciation through changes in 
the nominal exchange rates. They further point out tight monetary policy facilitates the 
reversal of currency undervaluation through nominal appreciation. When the economy 
is experiencing a banking crisis, the results are not robust and depend on the 
specification. Using monthly observations, Kraay (2000) finds that a tight monetary 
policy does not increase the likelihood of a successful defense of currency depreication 
in a sample of 75 developed and developing countries.  
 
The evidence of a perverse effect of tight monetary policy on the exchange rate has 
been found by Baig and Goldfajn (1998), using the VAR estimation and impulse 
response analysis of daily data for five East Asian countries. Using weekly data, Gould 
and Kamin (1999) apply Granger causality tests on interest rates and exchange rates for 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Mexico. They find that exchange 
rates are not significantly affected in any of the countries examined by changes in 
interest rates during the financial crises. A similar finding is reported by Ohno et al. 
(1999), who focus on daily observations of interest rates and exchange rates in Thailand, 
Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore. Based on monthly data 
for Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, Basurto and Gosh (2000) find little evidence that 
higher real interest rates result in a higher risk premium, whilst they appear to be 
associated with an appreciation of the currency.  
 
Tanner (2001), in particular, develops a VAR framework to investigate the 
interrelations between exchange market pressure (EMP) and monetary policy for the 
cases of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand in 1990-98. He finds that 
a reduction in domestic credit growth helps reduce EMP either by increasing the value 
of a country’s currency and/or its stock of foreign reserves. He also finds that the 
response of EMP to interest rate shocks is weaker than its response to changes in 
domestic credit growth. A very similar study of EMP with VAR can be found in 
Kamaly and Erbil (2000), who examine the cases in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia but get 
somewhat more mixed results than findings from Tanner (2001). Gochoco-Bautista and 
Bautista (2005) investigate the relationships between monetary policy and EMP in 
Philippines for the period 1990-2000. They conclude that the responses of monetary 
policy to EMP are more contractionary in the crisis period; also, that the impact of 
interest rates on EMP is negative in the tranquil period, but positive in the crisis period. 
Garcia and Malet (2005) include the effect of economic growth on the exchange market 
pressure to investigate the interactions between EMP and monetary policy by focusing 
on the case of Argentina for the period 1993-2004. They find evidence of a positive and 
double-direction relationship between EMP and domestic credit, but output growth also 
plays a role in the determination of EMP, even more than domestic credit or the interest 
rate. 
 
5.3 EMP and Currency Crisis: A Model-independent Approach  
 
5.3.1 A Model-independent Measure of EMP  
 
As mentioned earlier, as a good measure of crisis proneness, EMP can capture currency 
attacks that have been successfully resisted by the monetary authorities. In this section, 
we firstly focus on EMP as a general measure of tensions on the foreign exchange 
market and countries susceptibility to crisis. Following Kaminsky et al. (1998), we 
construct a model-independent EMP index as follows: 
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where  is the exchange market pressure index proposed by Kaminsky et al. 
(1998) for country i in period t;  is the units of country i’s currency per U.S. dollar 
in period t; 
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standard deviation of the rate of change in reserves (
ti
ti
r
r
,
,Δ );  is the nominal 
interest rate for country i in period t, and 
ti,int
intσ  is the standard deviation of the change in 
the nominal interest rate . From Equation (5.1), one can observe the different 
weights given to these three key components of exchange market pressures. In particular, 
the weights for the reserve and interest rate fluctuations depend on the relative size of 
their standard deviations (
ti,intΔ
rσ  and intσ , respectively) against that of the exchange rate 
eσ . By construction, an EMP index increases with a depreciation of the domestic 
currency, a loss of international reserve, and a rise in the domestic interest rate. The 
main advantage of this approach is the greater emphasis put on the interest rate, which 
has often been identified as an important factor of exchange rate determination in theory. 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) point out the interest rate hikes are the central banks’ response 
to speculative attacks as well and should be included in the computation of the EMP 
index.  
 
Data Description and Properties  
 
Given that our aim is to measure tensions on the foreign exchange market and countries 
susceptibility to currency crisis, monthly data series over the period from January 1995 
to December 2005 are used in this section in order to fully cover the currency collapse 
of 1997 and 1998. The exchange rate is expressed in local currency per U.S. dollar. The 
3-month money market rates are used as the measure of domestic interest rates. Line 11 
of the IFS database (foreign assets of the monetary authorities) is used as the measure of 
foreign exchange reserves.  
 
Figure 5.1 depicts the movements of model-independent EMP indices based on 
Equation (5.1) for five East Asian countries from 1995 to 2005. Along with the 
exchange market pressure line, the lines representing 1.5 multiple of standard deviation 
above and below the mean value are portrayed. Different exchange rate arrangements 
 162
 163
adopted by the sample countries during the analysed period are distinguished by shaded 
areas as indicated in Figure 5.1. The descriptive statistics of the model-independent 
EMP indices are displayed in Table 5.1. We find that EMP indices are skewed to the 
right in Korea, Philippines and Thailand, while are skewed to the left in Indonesia and 
Singapore. All of EMP series exhibit excess kurtosis which reflects fat-tailedness. In 
addition, the Jarque-Bera statistics are highly significant for all sample countries which 
further imply the non-normality distribution of the all EMP series. 
 
We observed the following from Figure 5.1: As for the pre-crisis period, Singapore has 
experienced considerably volatile development of the exchange market pressure among 
the sample countries. This is evident for the higher values of standard deviation as well 
as the higher magnitudes of EMP indices in the Singapore than those in other countries. 
In the crisis years of 1997/1998, most East Asian countries experienced the severe 
currency pressure and witnessed a significant increase in EMP indices. In the post-crisis 
period, the values of EMP indices began to decrease for most countries but still 
maintained a higher level than those in the pre-crisis period for most countries, which 
revealed a stronger selling pressure on the domestic currency for these countries. In 
addition, a greater volatility of EMP indices identified for most sample countries in the 
post-crisis period reflected the frequent changes in the exchange rates, foreign reserves 
and interest rates in these countries.  
 
5.3.2 EMP as A Measure of Currency Crisis Proneness  
 
To our knowledge, Eichengreen et al. (1996) are the first to employ the EMP as a basis 
for the analysis of currency crisis. If the speculative attack (currency pressure) is 
successful, there is a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency. However, the 
monetary authorities may instead accommodate the pressure by running down their 
foreign reserves or deter the attack by raising the interest rates. By constructing a 
weighted average of exchange rate changes, reserve changes and interest rate changes, 
the exchange rate is said to be under stress (there is selling pressure) if there is a 
significant increase in the exchange market pressure index.  
Especially, Eichengreen et al. (1996) define the crises as extreme values of EMP index 
in the following way: 
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=1 if                           (5.2)
  =0 otherwise, 
here 
ti,Crisis EMPEMP μσ +> 5.1ti,          
     
EMP
 
w EMPμ  and  are the sample mean and standard deviation of EMP 
ively. pproa
ollowing the definition of crisis as Eichengreen et al. (1996) specify, we compute the 
EMPσ
respect This a ch is widely used as a conventional method of selecting an 
arbitrary threshold in the crisis literature. It is important to highlight that a currency 
crisis in the context of exchange market pressure is not only defined as capturing 
instances of successful attacks (i.e., when a depreciation of the currency occurs), but 
also instances of unsuccessful attacks (pressure rebuffed by loss in reserves and/or rise 
in interest rates) (Kaminsky, et al., 1998; Goldstein et al., 2000). 
 
F
number and proportion of currency crises to which countries have been subjected during 
the analysed period, as reported in Table 5.2. A crisis quarter is defined as one in which 
the EMP-measure exceeds the mean value by 1.5 standard deviation. The choice of 
three-month window is adopted in order to examine the sensitivity of the results and to 
avoid counting the same crisis more than once, due to the fact that crisis may often last 
for over a month and more crises occur in successive months. According to the 
incidences of crises (or number of crises episodes) reported in Table 5.2, Indonesia is 
the one most severely afflicted by the crises among the sample countries, with 5.3% 
crises incidences. Philippines and Thailand witness 3.8% incidences of crises for the 
period under study. There are 4 crises episodes identified in the case of Singapore. 
Korea is the least severely crisis-affected country among the sample countries, with 
merely 2 crises episodes according to the EMP measure. Once the crisis incidence 
episodes have been computed, the dates of the currency pressure (crisis) can be captured 
accordingly. As shown in the last column of Table 5.2, it is evident that dates of crises 
episodes for five sample countries mainly cover the years of 1997 and 1998, confirming 
the evidence of severe currency depreciation around the currency collapse of 1997 and 
1998 for five East Asian countries.  
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.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 order to check whether the number of crises episodes and incidences are sensitive to 
5
 
In
the arbitrary choice of EMP construction, another form of EMP index developed by 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) is constructed as well. Different from Equation (5.2), reserves 
and interest rates of reference country (U.S.) have been taken into account in the 
construction of EMP: 
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here is the exchange market pressure index proposed by Eichengreen et al. w ERWtiEMP,  
e
(1996) for country i in period t; e  is the units of country i’s currency per U.S. dollars 
in period t; 
ti ,
σ  is the standard deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate 
ti
tie ,Δ ; tirm ,  the ratio of gross foreign reserves to money stock or monetary base for 
e ,
country t; 
is 
i in period rσ  is the standard deviation of the difference between the relative 
changes in the ratio of foreign reserves and money base in country i and the reference 
country (U.S.) )( ,, tUSti
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,  is the nominal interest rate for country i in 
period t; tUSi ,  is est rate for the reference country (U.S.) in period t; 
i
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σ  is the dard deviation of the nominal interest rate differential )( ,, tUSti ii −Δ . The 
 index can take values on the real line, with high positive values associated to a 
widening of the interest rate spread or a loss of foreign reserves.  
 
 
 stan
EMP
pressure on the domestic currency, as a combination of a nominal depreciation, a 
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able 5.3 shows the number and proportion of currency crises to which countries have 
een subjected, using the index. Similarly, a crisis quarter is defined as one 
However, as indicate index suggests different number and 
For example, 5 crises episodes have been 
two types of EMP indices indicates that the number and incidence of crises episodes are 
P const
 and monetary 
olicy in the post-crisis East Asia. Most existing studies heavily focus on the crisis 
T
b ERWtiEMP,  
d in Table 5.3, the 
in which the ERW measure exceeds the mean value by 1.5 standard deviation. 
identified in Thailand using the KRLEMP  while 11 crises episodes have been 
identified in this country using the ERW index. Obviously, a comparison of the 
sensitive to the arbitrary choice of EM ruction. Our analysis thereby implies that 
EMP turns out to be notably sensitive to minor choices on the index construction.  
 
5.4 EMP and Monetary Policy: An Empirical Analysis 
tiEMP,  
proportion of crises episodes for each country. 
ERW
tiEMP,  
t  index
tiEMP,  
i,
 
In this section, we restrict our attention to the interactions between EMP
p
event in East Asia and mainly examine the links of currency attack and monetary policy 
effectiveness prior to or during the crisis. To fill in the gap of little study on the 
post-crisis or recent East Asia, monthly data series covering the period January 
1999-December 2005 (yielding 84 monthly observations for sample countries) are 
employed in this section to revisit the interactions between EMP and monetary policy 
recently. The data are extracted from the IMF International Financial Statistics (See 
Appendix 5.1 for a full description of the data series). Since the East Asian financial 
debacle of 1997-98, a handful of countries in the region—Indonesia, Korea, Philippines 
and Thailand—explicitly or implicitly changed their exchange rate policies from more 
“rigid” to more flexible arrangements after the Asian financial crisis (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002). Note that the Asian financial crisis prompted these countries to alter 
their monetary policy regimes in addition to exchange rate policy regimes. Korea, 
Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand have instituted monetary policy arrangements 
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 answering this question, the issue that needs to be addressed firstly is how to measure 
                                                       
fashioned around an inflation objective, that is, inflation-targeting regimes21. It is, then, 
necessary for policymakers and researchers to examine whether and by how much, 
monetary policy responds to the exchange market pressure under more flexible 
exchange rate and inflation-targeting regimes adopted by these countries after the crisis.  
 
In
the stance of monetary policy. Regarding this, the earlier literature emphasised 
monetary aggregates as the monetary policy indicator. For instance, in the traditional 
monetary approach to the balance of payments, the domestic credit component of the 
monetary base was considered to be the variable controlled by policy makers. On the 
other hand, recent studies began to emphasise the role of interest rates (see, for example, 
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). Nevertheless, the nominal interest rate, which is usually 
viewed as the de facto instrument of monetary policy tightening, is argued to be 
inadequate as the only factor that measure the stance of monetary policy (Gould and 
Kamin, 1999). This is because not all changes in interest rates are the result of 
deliberate policy actions. Expectations of future depreciation or default on debt may not 
only cause a domestic currency to depreciate but also cause interest rates to rise. 
Furthermore, Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista (2005) point out in the case of sterilised 
intervention and exchange rate targeting, foreign reserve losses will be offset by 
increase in domestic credit. Monetary policy is loose even though interest rates have not 
fallen. Considering these, as a compromise, the monetary policy variables we choose in 
this study are both changes in domestic credit as a proportion of the monetary base, and 
the differential between domestic and U.S. interest rates. Thus, the effectiveness of both 
domestic credit growth and interest rate differential as monetary policy variables are 
examined in this study. We present a theoretical framework that captures the above 
factors in the next section.  
 
 
21 Korea was the first Asian country to implement the new regime in 1998, followed by Indonesia in 
1999, Thailand in 2000, and the Philippines in 2002. Singapore operates a quasi inflation target in that its 
monetary policy rule is the trade-weighted exchange rate rather than the interest rate. 
5.4.1 The Components of a Model-based EMP  
 
As a common model-dependent measure of exchange market pressure, the version of 
Girton and Roper (1977) model has been utilised and modified by a growing literature 
to investigate the relationship between monetary policy and EMP. Among them, a 
simple monetary model by Tanner (2001) is outlined as follows: 
 
Consider the usual stylised depiction of the asset side of the central bank balance sheet, 
on the demand side, the growth of real base money ( ) is: tm
 
tttt MMm π−Δ= −1/                                                  (5.4)  
 
where  is nominal (base) money at time t and tM tπ  is the inflation rate ( 1/ −Δ tt PP , 
 is the price level).  tP
 
The inflation rate is linked to world inflation  through the rate of growth of the 
nominal exchange rate  (units of the country’s currency per U.S. dollar): 
*
tπ
te
 
tttt ze +−= *ππ                                                      (5.5) 
 
where  is the deviation from purchasing power parity.  tz
 
On the supply side, the two components of nominal base money are international 
reserves  and net domestic assets . Thus, the stock of money is given as follows: tR tD
 
ttttttt rMDRMM δ+=Δ+Δ=Δ −− 11 /)(/                                  (5.6) 
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where  and 1/ −Δ= ttt MRr 1/ −Δ= ttt MDδ . 
 
Assuming that purchasing power parity holds and world inflation equals zero 
( ), we substitute Equations (5.5) and (5.6) into (5.4) and rearrange them to 
get an expression for EMP: 
0* == ttz π
 
ttttt mreEMP −=−≡ δ                                                (5.7) 
 
Equation (5.7) implies that EMP is measured as the sum of exchange rate depreciation 
and reserve loss/outflows (scaled by base money). It should equal the difference 
between the growth rates of the domestic component of the monetary base ( tδ ) and 
money demand ( ). If the real money demand is assumed constant, that is, = 0, we 
will get the following: the changes of EMP equal the changes of 
tm tm
tδ . This indicates that 
EMP and tδ  should move together with each other in this case.  
 
5.4.2 The Theoretical Implications of EMP and Monetary Policy 
 
As reviewed in the survey, traditional theory suggests that tight monetary policy, as 
implemented through lower domestic credit growth or higher interest rates, should in 
principle help strengthen a currency. Thus, monetary contraction should theoretically 
reduce the exchange market pressure. Nevertheless, some researchers also point out 
indirect effects and possible interactions between variables, which were hidden in the 
simple monetary framework (for example, Kamaly and Erbil, 2000; Garcia and Malet, 
2005). When the monetary transmission mechanism is taken into account, the 
relationship between domestic credit and EMP becomes ambiguous. On one hand, the 
monetary model indicates that a restrictive credit policy will decrease market pressure 
against the domestic currency. On the other hand, if a decline in domestic credit growth 
brings about a slowdown of output growth, this may in turn provoke an increase in EMP. 
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This is because lower output growth may feed devaluation expectations and thereby 
bring about pressures on the domestic currency.  
 
Interest rate, acted as a policy tool by central banks to control the growth of domestic 
credit tδ . EMP shocks and the interest rate differential, as Tanner (2001) suggests, 
should be positively correlated. This is because higher exchange depreciation and/or 
lower reserves signals more risk for investors. As suggested by Garcia and Malet (2005), 
an increase in the interest rate in the country would lead to a rise in the EMP, both 
directly as indicated in the monetary model (related in the model to lower demand for 
money) and indirectly via a decrease in output, as described in the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  
 
However, the relationship between EMP and interest rate deserves more discussion. 
Such relation has been frequently argued as negative, precisely opposite to that implied 
in the monetary model (Kamaly and Erbil, 2000). In this case, an interest rate defense 
exacerbates financial fragilities or the quasi-fiscal deficit (Flood and Jeanne, 2000; 
Lahiri and Vegh, 2001; and others). A standard IMF prescription to affected East Asian 
countries in the financial crisis was to use contractionary monetary policy to counter 
depreciation pressures and also suggested a belief in a negative relationship between 
interest rate and EMP (Boorman, et al., 2000). Such consideration is based on the 
rationale that, under capital mobility, the contractionary monetary policy will raise the 
differential between domestic and world (U.S.) interest rates (φ )  A higher (lower) 
interest rate differential attracts (expels) foreign investment and capital inflows, which, 
in turn, shrinks (widens) the gap between domestic currency demand and supply, 
implying a decrease (increase) of EMP. Nevertheless, as suggested by many studies, φ  
may be a noisy indicator of monetary policy since it contains market elements as well, 
including expected exchange depreciation and a risk premium. Sometimes higher 
interest rates are not due to the tight monetary policy but due to the overall economic 
situation and the risk prevalent in the market.  
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Moreover, the relationship regarding EMP and monetary policy is also reflected in the 
currency crises models. The first generation models stress the effect of domestic credit 
on EMP and consider that an expansionary monetary policy with a fixed exchange rate 
(via an increase in domestic credit not matched by an increase in money demand) will 
end up with the loss of international reserves (see, for example, Krugman, 1979; Flood 
and Garber, 1984). Therefore, if an empirical result suggests that domestic credit indeed 
increase EMP - maybe due to scarce monetary transmission to economic activity - the 
idea in Krugman (1979) can be supported accordingly. The second generation models 
predict a direct relationship between domestic interest rates and EMP. These models 
state the devaluation expectations, interest rate differentials, and any 
fundamentals-related problem that makes the maintenance of the nominal peg costly 
(see, for example, Obstfeld, 1986). Regarding the policy reaction, on the other hand, it 
is generally believed that authorities usually tighten monetary policy in response to 
increases in EMP. Nevertheless, several recent papers point out when there are large 
capital outflows, monetary authorities are likely to expand domestic credit to sterilise 
EMP increases (Flood et al., 1996; Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). 
 
In summary, the relationships between EMP and variables of monetary policy relay on 
the specific monetary framework. For the purpose of this study, our theoretical 
framework focuses on the interactions among EMP, domestic credit growth, and the 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. Although a scale variable for 
money demand should also be included in a monetary framework. Most frequently, this 
variable is gross domestic product (GDP). However, our study uses monthly data, for 
which GDP is not available.  
 
5.4.3 Empirical Framework: A Vector Autoregression (VAR) Approach   
 
As observable in many theoretical links between the variables under study, an analysis 
of the determinants of EMP using traditional Ordinary Least Square (OLS) technique 
would suffer from endogeneity problems. To overcome this problem, we follow 
previous studies and utilise a VAR technique. In particular, a similar strategy as Tanner 
(2001) is used for the estimation presented in this study. We construct the VAR 
framework which includes the following variables: EMP, domestic credit growth, and 
the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. This framework can be 
described as follows (Tanner, 2001): 
 
tttt vXaXaaX ++++= −− ...22110                                        (5.8) 
 
where  = (tX δ , EMP, φ ) is a vector of variables, the s is a vector of coefficients, 
and  is a vector of error terms. 
ia
),, φδ vvt (v= vEMP δ  is the scaled domestic credit 
growth, EMP is exchange market pressure, and φ  is the differential between domestic 
interest rate and U.S. interest rate. This system can help test for effects of past values of 
X on current values. According to Tanner (2001), the error vector includes the “own” 
error terms )  and the contemporaneous correlations with other 
errors. Thus, we get the following equ
 ,( δw , φwwwt = EMP
ation: 
 
tt Bwv =                                                            (5.9) 
 
where B is a 3x3 matrix whose diagonal elements indicating the “own” correlations 
equal one, and whose non-zero off-diagonal elements reflect contemporaneous 
correlations among the error terms. Specifically: 
 
φδφδδδ wbwbwv EMPEMP ++=                                           (5.10) 
φφδδ wbwwbv EMPEMPEMPEMP ++=                                       (5.11) 
φφδφδφ wwbwbv EMPEMP ++=                                           (5.12) 
 
Therefore, contemporaneous relationships among variables in X are reflected in both 
the expected signs of and priori (exogeneity) restrictions on the  coefficients. As 
suggested by Tanner (2001), the ordering of the variables in a VAR is justified by 
b
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imposing certain restrictions or assumptions on the matrix B. This permits a simple 
Cholesky decomposition to be used. Similar to Kamaly and Erbil (2000), Tanner (2001), 
and Gochoco-Bautista and Bautista (2005), we consider that domestic credit growth δ  
is more “exogenous” than EMP or the interest rate differential φ . Hence, as the 
exogenous policy variable, innovations to domestic credit growth δ  only reflect the 
preferences of the policymakers. 
 
To implement the impulse response function, the Cholesky decomposition approach as 
Tanner (2001) is employed, assuming the following relationships between the 
individual components of :  tv
 
tt
wv δδ =                                                           (5.13) 
 
This equation indicates the shocks to domestic credit growth  are from its own error 
terms . 
t
vδ
t
wδ
 
Second, shocks to exchange market pressure  has two parts: one is its “own” 
shock  which can be thought of as a shock to demand for a country’s currency, 
the other one is the portion of shocks to EMP that is contemporaneous correlated with 
the domestic credit (i.e. ):  
tEMP
v
tEMP
w
t
wbEMP δδ
 
ttt
wbwv EMPEMPEMP δδ+=                                              (5.14) 
 
Third, shocks to change in the interest rate differential  has three parts: one is its 
“own” shocks  which potentially contains policy and market determined elements, 
the other two elements are the portions of shocks to the interest rate differentials that are 
contemporaneous correlated with domestic credit (i.e. ) and EMP (i.e.  
t
vφ
t
wφ
t
wb δφδ
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tEMPEMP
wbφ
tt
wv φφ +=
), respectively: 
 
tt EMPEMP
wbwb φδφδ +                                         (5.15) 
 
The interest rate differential should respond to changes in EMP: if EMP shocks and the 
interest rate differential are positively correlated, this implies that higher exchange 
deprecation and/or lower reserves signals more risk for investors. Such effects are 
captured in the term . The innovations to domestic credit  affect the 
interest rate differential through either standard liquidity or Fisher channels. Therefore, 
such an ambiguity about sign of  reflects whether liquidity effects dominate Fisher 
effects. Thus, the above restrictions imply a Cholesky ordering of 
tEMPEMP
wbφ twδ
φδb
δ , EMP, φ . As 
Tanner (2001) suggests, this ordering permits a role for both monetary aggregate δ  
and an interest rate variable φ  as the central bank’s instrument. This is because the 
central banks’ preference regarding δ  and φ  in the current period are assumed to be 
contained in the shock terms  and . In addition to the contemporaneous 
relationships shown in Equations (5.13) through (5.15), The effect of past innovations 
(i.e., lagged elements of ) to current values of X can be described by the impulse 
response functions (henceforth, IRFs).  
t
wδ twφ
tw
 
5.4.4 Interpretation of Estimation Results  
 
Table 5.4 shows the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of the time series 
properties of the main variables, namely, EMP, δ , and φ . It is evident that these 
variables are stationary in levels for most countries. For Korea and Thailand, since tφ  
is nonstationary in levels but stationary in first differences, we used the first differenced 
series of interest rate differential ( φΔ ) for these two countries accordingly. Table 5.5 
presents the bivariate Granger-causality tests using 4 lags. The IRFs generated by the 
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Cholesky decomposition are presented in Figure 5.2, with the ordering: δ , EMP, φ 22. 
The empirical findings are summarised as follows: 
 
Effects of domestic credit growth on EMP 
 
Regarding the domestic credit growth δ  as policy variable, if monetary policy works 
in the expected direction, the coefficient  (i.e., shocks to EMP that is 
contemporaneously correlated with domestic credit growth) should be positive and 
significant, indicating a restrictive credit policy decreases market pressure against the 
domestic currency. However, we may also expect the negative impact of 
δEmpb
δ  on EMP 
since a decline in domestic credit growth might bring about a slowdown of growth, 
which might in turn provoke an increase in EMP. Allowing for the 10 percent level of 
significance, the F-statistics (Granger causality) find lagged δ  does not help explain 
EMP in most countries with the exception of Thailand, indicating little evidence that 
lagged δ  precedes EMP for the other four countries over the sample period. The 
results of IRFs show that the direction of the response is diversified. For Philippines, the 
IRFs show that an innovation in δ  has a significant and positive impact on EMP in 
one period, as expected in the traditional theory. For Singapore, according to IRF, there 
are significant positive and negative impacts of an innovation in δ  on EMP. In 
contrast, the negative and significant effects of δ  on EMP are found in Indonesia, 
Korea, and Thailand for one period. Hence, our findings suggest the ambiguous 
relationship between δ  and EMP for the sample countries.  
 
Effects of interest rate differential on EMP 
 
Regarding the interest rate differential φ , lagged effects are captured by corresponding 
IRFs and F-statistics (Granger causality) of φ  on EMP in system. Results from the 
                                                        
22 To see whether the results are sensitive with respect to other orderings, an alternative ordering of the 
variables in the VAR is also considered, placing δ after EMP rather than before. However, results were 
largely insensitive to alternative ordering.  
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Granger causality test show that lagged φ  precedes EMP only in Philippines and 
Singapore at the 10 percent significance level. As for the other three countries, we find 
no causality from lagged φ  to EMP. The negative effects of φ  on EMP can be found 
only in Singapore with an initial negative response, suggesting that positive innovations 
in the domestic interest rate help reduce EMP. As for Thailand, the effect of a shock to 
φ  on EMP is initially positive but turns to negative in two periods. This may be 
because a higher interest rate differential signals greater currency depreciation and risk 
or both. Also note that for Indonesia, Korea and Philippines, the effect of a shock to φ  
on EMP is found to be even weaker and insignificant within two periods. These mixed 
results suggest that, working through the whole system, a rise in interest rate differential 
does not always reduce the EMP as the traditional theory predicts. Nevertheless, 
somewhat weak response of EMP to interest rate shocks should not cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy for affecting EMP. The inconclusive results highlight 
the fact that interest rates have market-determined and policy-determined elements, as 
many previous studies suggest (for example, Tanner, 2001; Gochoco-Bautista and 
Bautista, 2005).  
 
Effects of EMP on the domestic credit growth 
 
As with the policy reaction, we also investigate the response of the monetary authorities 
to the impact of EMP. Regarding the domestic credit growth δ , the reaction function is 
summarised by IRFs and F-statistics (Granger causality) of lagged EMP on δ . Does 
the pressure on the currency lead the monetary authorities to increase domestic credit – 
that is, to sterilise the loss of reserves in order to preserve enough liquidity in the 
economic system? The Granger-causality tests show that lagged EMP can cause δ  in 
Indonesia, Korea and Philippines at the 10 percent significance level over the sample 
period. The IRFs show a lagged positive effect of EMP on δ  for most countries 
(expect Singapore), implying that the authorities of these countries in general respond to 
increased EMP by providing additional liquidity to the banking system rather than 
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contracting the money supply. Thus, lagged sterilisation has taken place for these 
countries. For Singapore, there is a negative impact of EMP δ  on at least for three 
periods, which may be related to the alternation of attempts to sterilise with a restrictive 
(hence, defensive) stance. However, the evidence stemming from the Granger-causality 
tests is weak. 
 
Effects of EMP on interest rate differential 
 
We may investigate whether the exchange market pressure has a positive or negative 
impact on the interest rates. If it is predicted as second generation models of currency 
crises, we may expect a positive effect of EMP on interest rates. If governments respond 
exchange market pressure by reducing interest rates to compensate for scarce external 
liquidity, we may expect a negative effect of EMP on interest rates. Regarding the 
interest rate differential φ , the reaction function is summarised by lagged IRFs and 
F-statistics (Granger causality) of EMP on φ . The Granger causality test results show 
that lagged EMP does not Granger cause φ  in most countries with the exception of 
Indonesia over the whole period. According to the IRFs, shocks to EMP in general 
affect φ  positively for all sample countries. This is not surprising, since an increase in 
EMP is generally associated with an increase in either expected exchange depreciation, 
risk or both. This positive impact tends to reflect the fact that interest rates have both 
market-determined and policy-determined effects. When EMP goes up, the authorities 
attempt to raise the interest rate differential in order to reduce EMP or stem the 
depreciation of the domestic currency, or that the interest rate differential widens when 
EMP increases because of fears of currency depreciation and a higher risk premium. 
Note that the effect of a shock to EMP on φ  is found to be slightly negative in 
Singapore after two periods, this may imply that the government of Singapore wants to 
compensate for scarce external liquidity and lowering interest rates in face to an 
increase in EMP.  
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Effects of domestic credit growth on interest rate differential 
 
The effect of money supply on the nominal interest rates is typically discussed from two 
perspectives: the liquidity effect and the Fisher effect. In theory, the term liquidity effect 
refers to a fall in nominal interest rates following an exogenous persistent increase in 
money supply. According to the classical Fisher effect, however, an exogenous 
persistent increase in money is predicted to increase expected inflation and so increase 
nominal interest rates. As Friedman (1968) argues, both forces operate in practice: a 
persistent increase in the money supply both reduces nominal interest rates and 
increases expected inflation so that the real interest rate (nominal minus expected 
inflation) also falls. Thus, regarding the effects of expansions in domestic credit on the 
interest rate differential, theory presents an ambiguous nature of the link: the liquidity 
effect implies that domestic credit shocks affect interest rate differential negatively 
while the Fisher effect implies that the positive impact of domestic credit shocks on 
interest rate differential. In this study, the positive responses of the interest rate 
differential to domestic credit growth can be generally found in Indonesia, Korea and 
Philippines, while the negative responses can be witnessed in Singapore within three 
periods. Note also that for Thailand, the effect of a shock to δ  on φ  is found to be 
even weaker and insignificant. Hence, the liquidity effect appears to prevail in 
Singapore while the Fisher effect appears to dominate in Indonesia, Korea and 
Philippines. Nevertheless, the Granger causality tests show little evidence of lagged δ  
proceeds φ  for most sample countries (expect Indonesia), suggesting the weak role of 
δ  in explaining φ  for most countries. 
 
Effects of interest rate differential on domestic credit growth 
 
The Granger test shows that changes in interest rate differential φ  do not precede 
domestic credit growth δ  in the system. But the IRFs present mixed results in relation 
to the sign of such relationship: the negative impact of an innovation to φ  on δ  can 
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be found in Thailand in three periods while shocks to φ  affect δ  positively in the 
case of Singapore. For other three cases (Indonesia, Korea, and Philippines), the 
responses of δ  to φ  according to IRFs are found to be insignificant. These 
diversified results have portray different reactions of δ  to φ : in face of changing 
interest rates, monetary authorities can either compensate for the lack (excess) of 
liquidity induced by a rise (decline) in interest rates, or reinforce the monetary 
contraction (expansion). 
 
5.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter provides an investigation on the measurement of foreign exchange market 
pressure and currency crisis proneness, as well as examines interrelations between 
exchange market pressure and monetary policy for a representative group of East Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) over the period 
1999-2005.  
 
Our findings confirm the presence of the severe currency pressure from a significant 
increase in the EMP indices during the 1997/98 financial crisis period. A stronger 
selling pressure on the domestic currency for sample countries has been identified. Our 
findings also imply the frequent changes in the exchange rates, foreign reserves and 
interest rates for sample countries after the crisis. With the model-independent measure 
of EMP index, we capture the crises episodes as well as the dates of the speculative 
attack on currency, and find evidence of severe currency depreciation around the 
currency collapse of 1997/1998 for five East Asian countries. Nevertheless, the 
sensitivity analysis on the basis of another EMP index indicates that the number and 
incidence of crises episodes are sensitive to the arbitrary choice of EMP construction. 
The methodological choices do matter and would affect the analysis of currency crises 
determinants. Given this, it is important for crisis researchers to investigate the 
sensitivity of their empirical results to alternative sets of EMP construction.  
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This study also attempts to investigate the monetary authorities’ response to pressures 
on currency for these five countries which adopt more flexible exchange rate and 
inflation-targeting regimes after the 1997/98 financial crisis. Using both changes in 
domestic credit and interest rate differential to measure the stance of monetary policy, 
this study applies the VAR techniques to investigate the interaction among three 
variables: EMP, domestic credit growth and interest rate differential. Our results can be 
summarised in the following manner. First, as for the effect of monetary policy on EMP, 
shocks to domestic credit have either positive or negative effect on EMP, depending on 
the country under study. The positive response supports the view that contractionary 
monetary policy helps defend the exchange rate, while the negative response possibly 
implies the occurrence of monetary transmission. The reaction of EMP to interest rate 
differential shocks is also inconclusive for studied countries. The initial negative 
response can be found only in Singapore with an initial negative response, suggesting 
that a higher interest rate help reduce EMP. The initial positive response can be found in 
Thailand, providing the evidence that higher interest rate differential can signal greater 
currency depreciation and risk or both in this case.  
 
Second, as for the policy reaction, we find positive impacts of EMP on δ  for most 
countries with the exception of Singapore, indicating that monetary authorities of most 
countries sterilised the changes in foreign reserves, probably in order to preserve the 
liquidity of the economic system. We also find shocks to EMP in general affect φ  
positively for five sample countries. This is not surprising, since an increase in EMP is 
generally associated with an increase in either expected exchange depreciation, risk or 
both. This positive impact tends to reflect the fact that interest rates have both 
market-determined and policy-determined effects. Moreover, our study confirms the 
ambiguous nature of the link between the domestic credit growth and interest rate 
differential. The liquidity effect appears to prevail in Singapore while the Fisher effect 
appears to dominate in Indonesia, Korea and Philippines.  
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Overall, there is considerable cross-country variety in the IRFs patterns. The empirical 
findings of this study provide further evidence on the post-crisis EMP responses and 
policy reactions for five East Asia countries. The mixed findings generated from this 
study, however, are broadly consistent with existing literature with inconclusive results 
regarding the mutual reactions between EMP and domestic credit growth, and between 
EMP and interest rate differential. In general, our study suggests that measuring 
exchange market pressure should jointly consider the exchange rate movements and 
foreign reserves rather than only focusing on either of them. This is in particular 
appropriate for economies which are neither perfectly fixed nor freely floating.  
Figures: 
Figure 5.1 Model-independent Measure of EMP per Country  
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Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs):  
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E. 
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(Continued) Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs):  
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations± 2 S.E. 
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(Continued) Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs):  
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations± 2 S.E. 
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(Continued) Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs): 
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations± 2 S.E. 
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(Continued) Figure 5.2 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs):  
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations± 2 S.E. 
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Tables: 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of EMP Indices of Sample Countries 
  
 Indonesia Korea Singapore Thailand Philippines 
 Mean 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 Median 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.000 
 Maximum 0.062 0.069 0.311 0.064 0.055 
 Minimum -0.087 -0.043 -0.445 -0.031 -0.034 
 Std. Dev. 0.013 0.012 0.076 0.013 0.012 
 Skewness -1.018 1.975 -1.068 0.917 1.287 
 Kurtosis 19.721 17.310 13.264 7.435 8.561 
 Jarque-Bera 1560.539* 1212.033* 604.523* 126.661* 206.531* 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Observations 132 132 132 132 132
Note: *denotes the null hypothesis of a normally distributed EMP measure is rejected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5.2 Number and Proportion of Crisis Episodes ( Measure) KRLtiEMP,
(Sample period: 1995:01- 2005:12) 
 
Country  No. of 
Observations
No. of Crisis 
Episodes  
Incidence Date of Crisis Episodes
Indonesia 132 7 5.3% Aug 1997 Nov1997  
April 1998 July 1998 
Nov 1998 Dec1999 
 Feb 2001  
Korea 132 2 1.5% Aug 1997 Nov1997 
Philippines 132 5 3.8% May 1997 Oct 1997  
Aug 1998 May 2000  
Oct 2000 
Singapore 132 4 3 % Aug 1997 Dec 1997  
May 1998 Mar 2001  
Thailand 132 5 3.8% Feb 1997 May 1997  
Aug 1997 Nov 1997  
Sept 1999 
Note: Incidence = No. of Crisis Episodes/ No. of Observations *100%.  
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Table 5.3 Number and Proportion of Crisis Episodes ( Measure) ERWtiEMP,
 (Sample period: 1995:01- 2005:12) 
 
Country  No. of 
Observations 
No. of Crisis 
Episodes  
Incidence Date of Crisis Episodes 
Indonesia 132 5 3.8% Jan 1995 April 1995  
July 1995 Oct 1995 
Aug 2005 
Korea 132 4 3.0% Nov1997 Sept 1999 
Dec 2000 Sept 2001 
Philippines 132 7 5.3% Feb 1995 July 1997 
Oct 1997 Aug 1998  
Oct 2000 July 2002 
June 2003 
Singapore 132 9 6.8% Jan 1996 Aug 1997 
 Dec 1997 Jan 1998  
Jan 1999 Mar 2001  
Sept 2001 Sept 2002  
 July 2004 
Thailand 132 11 8.3% Jan 1995 Aug 1995 
Sept 1996 Jan 1998 
Sept 1999 Sept 2000 
Jan 2001 April 2001 
Sept 2001 Sept 2002 
Mar 2003 
Note: Incidence = No. of Crisis Episodes/ No. of Observations *100%.  
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Table 5.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests 
 
EMP δ  φ  Countries 
Levels First 
Differences 
Levels First 
Differences
Levels First 
Differences
Indonesia -12.350*** / -11.819*** / -3.578*** / 
Korea -12.346*** / -13.581*** / -2.054 -4.620*** 
Philippines -8.986*** / -10.270*** / -3.823*** / 
Singapore -11.249*** / -9.604*** / -10.023*** / 
Thailand -8.202*** / -9.208*** / -0.759 -6.170*** 
Notes: *** denotes rejection of the null of unit root for the ADF test (with trend and 
intercept) at the 1% significance level. The critical values are -3.511, -2.897, -2.586 at 
1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. The chosen of lag length is automatically based on 
SIC. 
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Table 5.5 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
(Sample period: 1999:01- 2005:12  Lags: 4) 
 
Indonesia 
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
  δ  does not Granger Cause EMP   0.10194  0.98146 
  EMP does not Granger Cause δ   2.79791* 0.06807 
  φ  does not Granger Cause EMP 
  0.49658  0.73826 
  EMP does not Granger Cause φ  
 2.13554*  0.08528 
  φ  does not Granger Cause δ  
  0.62309  0.64754 
  δ does not Granger Cause φ  
 3.48687**  0.01173 
Note: Level of significance indicated by asterisks, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. 
 
 
Korea  
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
 δ  does not Granger Cause EMP   1.03628  0.39467 
  EMP does not Granger Causeδ    3.77952**  0.02707 
  Δφ  does not Granger Cause EMP 
  1.86864  0.12543 
  EMP does not Granger Cause Δφ  
 0.24746  0.91029 
  Δφ  does not Granger Cause δ  
  0.94202  0.44484 
  δ  does not Granger Cause Δφ  
 1.14430  0.34285 
Notes: Level of significance indicated by asterisks, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. 
The interest differential is entered as a first difference Δφ .  
 
 
 192
 
(Continued) Table 5.5 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
(Sample period: 1999:01- 2005:12  Lags: 4) 
 
 
Philippines  
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
  δ  does not Granger Cause EMP   0.23042  0.92043 
  EMP does not Granger Cause δ   2.98455**  0.02454 
  φ  does not Granger Cause EMP 
  2.80763**  0.03184 
  EMP does not Granger Cause φ  
 1.06643  0.37960 
  φ  does not Granger Causeδ  
  1.28322  0.28477 
  δ  does not Granger Cause φ  
 0.16923  0.95339 
Note: Level of significance indicated by asterisks, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. 
 
 
Singapore  
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
 δ  does not Granger Cause EMP   1.74629  0.14942 
   EMP does not Granger Causeδ   0.49916  0.73639 
  φ  does not Granger Cause δ  
  0.71290  0.58584 
  δ  does not Granger Cause φ  
 1.64086  0.17352 
  φ  does not Granger Cause EMP 
  2.18339*  0.07954 
  EMP does not Granger Cause φ  
 0.62234  0.64807 
Note: Level of significance indicated by asterisks, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. 
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(Continued) Table 5.5 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 
(Sample period: 1999:01- 2005:12  Lags: 4) 
 
 
Thailand  
 
  Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Probability 
  EMP does not Granger Causeδ    1.86033  0.12694 
  δ  does not Granger Cause EMP  2.28251*  0.06883 
 Δφ  does not Granger Cause δ  
  0.91593  0.45956 
  δ  does not Granger Cause Δφ  
 1.00161  0.41258 
  Δφ  does not Granger Cause EMP 
  1.50439  0.21014 
  EMP does not Granger Cause Δφ  
 1.38904  0.24651 
Notes: Level of significance indicated by asterisks, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent. 
The interest differential is entered as a first difference Δφ . 
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Appendix 5.1 Data Description 
 
The variables  and , which compose EMP, are calculated as follows: te tr
 
te  is the change of nominal bilateral exchange rate of domestic currency against U.S. 
dollar. It is obtained from IFS line AE, logged values. 
 
tr  is the change in international reserves divided by lagged monetary base. 
International reserves were obtained from IFS line 11.D; and monetary base is from IFS 
line 14, respectively.  
 
φ  is the interest rate differential between domestic 3-month money market rate 
(obtained from IFS line 60B) and the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate (obtained from 
IFS line 60CS.ZF). 
 
tδ  is the change in the domestic credit provided by monetary authorities divided by 
lagged monetary base.  
 
For Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand, domestic credit is defined as the sum of 
central bank credit to the government and to the financial system (obtained from the 
sum of lines 12 A, 12E, and 12F from the IFS). For Korea and Singapore, domestic 
credit is defined as the difference between the monetary base and net foreign assets (IFS 
line 14 minus line 12 plus line 16). Monetary base was, again, line 14 from the IFS. 
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Chapter 6  
The Relationship between Stock Prices and Exchange 
Rates: Evidence from Hong Kong 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following the generalised floating of the major currencies in the early 1973, the 
importance of exchange rates in influencing domestic prices, including stock prices, has 
been heightened. The dramatic increases in world trade and capital movements have 
made the currency value one of the main determinants of business profitability and 
equity prices. Therefore, developments of increased integration in the financial markets 
and the recent emergence of new capital markets have received considerable attention of 
researchers and policymakers in studying the exchange rates-stock prices linkage. The 
research of this area has mainly focused on the determination of causality between stock 
prices and exchange rates in both developed and developing countries. The 1997/98 
financial crisis, in particular, leads to the turmoil in both currency and stock markets for 
a group of Asian countries. A particular feature of the East Asian crisis is the almost 
simultaneous decline in asset prices and currencies, as international investors moved 
their capital out of the respective domestic markets. This resulted in a subsequent 
depreciation of the exchange rate as the domestic currency was sold. The crisis has 
motivated several researchers to dwell on the relationship between stock market and 
exchange rate or currency market (e.g., Granger et al., 2000; Ramasamy and Yeung, 
2002, and among others). When investigating the possible relationship between stock 
markets and the exchange rate, the main concern is usually over the direction of 
causality between these two variables. However, there is no theoretical consensus on 
this relationship, specifically, on the direction or a particular sign of the relationship.  
 
The “flow oriented” models (the traditional approach) and “stock oriented” models (the 
portfolio approach) are two classical theories on the exchange rate determination. 
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Specifically, “flow oriented” models put forward that exchange rates lead stock prices 
with arbitrary correlation. This is because currency appreciation may affect product 
international competitiveness and trade balance position. The contraction of output can 
affect the firms’ profit and in turn affect the stock prices. In contrast, the proponents of 
the portfolio approach suggest that equity may affect exchange rate changes via demand 
for money because equity can be acted as part of wealth. Higher stock prices, for 
instance, may lead to a higher demand for money with ensuring higher interest rates. 
With relatively higher interest rates, foreign capital inflows will result in an appreciation 
of domestic currency. Therefore, stock prices lead exchange rates with negative 
correlation.  
 
As theoretical economists and empirical researchers are far from reaching any 
consensus related to the interactions between stock market and foreign exchange market, 
it is advisable to carry out further investigation on this kind of issue. Establishing the 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates has important policy implications 
and might affect both monetary and fiscal policy. For instance, a booming stock market 
usually has a positive effect on aggregate demand. Gavin (1989) suggests if such 
positive effect is large enough, expansionary monetary or contractionary fiscal policy 
that targets the interest rate, and the real exchange rate, will be neutralised. 
Policy-markers also advocate less expensive currency in order to boost the export sector. 
It would be of great interest for them to be aware of whether such a policy would 
depress the stock market or not. Exploring the link between the two markets may also 
be used for predicting the path of each other. If the stock prices and exchange rates are 
closely related, investors can then predict the behaviour of one market using the 
information from the other. The multinational corporations can also take advantage of 
such information in managing their exposure to foreign contracts and exchange rate risk 
and/or do the currency hedging. Moreover, knowledge of the relationship between stock 
prices and exchange rates can be helpful to predict a crisis. If there is a causality 
relationship, for instance, running from exchange rates to stock prices, then we may 
prevent the crisis in the stock markets by adjusting the exchange rates. Khalid and 
Kawai (2003) as well as Ito and Hashimoto (2004) among others, claim that the link 
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between the stock and currency markets help propagate the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/98. The depreciation of the Thai baht not only has triggered the depreciation of 
other regional currencies, but also has led to the collapse of the stock markets. 
Awareness of such a relationship between the two markets would help take effective 
preventive action before the spread of a crisis.  
 
To address the above issues, this chapter provides further evidence on the relationship 
between stock prices and exchange rates, in the case of Hong Kong, to realise what kind 
of causality prevailed over the period 1995-2001. Hong Kong is selected to be 
investigated in this study for three reasons: First, being the second largest stock market 
in Asian, exceeded only by Japan, Hong Kong plays a significant role as a major 
international financial center and is characterised by its high degree of 
internationalisation, free trade and flow, and financial information network. Second, 
Hong Kong adopts a unique exchange rate regime: with currency board arrangement 
(CBA), Hong Kong fixes its nominal exchange rate against the U.S. dollar at a specific 
level. Third, during the 1997/98 financial crisis, the Hong Kong dollar has remained 
remarkably stable under the anchor of the linked exchange rate, while many other 
currencies in the Asian region have all suffered sharp depreciation. Hence, we can infer 
that the case of Hong Kong differs from that of most crisis-affected Asian economies, 
which provides a particularly interesting opportunity to investigate the long-run and 
short-run causal relationship between stock prices and exchange rates.  
 
Compared to previous work, this study provides a full investigation on how far both 
stock and exchange rate markets can be interrelated by employing a set of empirical 
methodologies. We firstly address the stationarity of the data series by conducting a 
group of unit root tests to draw robust conclusion on the data properties. We not only 
employ the conventional unit roots tests as previous studies did, but also take the 
possibility of a structural break into account. This is because the conventional tests may 
not be reliable when the sample period includes some major events. Failure to consider 
these events could lead to erroneous conclusions. Then we employ both Engle-Granger 
two-step methods and the Johansen cointegration procedure to investigate the long-run 
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relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. The Granger noncausality tests in 
the setting of the vector autoregressive (VAR) (or vector error correction (VEC) model), 
together with the impulse response (IR) function are adopted to examine the short-run 
causal relationship between two variables. Moreover, this chapter further explores the 
relative importance of each variable in forecasting the other, by estimating and 
comparing the adjusted R square from a set of regressions using the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method. In addition, most of previous studies have been conducted under 
periods where the stock markets are operating under normal conditions. This study 
provides a full examination of the relationship between exchange rates and stock prices 
during normal and stressful conditions. It would be important and interesting to take 
into account the situation where asset markets are under stress. In fact, exchange rates 
are often the easy target for policy intervention during an economic crisis. Hence, it 
would be crucial to know how exchange rates affect other asset markets.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 briefly reviews the theoretical literature 
and highlights the main empirical findings in developed and emerging economies. 
Section 6.3 discusses the methodological issues in detail. Section 6.4 introduces the data 
used in this study and provides some preliminary statistics of data series. Section 6.5 
presents an interpretation of the empirical results. Finally, Section 6.6 offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
6.2 A Review of Literature  
 
6.2.1 Main Theories on the Stock Prices- Exchange Rates Linkage 
 
The economic theories suggest a relationship between stock market performance and 
exchange rate behaviour. The literature in general also provides some evidence of joint 
determination between both markets. Nevertheless, there is no theoretical consensus on 
the direction of causality relationship: does a stock price change cause an exchange rate 
change or does an exchange rate change lead a stock price change? In this section, we 
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mainly outline three major competing theories that attempt to interpret this causal 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates.  
 
Traditional Approach 
 
The traditional approach, represented as the “flow oriented” models, suggests that 
exchange rates should lead stock prices. This approach postulates that changes in the 
exchange rate or exchange rate fluctuations will affect the competitiveness of a firm, 
which in turn will influence the firm’s earnings and net worth and stock prices in 
general (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980). To be specific, the “flow oriented” models 
assume that the exchange rate is determined largely by a country’s current account or 
trade balance of performance. Stock prices, on the other hand, are usually defined as the 
present value of future cash flows of firms. According to these models, changes in 
exchange rates or currency movements affect international competitiveness and the 
balance of trade position, and consequently influence the real economic variables such 
as income and output of the country. Firms get involved in international trade activities 
and could be exposed to foreign exchange risk. Bodnar and Gentry (1993), in particular, 
suggests the exchange rate fluctuations can affect firm’s prices and assets denominated 
in foreign currencies.  
 
Other studies which refer to the exchange rate exposure models also get the similar 
conclusion. For example, Hekman (1985) proposes a present value based financial 
valuation model for multinational firms, in which the exchange rate is a leading 
indicator of the stock prices. By exploring the impact of exchange rate volatility on the 
market value of firms, Sercu and Vanhulle (1992) conclude that an increase in exchange 
rate volatility has a positive effect on the market value of firms. Furthermore, Granger et 
al. (2000) argue that a change in exchange rates would change the market value of all 
firms that trade internationally. Granger et al. (2000) further imply the impact of 
exchange rates on firm’s stock prices would depend on firm’s status in terms of net 
importers or exporters: the currency devaluation would have a beneficial effect on 
firms’ profitability and thereby their stock market values if firms are net exporters. 
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In short, the traditional approach proposes that changes in exchange rates can Granger 
cause changes in stock prices. Nevertheless, firm can be either an exporter or an 
importer, and the net effect of the aggregation or stock market values cannot be 
explicitly determined. The sign of the correlation between exchange rates and stock 
prices is thereby arbitrary to some extent. The depreciation of the domestic currency 
will make local firms who are exporters more competitive and in turn raise their stock 
prices. Under this circumstance, we may expect a positive causal relationship running 
from exchange rates to stock prices.  
 
Portfolio Approach 
 
Alternatively, the portfolio approach which is typically represented by “stock oriented” 
models, highlight the role of exchange rates to the demand for and the supply of 
domestic as well as foreign assets from the viewpoint of internationally diversified 
portfolios. According to this approach, individuals hold domestic and foreign assets 
including currencies in their portfolio. If we define exchange rate as the price of one 
unit of foreign currency in local currency terms, then a decrease in exchange rate imply 
currency appreciation. When domestic stock prices increase, individuals will demand 
more domestic assets and sell foreign assets, leading to an appreciation of local currency. 
Hence, a negative relationship between stock prices and exchange rates is deduced 
according to this approach. Moreover, a traditional money demand equation proposes 
that changes in domestic economic activities (proxied by stock returns) lead to changes 
in demand for real currency balances and, consequently to changes in exchange rates 
(Ajayi et al., 1998).  
 
The portfolio adjustments (inflows/outflows of foreign capital) can be deemed as 
another channel through which changes in stock prices influence the movements of 
exchange rates. An increase in stock prices would lead to an increase in the wealth of 
domestic investors. This will result in a rise in the demand for money and thereby a rise 
in interest rates. Therefore, inflows of foreign capital would rise, leading to a currency 
appreciation. Again, the financial asset price or stock prices movements affect exchange 
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rate dynamics with a negative correlation. Earlier studies based on the portfolio-balance 
models can be traced back to the work by Branson (1983), Frankel (1983) and Gavin 
(1989). These studies have indicated that rising (falling) stock prices influence capital 
flows from foreign investors who substitute local (foreign) currency for foreign (local) 
currency. Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) argue that changes in stock prices 
may affect exchange rates through firms’ portfolio adjustments. Yu (1995) also provides 
a similar argument that capital outflows affect exchange rates if changes in stock prices 
are sufficiently persistent to generate or destroy the confidence of stock market 
investors. As a whole, the portfolio approach states that stock prices Granger cause 
exchange rates with a negative relationship: a rise in stock prices will lead to an 
appreciation of domestic currency due to an increase in the demand for domestic 
currency. Similarly, a fall in stock prices will lead to a deprecation of the exchange rate 
due to an increase in the supply of foreign currency.  
 
Asset Approach 
 
In addition to the former two different explanations of interactions between stock prices 
and exchange rates, the asset market approach implies that there is a weak or no 
association between both variables23. The exchange rate under this scenario is viewed as 
the price of an asset or price of one unit of foreign currency. Like prices of other assets 
from which the expected future value can determine the current value, the current 
exchange rate can be affected by any news or factors that affect future values. As 
developments of stock prices and exchange rates may be driven by different factors, it 
may imply no link between the said variables. Muhammad and Rasheed (2002) also 
explain the case of having no such association as follows: The domestic currency 
depreciation would raise the price of those firms that export goods to other countries. 
However, when these firms import most of its inputs from abroad, domestic currency 
depreciation would lead an increase in the cost of production and a decline in firm’s 
profit. Then these firms become less competitive and their stock price may not rise.  
 
23 More details about basic asset market models are given in Frenkel (1976), Dornbusch (1976), and 
Frankel (1979). For a comprehensive review of asset market models, see, for instance, MacDonald and 
Taylor (1992). 
 203
Nevertheless, we could still expect an association between these two financial variables 
if there are some common factors (for example, interest rates) that affect both stock 
prices and exchange rates. In fact, the theoretical models mostly consider the economic 
fundamentals like money supply, interest rate, price level in the determination of 
exchange rate movements. This implicitly implies an important link between stock 
prices and exchange rates.  
 
6.2.2 Empirical Studies on the Relationship between Stock Prices and 
Exchange Rates 
 
The relationship between stock prices and exchange rates has been empirically 
examined by extensive studies involving both developed and developing countries. For 
instance, studies on developed countries or advanced markets can be found in 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992); Ajayi and Mougoue (1996); Nieh and Lee 
(2001). Studies on Central and Eastern European countries can be found in 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Domac (1997); Grambovas (2003). Studies on South Asian 
countries can be found in Smyth and Nandha (2003); Mishra (2004); Narayan and 
Smyth (2005); Venkateshwarlu and Tiwari (2005). Studies on countries in North and 
East Asia can be found in Yu (1995); Abdalla and Murinde (1997); Ajayi et al. (1998); 
Granger et al. (2000); Ibrahim (2000); Wu (2000); Hatemi-J and Roca (2005); 
Ramasamy and Yeung (2005). In Table 6.1, a brief description of selected empirical 
findings is given. Close examination of the studies reported in Table 6.1 reveals the 
existence of numerous mixed findings regarding the statistical relationship between 
stock prices and exchange rates. In general, there has been no theoretical or empirical 
consensus on the direction of causation if stock prices and exchange rates are related. 
The disparity of results might be attributed to the different countries analysed and 
subjected to the different degrees of the capital mobility, trade volume and economic 
links among them. As for the same country investigated across the empirical studies, the 
existence of contradictions and inconclusive findings might also result from different 
methodology, time periods, and variables used in each study. 
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Obviously, in nearly all empirical studies mentioned in Table 6.1, Granger causality test 
has been extensively used. Regarding the varied results, ranging from bi-causality to no 
causality, however, it is suggested to take great caution when interpreting Granger 
causality results. Ramasamy and Yeung (2005), for example, point out that causality 
studies need to consider shorter periods for analysis if the results are to contribute 
towards any policy adjustments. Employing the standard Granger causality 
methodology to a research setting similar to that of Granger et al. (2000), they find the 
direction of causality can vary according to the length of period chosen.  
 
This chapter attempts to contribute to the literature by providing further empirical 
evidence for the case of Hong Kong on the relationship between stock prices and 
exchange rates. As mentioned in Section 6.1, Hong Kong is a typical example which 
offers a particularly interesting opportunity to investigate the relationship between stock 
prices and exchange rates due to its high degree of internationalisation, free capital 
mobility and unique exchange rate arrangement.  
 
6.3 Methodology Issues 
 
In this section, the methodology issues that apply to carry out the empirical 
investigation are described in details.  
 
6.3.1 Unit Root Tests 
 
Since this chapter deals with the time series financial data, the issue of unit roots needs 
to be taken into account in the presence of non-stationary variables. Many studies have 
previously shown that majority of time series variables are non-stationary or integrated 
of order 1. Thus, a unit root test should precede any empirical estimation to avoid the 
problem of spurious regressions. As a first step, the unit root tests are implemented to 
investigate whether the time series of exchange rate and stock price are stationary or 
not.  
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) tests 
 
The commonly used methods to test for the presence of unit roots are Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979 and 1981) and Phillip-Perron (PP) 
test (Phillips and Perron, 1988) in the empirical literature. In both tests, the null 
hypothesis is that a unit root exists in the autoregressive representation of the time 
series.  
 
In general, an ADF (p) model can be written as follow (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981): 
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where = ,  is a macroeconomic variable such as exchange rate or stock 
price,  is a trend variable, 
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tε  is a white noise term. Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) are often used to determine the optimal 
lag length or p. The null hypothesis is 1:0 =φH  and  is said to possess the unit 
root property if one fails to reject ; whereas the rejection of the null indicates the time 
series is stationary. On the other hand, PP test is an alternative (nonparametric) method 
of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root. Moreover, Perron (1989) 
suggests that failure to allow for an existing break leads to a bias that reduces the ability 
to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. The PP test can overcome this problem by 
allowing for a known or exogenous structural break in the ADF tests.  
tx
0H
 
KPSS test 
 
However, the above tests have been criticised for having lower power and tend to accept 
the null hypothesis too frequently against a stationary alternative (Schwert, 1987; 
DeJong et al., 1992). Our study also utilises mean stationary test proposed by 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (hereafter, KPSS) to complement the ADF and PP tests. The 
KPSS test is based on the following statistics (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992): 
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where  is the residual term from a regression of on an intercept, and  is a 
consistent long-run estimate of , and T represents the sample size. If the computed 
value of 
tV ty
2
tσ
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)(uη  is larger than the critical value, then the null hypothesis of stationarity is 
rejected. 
 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) test 
 
A problem common with the conventional unit root tests —such as the ADF, PP tests, is 
that they do not allow for the possibility of a structural break. It is well established that 
standard tests for integration order have low power if the effect of structural breaks that 
have occurred during the period of study is not explicitly taken into account. For 
example, as suggested by Granger et al. (2000), the ADF test is unreliable when the 
sample period includes some major events (for example, great depression, oil shocks). 
Failure to consider it properly could lead to erroneous conclusions in the case when the 
null is not rejected. Assuming the time of the break as an exogenous phenomenon, 
Perron (1989) shows that the power to reject a unit root decreases when the stationary 
alternative is true and a structural break is ignored. Zivot and Andrews (1992) propose a 
variation of Perron’s original test in which they assume that the exact time of the 
break-point is unknown. Since the sample of this study includes the turbulent period, the 
exchange rate and stock index may contain structural breaks. We thereby could consider 
the case of a unit root test that allows for an endogenous break. Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) unit root test is based on the following model24: 
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24 There are three different models provided by Zivot and Andrew (1992). We adopt the unit-root model 
as shown in Equation (6.3) due to the existence of a trend in the time series. Similar results are obtained 
using the other two models proposed by Zivot and Andrew (1992). 
where 1)( =κtD  for Tt κ>  and zero otherwise; TTB /=κ  represents the location 
of the structural break. T  is sample size; and  is the date when the structural break 
occurred. Zivot and Andrews (1992) choose the breakpoint that gives the least favorable 
result for the null of a unit root, that is, 
BT
κ is chosen to minimize the t-statistic for the 
null of 1=φ . Thus, the null hypothesis of Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is a unit root 
process without any endogenous structural breaks, and the relevant alternative 
hypothesis is a trend-stationary process with possible structural change occurring at an 
unknown point in time.  
 
6.3.2 Cointegration Analysis 
 
In general, in order to avoid spurious inferences, stationarity is strictly required in 
regression analysis. Nevertheless, by differencing the variables some information 
regarding a possible linear combination between the levels of the variables may be lost. 
The use of cointegration technique overcomes the problem of nonstationarity and allows 
for an investigation of both the levels and differences of exchange rates and stock prices 
(Phylaktis and Ravazzolo, 2005). 
 
In this study, the long-run relationship between the stock prices and exchange rates can 
be examined by implementing the cointegration analysis to see whether the combination 
of the variables is cointegrated or not. To test the existence of cointegrating relationship 
between the said variables, two classical approaches are carried out: the Engle and 
Granger (1987) two-step method, and the Johansen cointegration procedure (Johansen, 
1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990).  
 
Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration test 
 
We firstly apply the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step method. In the first step the stock 
prices are regressed on the exchange rates. The reverse-order regression is also taken 
into account. As a second step we test the presence of cointegrating relationship 
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between the two variables by applying ADF test of unit roots on the residual obtained 
from the cointegrating equation.  
 
The Engle-Granger two-step method consists of two equations as follows: 
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where  is the logarithm of stock price index,  is the logarithm of exchange 
rate, 
tLS
t
tLEX
ε  is residual from cointegrating equation and tμ  is residual from the equation 
of ADF unit root test which is assumed to be white noise. If the residual series are 
stationary, then these two variables have cointegration relations among the related 
variable pairs. 
 
Johansen cointegration procedure 
 
We can also adopt the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration 
test to check the robustness of the results generated from the previous Engle-Granger 
two-step method. Applied the maximum likelihood procedure to determine the presence 
of cointegrating vectors in non-stationary time series, the Johansen’s cointegration test 
is conducted on the basis of the following vector autoregression (VAR) equation 
(Johansen, 1988):  
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where  is a vector of non-stationary (in log levels) variables and C is the constant 
term. The information on the coefficient matrix between the levels of the 
tZ
Π  is 
decomposed as βα ′=Π  where α  matrix contains the adjustment coefficients and 
the β  matrix contains the cointegrating vectors. 
 208
Especially, two kinds of statistics known as the trace statistic and the maximum 
eigenvalue statistic are used to make inferences about the number of cointegrating 
relations. The trace statistic for the null hypothesis of r  cointegrating relations against 
the alternative of  cointegrating relations is computed as follows (Johansen, 1988):   n
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where  T  is the number of observations and iλ)  is the i -th largest eigenvalue.  
 
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r  cointegrating relations 
against the alternative of 1+r  cointegrating relations. This test statistic is determined 
using the following formula (Johansen, 1988):  
 
)1log( 1max +−−= rT λλ )         1,2,...,2,1,0 −−= nnr                       (6.8) 
 
In order to make inferences regarding the number of cointegrating relationships, we can 
compute the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics and compare them with the 
corresponding critical values which are tabulated in Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  
 
6.3.3 Granger Causality Analysis 
 
To examine the issue of causation between stock prices and exchange rates, the standard 
Granger causality tests in a bivariate VAR model or Granger causality tests in a vector 
error correction (VEC) model can be employed, depending upon whether there is a 
long-run relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. 
 
Standard Granger causality test in a bivariate VAR model 
 
If there is no any cointegrating relationship between the considered variables, standard 
Granger causality tests would be applied. Thus, the following bivariate VAR model can 
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be employed to test for the linear causality: 
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where  and  represent stock prices and exchange rates, respectively. The 
disturbances  and  are assumed to be uncorrelated, and t denotes the time period. 
Granger causality test requires that all data series involved are stationary. Otherwise the 
inference from the F-statistics might be spurious because the test statistics will have 
nonstandard distributions. Accordingly, the first differences of all log-level series are 
employed and the first difference operator is marked by
tS tER
tv1 tv2
Δ .  
 
Equation (6.9) postulates that current S is related to past values of S as well as of past 
ER. Similarly, Equation (6.10) postulates that ER is related to past values of ER as well 
as of past S. We may expect four possible conclusions regarding the causality 
relationship between stock prices and exchange rates as follows: (i) unidirectional 
causality from S to ER; (ii) unidirectional causality from ER to S; (iii) bilateral causality, 
i.e., S and ER Granger cause each other and (iv) S and ER are independent to each other. 
Therefore, not to reject 0...: 222210 ==== pH ααα  implies that exchange rates do 
not Granger cause stock prices. Likewise, not to reject 0...: 112110 ==== pH βββ  
implies that stock prices do not Granger cause exchange rates.  
 
Granger causality test in the vector error correction (VEC) model  
 
If the variables are non-stationary and are cointegrated, the adequate method to examine 
the issue of causation is the Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which is equivalent 
to the VAR in first differences with the addition of a vector of cointegrating residuals. 
Thus, the VEC system is represented as follows:  
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where 11 −− − tt ERS γ  is the error correction term obtained from the cointegrating 
equation (6.4).  is the first difference operator. Δ 1δ  and 2δ  are the error coefficients 
which capture the adjustments of tSΔ  and tERΔ  towards long-run equilibrium. The 
coefficients on  and tSΔ tERΔ , that is, i1α , i2α , i1β , and i2β  are expected to 
capture the short-term dynamics of the model. Therefore, inferences regarding the 
causality between the said variables can be made as follows: ER causes S if either 1δ  
is statistically significant (the long-run causality) or the i2α ’s are jointly significant 
(short-term causality).  
 
Similarly, S causes ER if 2δ  is statistically significant (the long-run causality) or the 
i1β ’s are jointly significant (short-term causality). For 021 == δδ  which implies no 
long-run equilibrium relationship between S and ER, the above causality test in the 
framework of VEC model then reduces to the standard Granger causality test in the 
framework of VAR model as shown in Equations (6.9) and (6.10). In particular, Granger 
and Weiss (1983) suggest that even if the coefficients on lagged changes in stock prices 
are not jointly significant, the error correction approach allows for the finding that stock 
prices causes exchange rates due to the presence of the long-run causality. This is 
because the VEC model incorporates lagged residuals from the cointegrating regression 
and Granger causality thereby may emerge and equilibrium could be established via this 
additional channel. 
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6.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
Weekly (Friday) closing prices in the Hang Seng Stock Price Index and foreign 
exchange rate (units of Hong Kong dollar per U.S. dollar) are employed and obtained 
from Datastream. The whole sample runs from 2 January, 1995 to 31 December, 2001. 
This particular sample is chosen to include financial crisis events. The use of weekly 
data in this study is justified by the fact that higher frequency data such as daily or 
intraday data contains too much noise while the lower frequency data such as the 
monthly or quarterly data may not be adequate to fully capture the information of 
changes in stock prices and exchange rates. Hence, the use of weekly data can 
compensate the weakness of both high and low frequency data properties.  
 
In order to better understand the particular relationship between the said variables 
during the turbulent time, we define the period 7 July, 1997- 4 May, 1998 as the crisis 
sub-sample. We can therefore compare the results obtained from both whole and crisis 
periods. This helps us to examine possible changes in either intensity or direction of 
mutual relationships between said variables over different time periods. In particular, for 
the crisis period when volatilities in the stock and exchange rate markets are high, it 
would be appropriate to consider short-term movements instead of long-term ones. 
Ajayi et al. (1998, p. 243) argue that “attempts at revealing long-term causalities may 
prove to be futile because the implications of the causality study can hold practical 
implications for regulators who are interested in the proper functioning of financial 
markets, and for financial institutions, multinational corporations, or individual 
investors who are interested in internationally diversified portfolios and management of 
foreign exchange risks”. Therefore, it is more reasonable to interpret and analyse the 
interactions between stock prices and exchange rates in each sub-sample period. 
 
We transform all variables into natural logarithmic form and thus the first differences 
correspond to growth rates which are computed as follows: 
 
)ln()ln()/ln( 1,,1,,, −− −== tititititi PPPPR                                   (6.13) 
 
where  is the price level of market (tiP , i 1=i  for the stock market and  for the 
exchange rate market) at time t .  
2=i
 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 plot the data series of Hong Kong stock prices and exchange 
rates over the period 1995-2001, respectively. As shown in Figure 6.1, the Hong Kong 
stock market dropped suddenly during the crisis period but turned out to be booming 
after the crisis. On the other hand, while the nominal exchange rate of the Hong Kong 
dollar against the US dollar has remained around the 7.80 level (as shown in Figure 6.2), 
the market rate still deviates from the official rate. Nevertheless, the currency 
fluctuations, although small in magnitude, provide some justification for the conducting 
analysis, in the same vein as Granger et al. (2000) have done. Table 6.2 provides a 
summary of descriptive statistics for each series (logarithmic differenced changes). As 
for the average value of the series, the sample means for stock price series and exchange 
rate series are not statistically different from zero. As shown in Table 6.2, the measures 
for skewness and excess kurtosis show that both return series are positively skewed and 
leptokurtic with respect to the normal distribution. Each series generally appears to 
follow a non-normal distribution as the Jarque-Bera statistics reject the null hypothesis 
of a normal distribution at the 1 percent level of significance. The Ljung-Box statistics 
(up to 10 lags) calculated for the return series, indicate the presence of significant linear 
dependencies possibly due to some forms of market inefficiency or market structure.  
 
6.5 Interpretation of Empirical Results 
 
6.5.1 Tests for Stationarity 
 
We implement the ADF and PP tests with and without the trend as recommended by 
Engle and Granger (1987) and back up their results by the KPSS test again with and 
without the trend. The optimal number of lags is selected according to Schwartz 
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Information Criterion (SIC) and the bandwidth is based on Newey-West using the 
Bartlett kernel spectral estimation method. The results of the ADF and PP unit root tests 
and KPSS stationarity tests are reported in Table 6.3. The results indicate that each of 
the series in levels is generally non-stationary. Although exchange rate changes in levels 
are found to be stationary according to the ADF test with constant and trend, both PP 
and KPSS tests indicates the nonstationary properties of exchange rate changes in levels. 
These tests in general reveal that the data series are non-stationary and integrated to the 
first order. Furthermore, considering the possible structural breaks that the Hong Kong 
economy encountered during the whole sample, the unit root test with an endogenous 
break has also been carried out in this study. The results of Zviot and Andrews test are 
presented in Table 6.4. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for both two 
variables at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, that is, all data series follow 
a unit-root process without any endogenous structural breaks. This confirms the validity 
of results using the conventional unit root tests (ADF and PP tests) which do not allow 
for the possibility of a structural break. All of these tests for stationarity imply that it is 
adequate to use the first differenced data series for the regression analysis.  
 
6.5.2 Cointegration Tests 
 
In this section, both Engle-Granger two-step method and Johansen cointegration tests 
are carried out to examine whether any combinations of the said variables are 
cointegrated. Table 6.5 presents the results of Engle-Granger cointegration test. The 
upper part of this table lists the statistics when  (stock price) is regressed on  
(exchange rate) whereas the statistics of the reverse-order regression is reported in the 
lower part of this table. The results indicate that there is unit root in the residual series 
for both the whole and the crisis periods. This implies that the two series are not 
cointegrated for the periods under analysis.  
ty1 ty2
 
Using a 5 percent significance level, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 report the results of 
Johansen cointegration test for the whole sample period and the crisis period, 
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respectively. This approach uses a maximum likelihood procedure that tests for the 
number of cointegration relationships and estimates the parameters of those 
cointegration relationships. The lag length is selected according to SIC on the 
undifferenced VAR25. Again, the outcome shows that the null hypothesis of zero 
cointegration vectors cannot be rejected for both data sets sampled from the whole 
period and the crisis period, according to both trace statistics and maximum-eigenvalue 
statistics.  
 
In summary, the findings from both Engle-Granger two-step method and Johansen 
cointegration procedure suggest no evidence of cointegrating (long-run) relationship 
between exchange rates and stock prices for both the whole sample covering the period 
1995-2001, and for the crisis sample covering the period 1997-1998. This is not 
surprising as it could be explained by the particular exchange rate policy (currency 
board arrangement) adopted in Hong Kong. The nominal exchange rate of Hong Kong 
is officially pegged to U.S. dollar. The market rate is allowed to fluctuate only within a 
very tightly band. Thus, mutual relations between stock prices and exchange rates could 
not emerge completely in the long-run. This finding is similar to the previous study such 
as Granger et al. (2000) and Nieh and Lee (2001) which state that there is no long-run 
significant relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. Since stock prices and 
exchange rates are not cointegrated, the following Granger causality test is based on the 
bivariate VAR without error correction terms.  
 
6.5.3 Bivariate VAR and Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
 
As the above analysis indicates no cointegrating (long-run) relationship between stock 
prices and exchange rates, this section continues to seek for any possible short-run 
causal relationship between both two variables. We attempt to answer the following 
question: Do changes in exchange rates cause stock prices or do changes in stock prices 
cause exchange rates in short-run? The standard Granger causality tests, as outlined in 
Equations (6.9) and (6.10), are employed to examine such linear causality. Tables 6.8 
 
25 Reimers (1992) finds that the SIC does well in selecting the lag length. 
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and 6.9 report the F statistics and probability values constructed under the null 
hypothesis of non-causality for the whole sample period and the crisis period, 
respectively. Number of lags is chosen on the basis of SIC, whilst two lags are identified 
as an optimal lag length in the estimation26. The results for the whole sample period (as 
shown in Table 6.8) suggest that the null of Granger non-causality from exchange rates 
to stock prices can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. In contrast, the null 
of Granger non-causality from stock prices to exchange rates cannot be rejected at the 5 
percent level of significance. Hence, a one-way causality running from exchange rates 
to stock prices for the whole sample period is identified through the tests, in line with 
the traditional approach which states that changes in exchange rates can affect changes 
in stock prices. This finding could imply that the transmission of information between 
the two asset markets is inefficient. It provides the hedge opportunity for investors in 
this case. Given the significant causality relation from exchange rates to stock prices, 
stocks could be used as a hedge for foreign exchange investment.  
 
On the other hand, the results for the crisis sample period, as reported in Table 6.9, 
indicate that there is no causality evidence between stock prices and exchange rates. 
The values of the F-statistics suggest that no trace of short-run dynamics can be found 
in the crisis period: exchange rates do not affect the stock prices; stock prices do not 
cause the exchange rates, either. This finding implies the independent relationship of 
both considered variables over the crisis period. Thus, this may indicate that the foreign 
exchange and stock markets become more efficient or that they cease to be integrated 
during the crisis period. Similar to the finding by Ajayi et al. (1998) who show 
insignificant causality between these markets, it is not possible to hedge the currency 
and stock risks by investing in both markets over the crisis period. In this case, one 
market cannot also serve as a base for policy intervention for stabilising the other 
market. That is, the foreign exchange market cannot serve as venue for intervention for 
the purpose of stabilising the stock market and vice versa.  
 
 
26 In order to check for the robustness with respect to the different lags, Table 5 and 6 report the results 
with lags 1 to 4. 
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As suggested by Kasman (2003), the inadequate lag selection could result in the 
omission of important information and hence lead to the spurious rejection of causal 
relationship. Considering that the results derived from the Granger causality test might 
be sensitive to the selection of the lag length, other lag length (lag = 1, 3, 4) is also 
selected to re-examine the causal relationship of both variables. However, as presented 
in Table 6.8 and Table 6.9, the conclusion in general is irrelevant with the different lags 
used in the estimation. Note that the empirical findings in this area unveil the fact that 
the results are dependent on the time period of the study. This is has been confirmed by 
Ramasamy and Yeung (2005), who point out that the causality between stock prices and 
exchange rates may vary depending on the state of the business cycle and the 
uncertainties surrounding the different markets for the period under study. They also 
argue that the results of causality are switched according to the length of period chosen. 
In terms of this, our study thereby provides further evidence on the causality between 
the said variables using weekly data and specific sample period we have chosen.  
 
6.5.4 Impulse Response Analysis 
 
The previous Granger causality tests have shown that the changes in exchange rates lead 
those in stock prices in the full sample. However, such definitive pattern obtained by the 
Grange causality test does not provide signs of such relation. In order to get further 
insight into the short run dynamic relations over the full sample and the crisis sample, 
this section takes advantage of the impulse response (IR) functions in the framework of 
Bivariate VAR and calculates standard deviation for each forecasting period. The IR 
analysis can provide further evidence on the short-run relations that not addressed by 
the Granger causality test.  
 
As revealed in Table 6.10, the results from the IR (10 periods) analysis are in 
conformity with that of the Granger causality test. That is, if the Granger causality test 
indicates change in exchange rates leads that in stock prices, the responses of exchange 
rates from one-unit shock of stock prices are insignificant. Such is the case for Hong 
Kong as shown in upper part of Table 6.10 (Panel A). One-unit shocks from the 
exchange rates have very discernible negative response on the corresponding stock 
prices (as shown in Table 6.10, Panel B). As for the whole period, it takes Hong Kong 
stocks to respond negatively within the first two weeks. As for the crisis period, the 
significant positive response can be found in the first week after the one-unit shock in 
exchange rates. Thus the IR analysis confirms the validity of the traditional approach. 
According to the traditional approach, exchange rate leads stock prices, but the 
correlation can be positive or negative depending on whether the individual firm is an 
exporter (output) or an importer (raw material). 
 
6.5.5 Predictable Portion Analysis 
 
In this section, we check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous sections 
by analysing the predictable portion of stock prices and exchange rate changes. If 
changes in exchange rate lead the changes in stock prices, then we expect to use the 
variations in exchange rates to predict or forecast stock prices. Harvey (1995), in 
particular, employs adjusted R-square (commonly denoted as 
2
R ) to investigate the 
predictability of stock prices for both emerging and developed markets27. Following 
Harvey’s method, we examine whether past information on exchange rate variations 
may be useful in predicting stock price changes in Hong Kong. In general, R-squared 
( ) statistic measures the success of the regression in predicting the values of the 
dependent variable within the sample. This statistic will equal one if the regression fits 
perfectly, and zero if it fits no better than the sample mean of the dependent variable. 
However, one problem with using  as a measure of goodness-of-fit is that  will 
never decrease as adding more regressors. Adjusted R-square (
2R
2R 2R
2
R ), on the other hand, 
penalises the  for the addition of regressors which do not contribute to the 
explanatory power of the model. For this reason, adjusted R-square is generally 
considered to be a more accurate goodness-of-fit measure than R-square.   
2R
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27 See Granger et al. (2000) for the similar methodology in carrying out the predictable portion analysis.  
Table 6.11 presents a comparison of predictable portion of stock price changes. We 
compare the adjusted R-squares generated from the following two regressions: 1) the 
regression in which change of current stock price is the dependent variable and its 
lagged variables28 are independent variables (
2
1R ), and 2) the regression in which 
current stock price change is the dependent variable and lagged variables of exchange 
rate change and stock price change are independent variables (
2
2R ). The estimated 
method employed is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Similarly, in order to check the 
forecasting ability of stock price change on the exchange rate, Table 6.12 reports a 
comparison of predictable portion of exchange rate changes. Therefore, in Table 6.12, 
current exchange rate acts as the dependent variable, instead.  
 
The results in both of the two tables (Table 6.11 and Table 6.12) can help visualise the 
relative importance of each variable in forecasting the other. 
2
2R  Vs. 
2
1R  is the 
percentage increases in 
2
R  by comparing the two regressions, it is calculated as 
follows: 
 
2
2R  Vs. 
2
1R = 
2
1
2
1
2
2 R−  
 
/)( RR                                           (6.14)
he results in Table 6.11 show that exchange rates possess forecasting power for stock T
prices as we find 
2
2R  > 
2
1R  for both whole sample period and the crisis period. In 
particular, the crisis riod veals more prediction power than the whole sample period 
(34.64% vs. 5.72%). According to the results shown in Table 6.12 where exchange rate 
is estimated as the dependent variable, the past information on stock prices variations is 
found to be not useful in forecasting exchange rate changes for the whole sample period. 
This is because the percentage increase in the adjusted R-square for the whole sample 
period is negative (
 pe re
2
2R  vs.
2
1R = -3.61%). This finding confirms the findings from 
previous Granger-causality analysis which suggests that changes in stock prices changes 
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28 2 lags have been used in this study.  
do not lead changes in exchange rates. Note that stock prices possess some degree of 
prediction power for exchange rates in the crisis period (
2
2R  > 
2
1R  and 
2
2R  vs.
2
1R = 
28.21%). This may provide some possibility of contagion mpact or spillover ef ct 
from the stock market to currency market over the crisis period. 
 
 i fe
.6 Concluding Remarks 
he traditional approach and portfolio approach represent competing hypotheses 
irst, we find no evidence on the long-run relationship between the considered variables. 
6
 
T
concerning the relationship between stock prices and exchange rates. This chapter 
provides a further investigation on the interaction between these two variables from the 
evidence of Hong Kong, using weekly data for the period January 1995-December 2001. 
After performing thorough analysis and tests of long-run and short-run dynamics 
between stock prices and exchange rates in Hong Kong, we have the following 
concluding remarks:  
 
F
A possible explanation is the particular exchange rates policy is currency board 
arrangement adopted by Hong Kong. The nominal exchange rate is officially pegged to 
U.S. dollar. The market rate is allowed to fluctuate only within very tightly band. Thus, 
mutual relations between stock prices and exchange rates could not emerge completely 
in the long-run. Second, analysis of short-run mutual interactions suggests a one-way 
causality running from exchange rates to stock prices for the whole sample period, 
which is in line with the traditional approach. The IR results confirm the Granger 
causality tests and provide additional information regarding the short-term dynamics of 
the lead-lag relationship between both said variables. This finding could imply that the 
transmission of information between the two asset markets is inefficient over the full 
sample period. Thus, during this period, stocks could be used as a hedge for foreign 
exchange investment. Note that the independent relationship of both considered 
variables has been found over the crisis period. This may indicate that the foreign 
exchange and stock markets became more efficient during the crisis period, and one 
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 general, our study finds no evidence of a long-run equilibrium relationship but 
market cannot also serve as a base for policy intervention for stabilising the other 
market during this period. Third, the predictable portion analysis implies that exchange 
rates possess forecasting power for stock prices for both the full sample and the crisis 
sample. However, it is interesting to find out that stock prices have certain forecasting 
power for exchange rates in the crisis period. This might be due to the possible 
contagion or spillover effect from the stock market to exchange rate market over the 
turbulent period.  
 
In
indicates an only uni-directional, from exchange rate to stock prices, causal relationship 
between two considered variables in the short-run. A certain degree of “predictive 
ability” of these variables to each other has also been identified. Our findings are 
generally consistent with the previous studies such as Granger et al. (2000), Nieh and 
Lee (2001), and Hatemi-J and Roca (2005). Our study in general supports the traditional 
approach, suggesting that changes in exchange rates lead changes of stock price in 
Hong Kong. The empirical evidence of this study also supports the view of Morley and 
Pentecost (2000), who claim that stock price index and exchange rate levels show a 
common cycle which is fundamentally short-run in nature.  
Figures: 
 
Figure 6.1 Time Series of Hong Kong Stock Price Index (Hang Seng Index) over 
the Period 1995-2001 
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Figure 6.2 Time Series of Hong Kong Exchange Rate (Hong Kong $/US $) over the 
Period 1995-2001 
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Tables:    
Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/ Period (s) of 
study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Aggarwal (1981) United States 
1974-1978  
Investigates the relationship 
between U.S. stock market 
indexes and a trade-weighted 
value of the dollar 
Correlation analysis  Stock prices and exchange 
rates are positively correlated 
Soenen and Hennigar 
(1988) 
United States 
1980-1986 
Analyse  the relationship 
between exchange rates and 
stock prices:  from the US 
experience between 1980 and 
1986 
Correlation analysis  There is a significantly 
negative relationship between 
stock prices and exchange 
rates. 
 
Roll (1992) 24 countries 
1988-1991 
Examines the industrial and the 
comparative behaviour of 
international stock market 
indices 
Cross-countries 
regression model 
US dollar is positively related 
to stock market returns 
Abdalla and Murinde 
(1997) 
India, Korea, Pakistan 
and the Philippines 
1985-1994 
Establish the causal linkages 
between leading prices in the 
foreign exchange market and 
the stock market 
Granger causality tests Unidirectional causality from 
exchange rates to stock prices 
in all sample countries except 
the Philippines.  
 
 
 
 
(Continued) Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/Period(s) 
of study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Chow et al. (1997) United States 
1977-1989 
Examine exchange-rate 
risk exposure of U.S. 
stock and bonds 
VAR No relationship for stock returns and real 
exchange rate returns. However, when the 
regression was carried out with longer 
horizons, a positive relationship between a 
strong dollar and stock returns can be 
found.  
Ajayi et al. (1998) Seven advanced markets 
from 1985-1991 and eight 
Asian emerging markets 
from 1987 to 1991 
Examine the causal 
relationship between 
stock returns and changes 
in exchange rates 
Pairwise Granger 
causality tests 
Unidirectional causality between the stock 
and currency markets in all the advanced 
economies.       
No consistent causal relations are 
observed in the emerging economies 
Granger et al. (2000) Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and 
Taiwan 
1983-1997 
Determine the 
appropriate Granger 
relations between stock 
prices and exchange rates 
Granger causality 
test in the 
bivariate VAR 
model 
 
Data from South Korea were consistent 
with the traditional approach. Data for the 
Philippines were consistent with portfolio 
approach. Data form Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan 
indicated strong feedback relations.  
 
Indonesia and Japan: No causal 
relationship. 
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(Continued) Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/Period(s) 
of study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Ibrahim (2000) Malaysia 
1979-1996 
Explores  the 
interactions between 
stock prices and 
exchange rates 
Bivariate and 
multivariate 
cointegration and 
Granger causality tests 
No long-run or cointegrating relationship 
between said variables in the bivariate 
models. There was cointegration between 
measures of exchange rate and stock prices 
when money supply (M2) and reserves were 
included.  
Wu (2000) Singapore 
In the 1990s 
Explores the 
asymmetric effects of 
four different exchange 
rates on Singapore 
stock prices  
Error correction 
modeling 
Singapore currency appreciation against the 
US dollar and Malaysian ringgit and 
depreciation against Japanese yen and 
Indonesian rupiah lead to a long-run 
increase in stock prices in most of the 
selected periods in the 1990s. The influence 
of exchange rates on stock prices increased 
in a chronological order in the 1990s. 
Nieh and Lee 
(2001) 
 
 
 
Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Japan, UK and the 
US 
1993-1996 
Identify the dynamic 
relationship between 
stock prices and 
exchange rates  
Engle-Granger 
Johansen’s Cointegration 
tests  
Vector error correction 
model 
No significant long-run relationship between 
said variables, ambiguous and significant 
short-run relationships can be found for 
these countries. 
 
 
 (Continued) Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/Period(s) 
of study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Muhammad 
and Rasheed 
(2002) 
Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh, 
and Sri- Lanka 
1994-2000 
Examine the long-run and short-run 
associations between stock prices 
and exchange rates 
Cointegration,  Vector 
error correction 
modeling technique 
and Granger causality 
tests 
No short-run association between the 
said variables for all four countries.  
 
No long-run relationship between 
stock prices and exchange rates for 
Pakistan and India as well. However, 
for Bangladesh and Sri-Lanka there 
appear to be a bi-directional causality 
between said variables 
Broome and 
Morley (2003) 
Thailand,  
Malaysia,  
Korea,  
Indonesia  
and the Philippines 
1996-1999 
Assess the effectiveness of stock 
prices as a leading indicator of the 
East Asian currency crisis 
Granger causality tests 
in a currency crisis 
model 
Domestic stock price, Hong Kong 
stock price and particularly U.S. prices 
are significant leading indicators of the 
crisis.  
 
Causality tests suggest evidence of 
bi-causality between the stock markets 
and foreign exchange markets. 
Kim (2003) United States 
1974-1998 
Investigates the long-run 
relationships among stock price, 
industrial production, real exchange 
rate, interest rate and inflation 
Error-correction 
models 
Variance 
decomposition analysis 
S&P 500 index is positively related to 
the industrial production but 
negatively to the real exchange rate, 
interest rate and inflation. 
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 (Continued) Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/Period(s) 
of study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Stavárek 
(2005) 
EU and USA 
1969-2003 
Tests long-run and short-run 
dynamics between stock prices 
and exchange rates 
Granger causality test Neither the intensity nor direction of 
causal relations are the same in the 
developed economies and the new 
EU-member countries   
 
It is not possible to register any 
long-run or short-run relation between 
stock prices and exchange rates 
Mishra (2004) India 
1992-2002 
Examines whether stock market 
and foreign exchange markets are 
related to each other or not 
 
Granger’s Causality test 
and Vector Auto 
Regression technique 
No Granger’s causality between the 
exchange rate return and stock return 
Hatemi-J and 
Roca (2005) 
Malaysia, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines and 
Thailand   
Jan 1997-Dec 1997 
Identify the causal relationship 
between exchange rates and equity 
market prices 
Bootstrap causality tests 
with leveraged 
adjustments 
Exchange rates granger caused stock 
prices in Indonesia and Thailand prior 
to the crisis, while the reverse was true 
in Malaysia 
 
No significant link between the 
variables during the crisis 
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 (Continued) Table 6.1 Review of Selected Empirical Studies 
 
Author(s) Country(s)/Period(s) 
of study 
Hypothesis Tested Methodology Results 
Phylaktis and 
Ravazzolo 
(2005) 
Pacific Basin 
countries  
1980-1998 
Establish the long-run and 
short-run dynamics between 
stock prices and exchange 
rates 
Cointegration and multivariate 
Granger causality tests 
Stock and foreign exchange markets 
are positively related and that the US 
stock market acts as a conduit for these 
links 
Yau and Nieh 
(2006) 
Taiwan and Japan 
1991-2005 
Explore the short-term and 
long-term interrelationships 
among the stock prices of 
Taiwan and Japan and the 
NTD/Yen exchange rate 
Cointegration test and Granger 
causality test 
The portfolio approach is supported 
for the short-term and the traditional 
approach is more plausible for the 
long-term in the Taiwanese financial 
market, whereas the portfolio approach 
is not suitable for the Japanese stock 
market. There is no long-term relation 
between NTD/Yen exchange rate and 
the stock prices of Taiwan and Japan. 
Tabak (2006) Brazil  
1994-2002 
Examines the dynamic 
relationship between stock 
prices and exchange rates 
Unit root and cointegration 
tests that allow endogeneous 
breaks, linear and nonlinear 
causality tests 
No long-run relationship but linear 
Granger causality from stock prices to 
exchange rates, in line with the 
portfolio approach 
 
Nonlinear Granger causality from 
exchange rates to stock prices, in line 
with the traditional approach 
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Weekly Changes of Stock Price Index and 
Exchange Rate  
 
Descriptive Statistics Stock price index 
Exchange rate  
(Hong Kong dollar/US dollar) 
 Mean 0.006  2.10E-05 
 Median  0.006  0.000 
 Maximum 0.920 0.002 
 Minimum  -1.019  -0.001 
 Std. Dev.  0.097 0.000 
 Skewness  0.367  0.142 
 Kurtosis  65.367 13.658 
 Jarque-Bera 59164.5***  1728.9*** 
 Probability  0.000  0.000 
LB (10) 19.43*** 103.04*** 
Note: *** indicates rejection of null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. 
 
 
Table 6.3 Results of Unit Root Tests without Structural Break  
 
 
Panel A. Unit root tests at Level 
ADF PP KPSS Variables 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
EX 0.001 -3.301** -0.067 -2.287 2.086***  0.467*** 
SR -1.354 -1.447 -1.389 -1.664 2.138*** 0.189** 
 
 
Panel B. Unit root tests at First difference 
ADF PP KPSS Variables 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
Constant  Constant 
and Trend 
EX -24.652*** -24.728*** -24.656*** -24.889***  0.209 0.100 
SR -10.357*** -10.387*** -29.813*** -29.869*** 0.138 0.101 
 
Notes: EX denotes the exchange rate while SR denotes the stock returns. ***, **, and * 
indicate rejection of null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For 
ADF test, the lag length is based on SIC. For PP and KPSS tests, the bandwidth is 
determined by Newey-West using Bartlett kernel.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Results of Unit Roots with Endogenous Break 
 
 
Variables t Statistic Structural break date 
SR -4.43 Aug 24th, 1998 
EX -4.68 Jan 3rd,  2000 
Notes: EX denotes the exchange rate while SR denotes the stock returns. Critical values 
for Zivot and Andrews test are -5.57 and -5.08 at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels of 
significance, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Results of Engle-Granger Cointegration Tests 
 
ADF Statistics  
y1t  is regressed on y2t  Constant Constant and Trend  
Whole period  -2.802  (-2.869) -2.421 (-3.422) 
Crisis period  -1.622  (-2.931) -2.134 (-3.518) 
ADF Statistics  
y2t is regressed on y1t  Constant Constant and Trend  
Whole period  -2.266 (-2.869) -2.777 (-3.422) 
Crisis period  -2.116 (-2.931) -2.425 (-3.518) 
Notes: y1t denotes the stock price while y2t denotes the exchange rate. The value in 
parentheses shows the 5 % critical value due to MacKinnon critical value. 
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Table 6.6 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test in the Whole Sample Period  
 
Panel A. Trace test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Trace 
statistic  
0.05 Critical 
value  
Prob.** 
None  0.026  10.697  15.495  0.231 
At most 1   0.003  1.206  3.841  0.272 
Notes:  
1. Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
2. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
 
Panel B. Maximum Eigenvalue test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
statistic  
0.05 Critical 
value  
Prob.** 
None  0.026  9.490  14.265  0.248 
At most 1   0.003  1.206  3.841  0.272 
Notes:  
1. Maximum-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
2. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
Table 6.7 Results of Johansen Cointegration Test in the Crisis Period  
 
Panel A. Trace test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Trace 
statistic  
0.05 Critical 
value  
Prob.** 
None  0.217  14.035  15.495  0.082 
At most 1   0.071  3.256  3.841  0.071 
Notes: 
1. Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
2. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
 
Panel B. Maximum Eigenvalue test 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) 
Eigenvalue  Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
statistic  
0.05 Critical 
value  
Prob.** 
None  0.217  10.779  14.265  0.166 
At most 1   0.071  3.256  3.841  0.071 
Notes:  
1. Maximum-eigenvalue test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level. 
2. **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values. 
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Table 6.8 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests between Stock Price 
 and Exchange Rate (Whole Sample Period) 
 
Null hypothesis: F-Statistic   Probability Lags 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  3.74  0.05 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  2.77  0.09 
1 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  3.89  0.02 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  0.96  0.38 
2 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  3.18  0.02 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  0.91  0.44 
3 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  2.73  0.02 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  0.57  0.68 
4 
Notes: E denotes the exchange rate while S denotes the stock returns. The results in bold 
indicate the optimal lag length (2 lags) selected by SIC.  
 
 
Table 6.9 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests between Stock Price  
and Exchange Rate (Crisis Period) 
 
Null hypothesis: F-Statistic   Probability Lags 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  1.14  0.29 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  1.97  0.17 
1 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  0.59  0.55 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  1.12  0.34 
2 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  0.41  0.75 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  1.37  0.27 
3 
E does not Granger 
Cause S  0.40  0.81 
S does not Granger 
Cause E  0.99  0.42 
4 
Notes: E denotes the exchange rate while S denotes the stock returns. The results in bold 
indicate the optimal lag length (2 lags) selected by SIC.  
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Table 6.10 Estimation Results of Impulse Response Function 
 
Panel A: response of exchange rates from one-unit shock in stock price changes 
Period (weeks) Full sample  Crisis sample 
1 0.0000 0.0001 
2 0.0000 0.0001 
3 0.0000 0.0001 
4 0.0000 0.0000 
5 0.0000 0.0000 
6 0.0000 0.0000 
7 0.0000 0.0000 
8 0.0000 0.0000 
9 0.0000 0.0000 
10 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Panel B: response of stock prices from one-unit shock in exchange rate changes 
Period (weeks)  Full sample  Crisis sample  
1 -0.0123*** 0.0192* 
2 -0.0166*** -0.0180 
3 0.0007 0.0059 
4 0.0006 -0.0035 
5 -0.0038 0.0014 
6 0.0018 -0.0006 
7 -0.0010 0.0002 
8 -0.0001 -0.0001 
9 0.0003 0.0000 
10 -0.0003 0.0000 
Notes: ***=1% significance level; **=5% significance level; *=10% significance level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.11 Comparison of Predictable Portion of Stock Price Changes with and 
without Exchange Rate Variable 
 
Adjust R-Squares Whole Sample Period  Crisis Period  
2
1R  
0.2169 0.0384 
2
2R  
0.2293 0.0517 
2
2R  vs. 
2
1R  
5.72% 34.64% 
Notes:  
1. The estimated equations are: 
ttttt vSSCS 121 +Δ+Δ+=Δ −−
tttt ESSCS 21
 (a)  Vs. 
ttt vE 221 +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ −− −− (b) 
2
1R  is obtained from the regression (a) while 
2
2R  is obtained from the regression (b) 
2. Estimated method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
 
Table 6.12 Comparison of Predictable Portion of Exchange Rate Changes with and 
without Stock Price Variable  
 
Adjust R-Squares Whole Sample Period  Crisis Period  
2
1R  
0.0083 0.0195 
2
2R  
0.0080 0.0250 
2
2R  vs. 
2
1R  
-3.61% 28.21% 
Notes:  
1. The Estimated Equations are: 
ttttt vEECE 121 +Δ+Δ+=Δ −−  (c) Vs.  
ttttttt vSSEECE 22121 +Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ −−−−  (d) 
2
1R  is obtained from the regression (c) while 
2
2R  is obtained from the regression (d) 
2. Estimated Method: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
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Chapter 7  
General Conclusions and Future Work 
 
7.1 Contributions  
 
This thesis provides a better understanding of the exchange rate regime and exchange 
rate performance in East Asia over the last few years. It conducts a comprehensive and 
thorough study from different angles and aspects regarding the exchange rate regime, 
exchange rate behaviour and related monetary policy in East Asia. Contributing to the 
existing literature and current debates, this thesis enriches the current literature from the 
following three perspectives: 
 
First, considerable interests and fresh theoretical arguments have been embedded within 
this thesis in the following aspects: i) we have clarified the nature and characteristics of 
exchange rate regime before and after the 1997/98 financial crisis; ii) we have 
investigated the progress of regional exchange rate coordination; iii) we have explored 
the effect of regime choice on the independence of monetary policy; iv) we have 
examined the possible exchange rate volatility transmission from a designated economy 
to the other regional markets in both crisis and tranquil periods; v) we have attempted to 
measure foreign exchange market pressure and countries susceptibility to currency 
crisis; vi) we have assessed the reaction of monetary policy to exchange market pressure 
under more flexible exchange rate and inflation-targeting regime in the post-crisis 
period; and vii) we have analysed the short-run and long-run relationships between 
stock prices and exchange rates in the case of Hong Kong market where a free flow of 
trade and capital and currency board arrangement have been prevailed.  
 
The second contribution concerns the new patterns of the exchange rate regime and 
performance, which differ from those in the 1980s and 1990s. These patterns have been 
identified by a more recent sample period concerned in this thesis. The whole sample 
period involved in this study spans from 1990 to recent years (up to 2005), which fully 
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captures the transition of exchange rate regimes in the context of 1997/98 financial 
crisis as well as the most recent trend and developments of exchange rate markets in 
East Asia. Also, the choice of the sample period depends on the availability of data and 
on the possibility of contrasting alternative exchange rate regimes. Hence, the 
performance of exchange rate regime and exchange rate behaviour in the pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods can be comprehensively compared and assessed, and our findings on 
recent trend of exchange rate behaviour and management, in particular, provide 
comparisons to the existing related studies.  
 
Third, guided by established theories, various forms of evidence and empirical 
techniques have been extensively applied and fully evaluated in this research, including 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Generalised Method of Movements (GMM), 
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH), Exponential 
GARCH (EGARCH), Vector Autoregressions (VAR) and their Impulse Response 
Functions (IRF), Unit Root Tests, Cointegration, and Granger Causality Tests. Our 
study using the above listed techniques comprehensively covers the different angles 
viewing the economic phenomenon before, during, and after the 1997/98 East Asian 
financial crises. Hence, the analysis provided in this thesis can assist us to have a 
complete understanding in what could be learned from the crisis, and how to evaluate 
the exchange rate policies, behaviours, and performances. Although this thesis is 
dedicated to an analysis of East Asian countries, the methodologies covered in this 
research could be easily extended to other emerging countries. The main findings and 
key ideas drawn from this research have important policy implications detailed in the 
next section. 
 
7.2 Main Findings, Key Ideas and Policy Implications  
 
This section gives a brief summary of the main findings, key ideas, and the important 
policy implications drawn from this research. 
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Chapter 2 investigates the performance and characteristics of exchange rate regimes in 
East Asia, before and after the 1997/98 financial crisis from three perspectives: First, it 
answers the question that how much influence the international anchor currencies, such 
as U.S. dollar, Japanese yen and Euro/Deutsche mark, had on the local East Asian 
currencies before and after the crisis. Our findings confirm the important role played by 
exchange rate regime in influencing the movement of exchange rate. The dominant role 
of the U.S. dollar played in emerging East Asian currencies until the 1997/98 currency 
crisis, has been confirmed. However, the increased weights of Japanese yen and Euro 
have been identified in some East Asian currencies after the crisis. Second, Chapter 2 
answers the question that whether the flexibility of exchange rate regime increased after 
the crisis, compared to the pre-crisis period. Our findings imply that the flexibility of 
exchange rate regime has indeed increased in most East Asian countries/regions which 
officially adopted the floating regime in the post-crisis period. This is consistent with 
the existing literature, while our study involves markedly more recent data for analysis. 
Third, Chapter 2 addresses the question: has the regional coordination of exchange rate 
management strengthened after the crisis? Our results show little evidence on the 
strengthened regional coordination of the exchange rate management in the post-crisis 
period.  
 
In general, our study suggests that exchange rate policy plays an important role in 
influencing the movements of exchange rates. Despite more flexibility can be observed 
after experiencing transitional regime, the managed floating regimes rather than the free 
floating ones have been dominated for many emerging East Asian economies. These 
economies recently move within a given band with their centre targeted at a basket of 
currencies, including the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen and the Euro, given the 
diversified trade and foreign direct investment relationships with the Unite States, Japan 
and the European Union. Our study further supports the argument of less possibility of 
an optimal currency area (OCA) for East Asian region. This is in line with previous 
studies, which assess the criteria of OCA, while our study measures the regional 
coordination of exchange rate management. The financial crisis promoted economists 
and policy makers to realise the importance of regional financial cooperation in East 
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Asia. There is a growing perception that stronger and more effective regional financial 
coordination could help prevent and manage the crises. Since the emerging East Asian 
economies heavily depend on trade and investment, exchange rate stability, in particular, 
is desirable for the promotion of trade and investment and economic development. The 
intra-regional exchange rate stability could also beneficial for East Asian economies that 
have increasingly integrated with one another. Nevertheless, little progress has been 
made in the area of exchange rate coordination or stabilisation after the crisis and 
regional financial cooperation in East Asian is still in its infancy. One of the reasons for 
the lack of progress might be due to the fact that there is no international rule or best 
practice with regard to exchange rate regimes. The prevailing “two-corner solution” 
view highlights exclusively on the crisis prevention. However, countries can 
appropriately pursue objectives such as growth, trade, investment promotion through 
exchange rate policy. Therefore, given the desirability of stable exchange rates in East 
Asia, a framework for exchange rate and monetary policy coordination will have to be 
developed. East Asian countries should make strong efforts to promote regional 
monetary and financial cooperation. The firm political commitment to exchange rate 
decisions, at the same time, would be crucial to ensuring the form of a regional 
monetary and exchange rate arrangement.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the implications of exchange rate regimes on the independence of 
monetary policy. From the perspective of monetary independence, this chapter conducts 
an assessment of the competing claims on the relative merits of alternative exchange 
rate arrangements. First, this chapter answers the question that whether the adoption of 
new exchange regime in the post-crisis period affected monetary autonomy. It also 
addresses the question that how the local interest rates reacted to international interest 
rates (U.S. interest rates) in the pre- and post-crisis periods. Our findings show that the 
sensitivity of local interest rates to U.S. interest rates has declined in many East Asian 
countries, which adopted floating exchange rate regimes in the post-crisis period. In 
addition, a higher long-run adjustment was observed under a pegged regime, while 
lower interest rates adjustment was witnessed under a floating regime. Therefore, these 
findings confirm that countries with more floating exchange rate regimes have a higher 
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degree of independence in monetary policy than those with an intermediate regime, and 
far more than those with a pegged regime. Our work also highlights that the choice of 
the exchange rate regime is a critical factor of the autonomy of monetary policy: the 
floating exchange rate regime offers East Asian countries a relatively high degree of 
monetary independence, compared to the intermediate and pegged regimes.  
 
Our findings confirm the effectiveness of the traditional doctrine of impossible trinity or 
trilemma. With the development of globalisation, broad-ranging capital controls will 
gradually disappear and East Asian countries will eventually continue to move towards 
full financial integration. This will leave East Asian with two options: that is, either to 
achieve both exchange rate stability and financial integration sacrificing monetary 
independence or aim for monetary independence and financial integration. Therefore, 
the choice of the exchange rate regime in the process of capital account liberalisation 
can be framed in terms of trade-off between credibility and flexibility, as well as the 
trade-off between monetary independence and exchange rate stability. 
 
Chapter 4 examines exchange rate volatility and its contagion/spillover effect from the 
evidence of East Asia. It tackles the following question: did volatility of one exchange 
rate market transmit to others in some way? If so, to what extent this volatility 
contagion/spillover effect worked during the crisis or tranquil period? Our findings 
imply that the volatility shocks are persistent in the foreign exchange markets under the 
time period involved in this study. It is also in general consistent with earlier research in 
the area of financial market contagion. The empirical finding confirms the evidence of 
volatility contagion from Korea won to other regional currencies during the financial 
collapse. Hong Kong dollar also generates volatility spillover effect to other regional 
currencies over the tranquil period. The results imply a certain degree of 
interdependence among East Asian exchange rate markets, which may signal tight trade 
and financial linkages and macroeconomic similarities in East Asian economies.  
 
A thorough understanding of the dynamic properties of cross-market volatility 
transmission is crucial for evaluating the level of integration between markets. From a 
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broader perspective, closer integration with Korea and Hong Kong would represent 
closer co-movements of economic fundamentals and may facilitate the transmission of 
shocks between Korea or Hong Kong and other economies in the region. Our study of 
volatility contagion/spillovers provides useful insights into how information is 
transmitted from Korea or Hong Kong foreign exchange market to other Asian 
exchange markets. These findings are helpful for policy makers to design appropriate 
polices in case an adverse shock is observed in Korea and Hong Kong foreign exchange 
markets where contagion/spillover effect is empirically evident. 
 
Chapter 5 studies the exchange rate and monetary policy of five East Asian countries 
from the perspective of exchange market pressure (EMP). First, it addresses the 
question that how to measure the tensions (pressure) on the foreign exchange market, 
and how to estimate countries susceptibility to crisis in East Asia. By constructing a 
model-independent measurement of EMP index, our study not only confirms the severe 
currency depreciation during the crisis period, but also fully captures the crisis 
incidence episodes as well as the dates of the speculative attack on currencies. 
Nevertheless, the sensitivity analysis on the basis of another EMP index reveals that the 
number and incidences of crises episodes are sensitive to the arbitrary choice of EMP 
construction. Second, this chapter addresses the following questions: What is the 
relationship between EMP and monetary policy, especially for the post-crisis East Asia? 
How did monetary policy affect EMP? What was the reaction of monetary policy to 
EMP? Our study yields several findings: As for the effect of monetary policy on EMP, 
shocks to domestic credit have either positive or negative effect on EMP, depending on 
the country under study. The positive response supports evidence by Goldfajn and 
Gupta (1999) that contractionary monetary policy helps support the exchange rate, 
while the negative response possibly implies the occurrence of monetary transmission. 
The response of EMP to the monetary policy shocks also varies across different sample 
countries. As a policy reaction function, in most cases, EMP shocks affect domestic 
credit growth positively. This implies that the authorities of the sample countries 
respond, in general, to increase in EMP by providing additional liquidity to the banking 
system rather than contracting the money supply. We also find shocks to EMP in 
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general affect interest rate differential positively for these countries. This positive 
impact reflects the fact that interest rates have both market-determined and 
policy-determined effects. Moreover, our study confirms the ambiguous nature of the 
link between the domestic credit growth and interest rate differential. The innovations to 
domestic credit affect the interest rate differential through either standard liquidity or 
Fisher channels.  
 
The mixed findings generated from this study, however, are broadly consistent with 
existing literature with inconclusive results regarding the mutual reactions between 
EMP and monetary policy. Our study in general reveals that measuring exchange 
market pressure should jointly consider the exchange rate movements and reserves 
rather than only focusing on either of them. This is in particular appropriate for 
economies which are neither perfectly fixed nor freely floating.  
 
Chapter 6 provides a particularly interesting investigation in the relationship between 
stock prices and exchange rates from the representative case of Hong Kong during 
1995-2001. It not only explores the dynamic long-run and short-run relationships 
between stock prices and exchange rates, but also examines the direction of causality 
between these two variables. In general, the empirical findings show no evidence of a 
long-run equilibrium relationship between these two financial variables in Hong Kong. 
Instead, a uni-directional, from exchange rate to stock prices, causal relationship 
between the two considered variables has been identified in short-run. This finding 
could imply that the transmission of information between the two asset markets is 
inefficient over the full sample period. Hence, stocks could be used as a hedge for 
foreign exchange investment during this period. Note that the independent relationship 
of both considered variables has been found over the crisis period. This may indicate 
that the foreign exchange and stock markets become more efficient during the crisis 
period, and one market cannot also serve as a base for policy intervention for stabilising 
the other market during this period. Moreover, a certain degree of “predictive ability” of 
these variables to each other has also been found. The empirical evidence in general 
supports the traditional approach, suggesting that exchange rates can granger cause or 
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lead stock price changes. Our findings establish the links between exchange rates and 
stock prices in Hong Kong and have important implications for investors and 
multinational corporations to make investment decisions. Especially, the policy makers 
can relay on this information to predict the behaviour of market and take effective 
preventive actions before the spread of a crisis.  
 
Summing up this thesis, the subtopics addressed in this research fully evaluate the 
exchange rate regime and exchange rate performance in East Asia. The behaviours of 
Asian currencies, especially their recent trends, have been embedded in this research. 
Findings of this research generate important implications for the East Asian exchange 
rate management and policy. 
 
7.3 Future Work  
 
A number of issues that we do not consider in this thesis are worth being pursued for 
further research. This section discusses several directions of future work related to each 
chapter of thesis: 
 
Chapter 2 provides an empirical investigation on the exchange rate arrangements on the 
basis of the observed exchange rate before and after the 1997/98 financial crisis. The 
regional coordination in the post-crisis exchange rate management has been 
preliminarily discussed as an aspect of assessing the possibility of an optimal currency 
area in East Asia. Nevertheless, the feasibility of optimal currency area deserves further 
comprehensive research. Exploring the factors such as intra-regional trading pattern, 
factor mobility as well as the monetary transmission mechanism would be interesting 
for the future study in this field.  
 
The analysis in Chapter 3 implies a significant role for the exchange rate regime in 
determining the importance of base interest rate to the local interest rate. In fact, there 
are other factors might affect the estimation of the sensitivity of the local interest rate to 
 243
foreign interest rate. For example, the level of industrialisation seems to have a 
considerable impact on the correlation between local and base rates; the worldwide or 
regional shocks could also cause a certain correlation between these two interest rates. 
In addition, there is one factor that may affect the relationship between U.S. and 
domestic interest rates: volatility in international financial markets or the international 
risk premium. Since this research aims to highlight the implications of exchange rate 
regime choice, the basic model described in Chapter 3 is adequate for the purpose of 
testing the impact of exchange rate regime on the independence of monetary policy. 
Although a formal testing on other factors that may influence the correlation between 
local and base interest rates is beyond the scope of this work, in future research, 
incorporating a wider range of control variables in the current model might provide an 
interesting point of comparison to the present study.   
 
The study in Chapter 4 focuses on the exchange rate volatility contagion/spillover effect 
from Hong Kong and Korea to other East Asian economies. It would be interesting to 
extend the current model to a multivariate GARCH framework. Another possible 
extension of this study is to replicate the same methodology for stock market and 
examine the inter-market linkages. These extensions require a more complicated 
methodological approach and will be a possible future extension of this Chapter.  
 
The empirical findings of Chapter 5 provide evidence on the diversity of the interactions 
between monetary policy and EMP of the five studied countries after 1997-1998 crises. 
Areas for future research may include an alternative measure to EMP and a more 
detailed model of the possible channels of monetary policy to examine the effectiveness 
of the traditional theory. For instance, we may incorporate the output growth variable to 
the current model. The underlying idea is that the literature about monetary transmission 
suggests some indirect effects and possible interactions between variables when the 
output growth is taken into account.  
 
Chapter 6 deals with the statistical relations based on the Granger causality and impulse 
response (IR) analysis. Granger et al. (2000) point out the difficulty in interpretation of 
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some underlying fundamental economic relation based on the Granger causality. They 
further suggest that the results are likely to be generated from other structure relations 
such as through interest rate parity condition or IS-LM related polices. For instance, the 
recessionary signals or unfavourable shocks may lead a decrease in stock prices or a 
deprecation of exchange rates. In such circumstance, the causal relation between the 
stock prices and exchange rates will be generated from the relative efficiency of the 
stock market and foreign exchange market, and the Granger causality and IR 
approaches may not play an influencing role in generating the relation. Considering 
these, this research might be further improved by taking into account other factors or 
variables for which exchange rates and stock prices can be conintegrated in order to 
re-examine the causal relationship of both variables.  
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